Federalizing Privilege by Glynn, Timothy P.
American University Law Review
Volume 52 | Issue 1 Article 7
2002
Federalizing Privilege
Timothy P. Glynn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glynn, Timothy P. "Federalizing Privilege." American University Law Review 52, no.1 (2002): 59-171.
Federalizing Privilege
This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol52/iss1/7
GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002 1:29 PM 
 
59 
FEDERALIZING PRIVILEGE 
TIMOTHY P. GLYNN∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction.......................................................................................... 60 
 I. The Need for Reasonable Certainty .......................................... 65 
 A. The Privilege’s History, Elements, and Purposes............... 65 
 B. The Utilitarian Justification and Reasonable Certainty..... 73 
 II. The Lack of Reasonable Certainty............................................. 85 
 A. How We Got Here:  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
and State Privilege Law ....................................................... 87 
 B. Conflicts and Confusion in Attorney-Client Privilege 
Law ....................................................................................... 93 
 1. The lack of Supreme Court leadership ........................ 94 
 2. Intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts and 
confusion........................................................................ 98 
 a. The elements of the privilege .................................. 99 
 b. The crime-fraud exception .....................................113 
 c. Waiver and post hoc qualification ..........................116 
 C. Choice of Law and Privilege ..............................................121 
 D. Extrajudicial Proceedings ..................................................126 
 E. Today’s Uncertain and Unpredictable Privilege ..............129 
 III. The Solution: Federalizing Privilege ........................................132 
 A. The Need for a Codified, Preemptive, Federal 
Privilege...............................................................................134 
 1. The limitations of other proposed reforms.................134 
 2. Systemic problems with a common-law approach to 
privilege .........................................................................136 
                                                          
 ∗  Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  J.D., University 
of Minnesota Law School, 1994; B.A., Harvard College, 1989.  The author would like to 
thank Kathleen Boozang, Kenneth Broun, Howard Erichson, Crystal Olsen Glynn, 
John Jacobi, and Charles Sullivan for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, 
and John Falzone, Shawn Merritt, Danielle Defillipis, Katherine Escanlar, and Lucas 
Townsend for research assistance.  The author would also like to thank the Seton 
Hall Law School Faculty Scholarship Fund for financial support of this project.  The 
views expressed in this Article are entirely the author’s own. 
GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002  1:29 PM 
60 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:59 
 3. The essential contents of a national privilege law.......146 
 B. Congress’s Capacity and Power to Federalize Privilege....151 
 1. Congress’s ability to craft appropriate legislation .......152 
 2. Congress’s power to federalize privilege .....................156 
 a. The Commerce Clause............................................157 
 b. The Tenth Amendment and the values of 
federalism ................................................................162 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................171 
INTRODUCTION 
The attorney-client privilege is a mess.  One might expect a few 
unresolved issues because there is no national law governing the 
privilege, no codification of the privilege in the federal courts, and 
little leadership from the Supreme Court on the subject.  Yet the 
conflict and confusion runs deeper and is more widespread than 
many observers realize.  Unlike most other areas of the law of 
evidence, there is a lack of convergence in key aspects of the attorney-
client privilege.1  The law of privilege varies greatly from state to state, 
federal circuit to federal circuit, and context to context, and its 
application often is unclear within particular jurisdictions and even 
within particular cases. Most strikingly, the conflicts and ambiguities 
are not relegated to the margins.  Fundamental issues, such as the 
requirements of confidentiality, the parameters of the corporate 
attorney-client privilege, and the scope of the crime-fraud exemption 
are disputed or largely unresolved.  Moreover, choice-of-law 
principles governing the choice between conflicting privilege 
doctrines of interested jurisdictions simply exacerbate the 
unpredictability because these principles vary widely and often 
default to application of the law of the forum. 
The disarray reflects our love-hate attitude toward the privilege.  
Attorneys and clients assessing their own relationships believe the 
privilege promotes candor, communication, and sound legal advice, 
and serves other important interests, such as protecting privacy and 
ensuring loyalty.  Indeed, the mere suggestion that attorney-client 
                                                          
 1. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial 
Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 786 (2002) (noting 
that, in the federal system, many important, unresolved issues relating to testimonial 
privileges involve the attorney-client privilege); see also Margaret A. Berger, The Federal 
Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 
256 (1984) (discussing the trend toward codification by states, Puerto Rico, and the 
military of evidence codes following adoption of, and based on, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence); Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural (IL) Logic of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1992) (stating that the 
attorney-client privilege has long been the most controversial area of federal 
evidence law). 
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confidences may be disclosed or used against the client evokes 
outrage in many members of the legal profession.  The recent uproar 
over the Justice Department’s post-September 11 decision to allow 
government officials to monitor prisoners’ telephone conversations 
with their attorneys is an obvious example.2 
Yet, when the focus shifts outward, specifically to an adversary’s use 
of the privilege as a shield in discovery or at trial, attitudes toward the 
privilege turn decisively sour.  From this perspective, attorneys and 
their clients view the privilege as a formidable barrier to ascertaining 
truth, and the plaintiffs’ bar in particular sees claims of privilege as 
largely overstated and obstructionist.3 Likewise, the public takes a dim 
view of assertions of the attorney-client and other privileges by those 
under scrutiny in well-publicized disputes or scandals, such as the 
tobacco litigation and the recent Enron debacle.4 
These strong feelings and competing interests ensure that 
controversy over the privilege will not go away.  Skeptics will remain, 
among them commentators who question the basic assumption that 
the privilege produces social benefits, particularly in the corporate 
context.5  Yet, given its long history and solid foothold in every 
jurisdiction, the privilege—including the corporate privilege—is here 
to stay, in one form or another.  The question then, is not whether to 
keep or abandon the attorney-client privilege, but rather, how to 
                                                          
 2. On October 31, 2001, the Justice Department announced that it had the 
authority to monitor conversations between detainees and their attorneys whenever 
the government has “substantial reason” to believe that the conversations could 
facilitate violence or terrorism by passing on information or instructions.  Prevention 
of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2002).  Some criminal 
defense attorneys and civil libertarians have called the rule “horrifying” and have 
expressed concerns that the rule will make it impossible for attorneys to prepare 
defenses.  Tom Brune, Rule Would Bypass Attorney Privilege, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 2001, 
available at http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/nyusrule06245043 
1nov06.story.  The American Bar Association also opposed the rule.  Review Wire 
Services, ABA Opposes Monitoring of Client-Lawyer Talks, But Supports Use of Tribunals, 76 
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 11, 2002, at 13. 
 3. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary 
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 722-25 (1998) (discussing attitudes of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys toward the defense and corporate bars and finding most plaintiffs’ 
attorneys believe the other side is obstructionist and evasive in discovery).  While 
there may be good reasons for drawing sharp distinctions between different contexts, 
shifting attitudes with respect to the circumstances in which the privilege should 
apply also often reflect differing experiences and sympathies. 
 4. See, e.g., Jonathon D. Glater, Round Up the Usual Suspects. Lawyers Too?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at C4 (noting public criticism of efforts by lawyers and other 
corporate executives to conceal malfeasance through the attorney-client privilege); 
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Tobacco Lawyers and The Case For Cover-Up Reform, NAT’L J., Feb. 10, 
2001, at 388 (criticizing lawyers who use the attorney-client privilege to shield 
evidence of the harmful effects of tobacco). 
 5. See infra notes 53-57, 70-73 and accompanying text (articulating specific 
criticisms of the privilege). 
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maximize its potential benefits while limiting its costs. 
Some are content to let parties and courts continue to hash out 
privilege doctrine on a case-by-case, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.  
That is what Congress did in 1975, when it chose to leave the 
development of privilege doctrine to the courts.6  Continuing on this 
course makes no sense, however.  First, re-litigating the parameters of 
privilege doctrine over and over again creates enormous transaction 
costs.7  More importantly, the uncertainty that this approach has 
produced defies the principal justification for the modern privilege.  
By shielding attorney-client confidences from discovery, the privilege 
is supposed to promote communication and candor between the 
attorney and client, which, in turn, is supposed to foster compliance 
with the law, facilitate the effective administration of justice, and 
produce other social benefits.  Sufficient certainty or predictability 
that these confidences will be protected from disclosure is essential to 
promote, and avoid chilling, client candor.  Indeed, an uncertain 
privilege offers nothing but harm: it inhibits access to the truth and 
creates enormous transaction costs while failing to enhance attorney-
client communication and candor.  Thus, today’s highly uncertain 
privilege is intolerable. 
In the quest for greater certainty, many commentators have called 
for reform.  Some have advocated specific changes to the substance 
of privilege doctrine or called on specific jurisdictions to change the 
way in which they approach or apply the privilege.8  Others have 
taken a more holistic approach.  One commentator, for example, has 
called for adoption of new choice-of-law principles that enhance 
predictability by ensuring that the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
attorney practices governs the privilege determination, rather than 
the privilege law of the forum state.9  In addition, there is a revitalized 
movement to abandon the common-law approach to privilege in the 
                                                          
 6. See infra notes 109-17, 126, 129 and accompanying text (describing Article V 
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, which was proposed to codify the law of 
privilege). 
 7. See Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence With Supporting Commentary, 171 F.R.D. 330, 346 n.16 (1997) [hereinafter 
Rice, Evidence Project] (noting that both federal and state bodies of case law on the 
attorney-client privilege include more than five thousand cases).  This case law, 
however, has not established clear standards nor prevented re-litigation of privilege 
issues. 
 8. See infra notes 68, 327 and accompanying text (explaining arguments used to 
advocate reform of privilege law, such as the need for greater predictability and 
certainty). 
 9. Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Territorial 
Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 912-13 (1991). 
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federal courts and codify a set of testimonial privileges.10 
These proposed reforms, however, cannot solve the uncertainty 
problem.  Obviously, clarification of particular aspects of privilege 
law, a well-crafted set of new privilege rules for the federal courts, and 
a more sensible choice-of-law regime would be welcome.  Yet, given 
the competing policies at stake, enormous differences between and 
within jurisdictions inevitably will remain.  A better choice-of-law 
regime will not address the uncertainties resulting from “vertical” 
inconsistencies—that is, federal versus state law—or, even more 
fundamentally, uncertainties within jurisdictions.  This is true 
because the law of privilege is largely or exclusively a product of the 
common law, which has not, and in my view cannot, produce 
governing principles that foster certainty and predictability in 
privilege protections.  Likewise, although a new set of privilege rules 
for the federal courts may foster greater certainty in federal criminal 
and federal question cases, these rules will not result in sufficient 
inter-jurisdictional agreement and corresponding predictability, 
given that many states have been reluctant to follow the federal 
common-law lead on attorney-client privilege law.  Moreover, none of 
these approaches to reform addresses the troublesome question of 
the application of privilege protections in arbitral, administrative, 
legislative, and other nonjudicial fora, which oversee a growing mass 
of adversarial disputes, and in which decision makers may feel less 
constrained by the privilege rules applicable in state and federal 
courts. 
The time has come for a more radical solution.  A quarter century 
after the last serious congressional consideration of, and ultimate 
inaction on, the attorney-client privilege, this area of the law is now in 
serious need of renewed congressional attention.  Yet enhancing 
certainty demands more than changes in choice-of-law principles or 
                                                          
 10. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 769-72, 789-815 (arguing that Congress 
should codify a set of rules governing testimonial privileges, including the attorney-
client privilege, applicable in federal criminal and federal question cases); Rice, 
Evidence Project, supra note 7, at 346 (same); Kenneth R. Tucker, Note, Did Congress 
Err in Failing to Set Forth Codified Rules Governing Privileged Relationships and Resulting 
Communications?, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 181, 184 (1994) (advocating congressional 
codification in all federal cases).  Indeed, the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence has begun to consider codification of various testimonial 
privileges.  Broun, supra note 1, at 814 n.292.  Others, however, believe that the 
federal decision makers should not attempt to codify the law of privilege.  See, e.g., 
The Committee on Federal Courts, Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Revisiting the 
Codification of Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 55 THE REC. 148, 152-53 
(2000) [hereinafter Committee on Federal Courts]; Raymond F. Miller, Comment, 
Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 
771, 772 (1999). 
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the codification of a set of privilege rules for the federal courts.  
Rather, to resolve both lingering conflicts between jurisdictions and 
confusion within jurisdictions, we need a single, codified solution. 
Congress, therefore, should federalize the law of privilege 
preemptively, creating uniform protection for client confidences that 
will apply in every proceeding in federal and state court, as well as in 
arbitration proceedings, administrative hearings, and legislative 
proceedings. Federal privilege legislation providing clear, 
unqualified,11 and generally applicable privilege protections will 
produce a level of certainty sufficient to reap the potential benefits of 
the privilege while ultimately lowering its transaction costs.  Congress 
has both the capacity and the constitutional power to enact this 
needed reform. 
Part I of this Article discusses the need for reasonable certainty in 
attorney-client privilege protections.  It begins by tracing the history 
of the privilege, outlining the doctrine’s basic elements, and 
reviewing various justifications for the privilege.  It then discusses the 
predominant utilitarian or instrumental rationale, which is premised 
on the assumption that the privilege promotes client candor and full 
communication between attorneys and clients, and thereby produces 
social benefits that outweigh its social costs.  Next, Part I outlines why, 
to achieve any social benefits, privilege protections must be 
sufficiently certain to assure that attorneys and their clients can fairly 
predict whether their communications will be subject to later 
disclosure.  Finally, Part I concludes that, because absolute certainty is 
not attainable, policy makers should seek to ensure that the privilege 
doctrine provides at least reasonably certain protections, thereby 
allowing attorneys and clients to assess accurately whether various 
communications will be protected. 
Part II details why the protections that the modern privilege affords 
are often uncertain.  It begins by tracing why Congress chose not to 
codify the attorney-client privilege in the early 1970s and the effects 
of that choice.  Part II then shows how the Supreme Court has since 
provided little leadership on privilege doctrine.  Next, it outlines the 
significant tangle of inter-jurisdictional conflicts and the lingering 
intra-jurisdictional confusion on privilege doctrine.  Similarly, Part II 
                                                          
 11. By “unqualified,” I do not mean without exceptions.  A qualified privilege, as 
I use the term, means a privilege that is subject to a judge’s discretionary or post hoc 
balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis.  Any privilege regime will contain 
exceptions and waiver doctrines; thus, an unqualified or absolute privilege is one 
that contains exceptions and recognizes waiver doctrines, but these exceptions and 
doctrines are both categorical and defined in advance, giving attorneys and clients 
notice of the limits of the protection. 
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discusses the varied and flawed choice-of-law approaches that states 
apply in choosing among the conflicting privilege laws and the largely 
unexplored question of application of privilege protections in 
nonjudicial fora, such as arbitral, administrative, and legislative 
proceedings.  Given all of this, and the fact that communications may 
lose their privileged status once a single decision maker compels 
disclosure, this Part concludes that privilege protections are highly 
uncertain. 
Part III offers a new approach to reform.  Other proposed reforms 
cannot resolve the existing problems either because they are limited 
in reach or because they do not address the systemic problems with a 
court-centered, common-law approach to developing privilege 
doctrine.  For these reasons, the solution to the problem of 
uncertainty must be both legislative and national in scope.  This Part 
therefore proposes that Congress federalize the law of privilege, 
adopting a clear, unqualified, and generally applicable privilege 
statute that preempts contrary state law.  Such a law would provide 
the client with a federal privilege right applicable in all proceedings 
in federal and state court, and in all nonjudicial proceedings.  
Although Congress refused to act a quarter century ago, today it has 
greater history and resources to draw upon in crafting such 
particularized legislation and avoiding political derailment.  Finally, 
Congress has the power to enact this preemptive legislation under 
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, and the exercise of this 
power will not offend the Tenth Amendment or the values of 
federalism it serves. 
I. THE NEED FOR REASONABLE CERTAINTY 
A. The Privilege’s History, Elements, and Purposes 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the evidentiary 
privileges, predating the Constitution.12 The Anglo-American 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that 
the attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the common-law privileges for 
confidential communications) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton 
1961)); 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181, 
at 302 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2001) (noting that privilege originates in Roman and 
canon law); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 503.03 (2002) 
(explaining the rationale and nature of attorney-client privilege); see also Note, 
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the 
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227-28 (1962) [hereinafter 
Functional Overlap] (noting that recognition of the attorney-client privilege by British 
and American courts predates the recognition of all other professional privileges by 
nearly 300 years).  Indeed, the privilege originates in Roman and canon law.  JOHN 
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privilege developed contemporaneously with the right of compulsory 
process,13 and the availability of the doctrine is unquestioned in every 
jurisdiction in this country.14  Indeed, some form of the privilege is 
probably guaranteed in the criminal context by the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution15 and parallel state constitutional 
provisions.16  In the civil context, the protections that the privilege 
provides do not rise to the constitutional level, but such protections 
are recognized by the federal courts and all fifty states.17 
Despite the privilege’s long history and the enormous amount of 
litigation it has spawned,18 the basic elements of the privilege have 
remained largely the same for over a century.  Unless it is waived, the 
attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications 
between the client and attorney made for the purpose of obtaining or 
providing legal advice.19  Of course, questions regarding each of these 
                                                          
WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04 (3d ed. 2001). 
 13. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 181, at 302. 
 14. See generally PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW § 1 (1996) 
(discussing the history of the attorney-client privilege in each state and the District of 
Columbia). 
 15. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 16. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) (assuming, tacitly, 
that government intrusion on confidences between criminal defendants and their 
counsel would violate the Sixth Amendment); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, 
§ 181, at 305 (stating that attorney-client privilege also has been viewed as an adjunct 
to the privilege against self-incrimination, at least to the extent that incriminating 
admissions of a defendant could otherwise be extracted from the defendant’s 
attorney). 
 17. See generally RICE, supra note 14, § 1 (examining the attorney-client privilege 
in all states and the District of Columbia). 
 18. Rice, Evidence Project, supra note 7, at 346 n.16.   
 19. Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES § 2:1, at 2-45 (1993)).  The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 
offers a substantially similar definition.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) (protecting a communication made between 
privileged persons, in confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
assistance for the client).  Another often accepted statement of the scope of the 
privilege is embodied in the Revised Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(b): 
General rule of privilege.  A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client (i) between the client or a representative of the client 
and the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer, (ii) between the 
lawyer and a representative of the lawyer, (iii) by the client or a 
representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the 
lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party 
in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein, 
(iv) between representatives of the client or between the client and a 
representative of the client, or (v) among lawyers and their representatives 
representing the same client. 
REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (1999); see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 347-48 
n.19 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON 
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elements generate controversy—i.e., who is the client, when is a 
communication made in confidence, when are attorney 
communications to the client privileged, and when is confidentiality 
waived. 
The protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and other 
unqualified evidentiary privileges is distinguishable from the 
protections afforded by other evidence rules that operate to 
exclude—e.g., hearsay, opinion evidence, and character evidence 
restrictions—in two respects.  First, privileges not only prevent the 
use of protected communications at trial but also prohibit adverse 
parties from gaining access to such communications, even if they 
contain otherwise relevant information.  Privileges protect 
communications by both parties and non-parties from discovery and 
other forms of compulsory disclosure.  Thus, unlike other legal 
doctrines classified as evidentiary rules, privileges protect against 
discovery of relevant information.20  Of course, the attorney-client 
privilege does not protect underlying facts or information, which can 
be discovered through means other than disclosure of the attorney-
client communication.21 
Second, the testimonial privileges, including the attorney-client 
privilege, are unlike other exclusionary rules because they are not 
designed to assist in finding the truth by excluding evidence which is 
unreliable or likely to be unfairly prejudicial or misleading.22  To the 
contrary, privileges have the effect of inhibiting, rather than 
facilitating, the illumination of the truth.23  Privileges serve to protect 
other interests that are regarded as sufficiently important to warrant 
limiting access to relevant evidence.24 
Throughout the attorney-client privilege’s long history, a number 
of justifications have been offered to support the protection it 
affords.25  For example, in 1768, Blackstone suggested that the 
                                                          
EVIDENCE] (relying on and excerpting Rule 502(b)). 
 20. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 170, at 220-21 (noting the 
distinct rationale and broader sweep of privilege rules in relation to other evidence 
law, specifically referring to privileges’ unique ability to exclude probative evidence, 
hinder the discovery of truth, and produce inefficiency in the litigation process). 
 21. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).  Indeed, since the 
underlying information contained in the attorney-client communication is otherwise 
obtainable, some have argued that the costs of the privilege to truth-seeking are 
limited.  See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 22. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 72, at 298-99 (contrasting 
exclusionary rules with rules of privilege, noting that the former seek to exclude 
prejudicial, misleading, or unreliable evidence, while the latter seek to inhibit the 
truth). 
 23. Id. at 299. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Indeed, the prevailing justifications have evolved over time. See, e.g., 
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privilege is an extension of the right of individuals to avoid self-
incrimination.26 Modern commentators have contended that the 
privilege is necessary to preserve a criminal defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment27 privilege against self-incrimination and Sixth 
Amendment28 right to counsel.29  Others have argued that the 
privilege is necessary to uphold the professional relationship between 
the attorney and client: without it, there could be no confidentiality 
and corresponding trust and loyalty.30  Similarly, some commentators 
suggest that the attorney’s traditional role as an advocate in our 
adversarial system would be seriously undermined if attorneys could 
be utilized routinely as a source of information about the client.31  
Still others have contended that the attorney-client privilege is 
necessary to protect the client’s privacy or dignitary interest in 
preventing interference with the client’s relationship with a close 
advisor.32 
                                                          
Bradford, supra note 9, at 913-14 (describing the various policy justifications from 
Roman times to the present); GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.04 (same). 
 26. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 370 (1768); see also Note, Developments in the 
Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (1985) [hereinafter 
Privileged Communications] (discussing Blackstone’s self-incrimination theory). 
 27. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 28. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense.” Id. amend. VI. 
 29. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional 
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 485-86 (1977) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Privilege] 
(explaining that, although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, when viewed together, 
seemingly do not provide for the attorney-client privilege protection, the absence of 
such a privilege would preclude enjoyment of rights enumerated in either 
amendment). 
 30. E.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980) (stating that both the attorney-client fiduciary 
relationship and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation 
of confidences); Broun, supra note 1, at 796-97 (discussing loyalty concerns as one of 
the considerations supporting the maintenance of the attorney-client privilege); 
Note, Developments in the Law—Privileged Communication: Modes of Analysis: The Theories 
and Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1498 (1985) 
[hereinafter Theories and Justifications] (attributing the attorney-client privilege to the 
importance society places on both the attorney-client relationship and the codes of 
ethics governing the relationship); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1502 
(noting that the original justification for the privilege was based on an individual’s 
right to avoid self-incrimination and, alternatively, the attorney’s oath of loyalty to 
the client). 
 31. E.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 346 (noting that the 
strong tradition of advocacy would be outraged by examination of attorneys aimed at 
uncovering client confidences). 
 32. E.g., Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 483; Theories and Justifications, 
supra note 30, at 1481-82; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 
345-46 (noting that, although contemporary arguments suggest that privacy defines 
and supports the attorney-client privilege, courts remain hesitant to adopt the privacy 
rationale); Broun, supra note 1, at 790-96 (discussing how modern writers frequently 
justify the existence of privilege protections based on privacy and endorsing such a 
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Each of these justifications is consistent with the protections 
afforded by the modern privilege, and each continues to receive 
scholarly recognition and support.33  Indeed, each justification 
highlights an important interest—protecting against self-
incrimination, facilitating maintenance of the trust relationship, 
guarding the integrity of the adversarial system, and respecting 
legitimate expectations of privacy and human dignity—that the 
privilege ought to continue to serve.  Thus, any discussion of the 
adequacy of current privilege doctrine or reforms must include 
consideration of these interests.  Yet none of these justifications can 
fully explain the modern privilege, which applies in criminal and civil 
contexts, protects attorney-client communications made in and 
outside of litigation, is generally unqualified, and affords protection 
for both natural and corporate persons.34 
Rather, the widely accepted, overarching purpose for the modern 
attorney-client privilege is utilitarian or instrumental.35  The 
predominant modern rationale for the privilege is that it fosters 
client candor and full communication between attorneys and clients, 
which produce social benefits that outweigh the privilege’s social 
costs.36  The Supreme Court has unambiguously endorsed this view: 
[The privilege’s] purpose is to encourage full and frank 
                                                          
view). 
 33. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 796 (discussing how commentators continue 
to endorse privilege protections based on privacy and professionalism interests, and 
indicating that the best arguments for the maintenance of privileges are those that 
take into account instrumental as well as privacy, dignity, and loyalty considerations). 
 34. See John W. Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: Cases Applying Upjohn, 
Waiver, Crime-Fraud Exception, and Related Issues, 38 BUS. LAW. 1653, 1659 (1983) 
(discussing why the attorney-client privilege cannot be based on notions of individual 
privacy alone).  For example, the privilege applies even in those civil matters in 
which the right against self-incrimination is not implicated.  Likewise, the privacy 
rationale—at least one which views individual privacy as an end in itself—may not 
extend to organizations, such as corporations.  See Theories and Justifications, supra 
note 30, at 1482 (discussing the uncomfortable fit between the privacy rationale and 
privileges that extend to organizational clients). 
 35. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344 (stating that the 
utilitarian purpose became the primary rationale for the privilege in the eighteenth 
century and continues to be the principal justification today); Bradford, supra note 9, 
at 915 (stating that the desire to promote effective legal representation remains the 
best explanation for the attorney-client privilege); Theories and Justifications, supra 
note 30, at 1486-87 (characterizing the privilege’s utilitarian purpose as 
predominant).  As suggested above, however, the utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
justifications are not irreconcilable.  Indeed, recent commentary has suggested that 
non-utilitarian concerns—including privacy and dignitary interests—can be 
incorporated within a broad utilitarian framework by factoring these concerns into 
any balancing of social benefits and costs.  Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 
1504-07. 
 36. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 466 (stating that the goal of 
fostering legal communication has remained the unchallenged justification for 
attorney-client privilege since the mid-nineteenth century). 
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communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.  The privilege recognizes that sound legal 
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or 
advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the 
client.37 
Correspondingly, without the attorney-client privilege, the 
argument goes, clients would be deterred from making open and 
candid disclosures to their attorneys.38 Absent reasonable assurance 
that such disclosures could not be used against them later—via their 
attorney’s testimony or otherwise—clients would be unwilling to 
disclose embarrassing, unpleasant, or otherwise harmful facts.39 
In addition to serving the independent interests described above, 
full client disclosure and the corresponding interchange between 
attorney and client purportedly produce several social benefits.  First, 
full and frank communication is necessary for the provision of 
effective legal representation.40  In the litigation context, for example, 
attorneys otherwise would be deprived of information necessary for 
the preparation and anticipation of claims and defenses, which would 
harm both the client’s interests and the adversarial process.41  The 
vindication of rights in, and overall efficacy of, our justice system 
often depends on sound and adequate legal advice and assistance.  
Outside the litigation context, candid interchange between attorney 
and client is necessary to assess legal risks and consequences, and to 
allow counseling in avoidance of risks, adverse consequences, and 
litigation in our modern, complex regulatory regime.42 
                                                          
 37. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Privileged 
Communications, supra note 26, at 1502-03 (discussing the utilitarian justification for 
the privilege and distinguishing it from right-based theories). 
 38. See Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1502-03 (stating that sound 
legal advice both serves public ends and depends on full disclosure of information to 
the attorney); see also Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1475 (noting that the 
absence of the privilege may deter communications between an attorney and a 
client). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (1998). 
 40. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344. 
 41. See Geoffrey Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978) (stating that the attorney-client privilege is viewed as 
indispensable to an attorney’s ability to prepare a case and effectively advocate); 
Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1506 (discussing the importance of the 
privilege in the litigation process, particularly given the complex and imposing array 
of formalities and procedures). 
 42. See Hazard, supra note 41, at 1061 (arguing that the privilege is necessary to 
the attorney’s function as confidential counselor in law on the theory that proper 
advice only can be given if the client is free to make full disclosure); see also MODEL 
CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 210 cmt. a (1942) (same); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 
19, § 87, at 344 (stating that expert legal advice is essential in structurally 
complicated and detailed society). 
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In addition, greater client candor and communication facilitates 
ongoing compliance with the law.43  Legal rules are complex and fact-
specific in application; attorneys are better situated to appreciate the 
meaning and effect of such rules and to determine whether or not 
actions conform to these rules.44  Moreover, legal compliance 
enhances social welfare by furthering the underlying aims of the 
law.45 
Yet, given the privilege’s potential social costs, even ardent 
supporters of the utilitarian rationale—including the Supreme 
Court—advocate construing the privilege narrowly.46  Doctrinal 
limitations, such as the crime-fraud exception, which seek to address 
abuse of the privilege, are designed to reduce potential social harm.47  
Despite such limitations, because the privilege inhibits discovery of 
relevant communications, it can create obstacles to ascertaining the 
truth.48  The significance of this adverse consequence is 
indeterminate because the privilege protects only attorney-client 
communications that arguably would not otherwise exist and does 
not shield underlying information or facts from discovery.49  Still, the 
                                                          
 43. See, e.g., GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.12 (stating that the privilege promotes 
law-abiding behavior); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1506-07 (stating 
that the privilege promotes behavior that conforms to the law, because the law is so 
complex, “people need the assistance of counsel to understand its dictates”).  The 
Supreme Court agrees with this view.  See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392 (rejecting as too 
narrow the “control group” test in part because the test threatens to hinder efforts of 
corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law). 
 44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (1998). 
 45. Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1507 (stating that the attorney-
client privilege furthers social good because, without the aid of an attorney’s advice, 
laypeople may unknowingly break laws that they would have been willing to follow) 
(footnote omitted). 
 46. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (stating that the 
attorney-client privilege applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose because 
the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the fact-finder); 
Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1504 (noting that utilitarian supporters of 
the privilege generally argue for a narrow application by balancing easily observed 
social costs with less concrete benefits). 
 47. E.g., Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 467 (stating that the existence of 
the crime-fraud exception demonstrates a recognition that some values outweigh the 
values advanced by protecting confidential relations). 
 48. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 914 (stating that the privilege represents a 
tradeoff between effective legal representation and full discovery of relevant facts). 
 49. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1477-78.  In Upjohn, the Supreme 
Court adopts the view that the privilege has little impact on ascertaining the truth.  
449 U.S. at 395 (“Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications such 
as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position than if the 
communications had never taken place.”).  The Court reasons that because the 
privilege protects only communications, and not underlying facts or information, it 
causes inconvenience for an adverse party but does not prevent discovery of the 
truth.  Id. at 395-96.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 68 cmt. c (1998) (stating that the evidentiary consequences of the privilege are 
indeterminate because, if the behavioral assumptions supporting the privilege are 
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privilege unquestionably imposes barriers to confrontation and 
ascertaining facts by shielding attorneys from testifying and otherwise 
disclosing relevant communications and, at times, shielding clients 
from full examination.50  Indeed, the sheer volume of litigation over 
privilege issues strongly suggests that adverse parties view access to 
these communications as both useful and important.51 
Moreover, the litigation over the privilege itself constitutes a 
significant transaction cost.  Privilege disputes—particularly in large 
and complex civil cases—can take months and even years to resolve, 
and can consume enormous private and public resources.  While I 
have found no study estimating the actual cost of privilege disputes in 
litigation, the aggregate cost of these battles is undoubtedly 
enormous.52 
Although almost no one advocates abolishing the attorney-client 
privilege in its entirety—indeed, it is too late in the game for that—
the utilitarian justification has its critics.53  Some argue that the costs 
of the privilege outweigh the purported benefits in certain contexts,54 
and others question whether the benefits are in fact real.55  For 
example, scholars have questioned whether the corporate attorney-
                                                          
well-founded, the evidence excluded by the privilege would not have come into 
existence if not for the privilege); GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.15 (suggesting that the 
costs of the privilege may be as speculative as its benefits); Functional Overlap, supra 
note 12, at 1238 (discussing the results of Yale Law Journal survey, which found that 
more attorneys believe that the evidence was otherwise available from another source 
than those who believe that the privilege usually kept out otherwise unobtainable 
evidence); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1507-08 (stating that the 
privilege keeps from the court only sources of information that would not exist but 
for the inducement to communicate with attorneys that the privilege provides). 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (1998) 
(discussing evidentiary consequences of the privilege).  For example, in some 
circumstances, utilizing attorney-client communications to impeach may be the only 
realistic way an adversary can demonstrate that the client is not being truthful. 
 51. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1476 (noting that, if testimony 
were an adequate substitute for privileged information, courts would have little 
reason to compel disclosure). 
 52. This must be true, given the complexity of the privilege and the sheer volume 
of litigation over both its doctrinal limitations and application.  See, e.g., Rice, Evidence 
Project, supra note 7, at 346 & n.16 (describing the privilege as complex and stating 
that it has generated a body of federal case law that exceeds five thousand cases and a 
similar body of state case law). 
 53. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344-45 (discussing 
the history of the controversy surrounding the privilege, including Jeremy Bentham’s 
famous criticisms). 
 54. See, e.g., Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 470 (arguing for a qualified 
privilege in certain circumstances because the interests served by the privilege are 
outweighed by other interests). 
 55. Id. (questioning whether the privilege actually promotes attorney-client 
communications); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1472 (noting belief 
among some evidence experts that privileges serve no important societal purpose). 
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client privilege is necessary and whether it enhances social welfare.56  
Others may contend that the benefits of the privilege are too 
speculative to justify the costs.57  In addition, judges and litigants, 
faced with privilege-created obstacles in a particular piece of 
litigation, may find the privilege’s harsh consequences unbearably 
difficult to accept.58 
The fact that the benefits of the privilege are extrinsic and 
speculative while the costs are intrinsic to the particular dispute in 
which the privilege is asserted, combined with the sheer frequency of 
privilege claims, assures that the privilege will remain controversial 
and difficult to apply.  Most judges, law makers, attorneys, and 
scholars tend to agree that the privilege is useful and important, but 
should be narrowly construed.59  There is far less agreement, however, 
as to what exactly this means, either generally or in particular cases. 
B. The Utilitarian Justification and Reasonable Certainty 
The utilitarian justification for the attorney-client privilege is 
premised on the assumption that providing protection for attorney-
client confidences will enhance client candor or, at a minimum, 
foster greater attorney-client communication.60  Although most 
courts, practitioners, and commentators accept this assumption 
outright, it is both disputed and empirically unverified.61  Skeptics 
                                                          
 56. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Loss of Predictability 
Does Not Justify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55 BUS. LAW. 735, 741 (2000) [hereinafter Rice, 
Loss of Predictability] (questioning the utility of the privilege in the corporate 
context); Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 473-76 (calling into question the 
efficacy and necessity of the privilege in the corporate context).  Others believe the 
corporate privilege is justifiable.  See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.21 (noting that the 
privilege is justifiable particularly in the corporate context because of the 
corporation’s need for access to legal advice to ensure compliance with the law). 
 57. Cf. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 
1990) (supporting the privilege, but conceding that its benefits are all indirect and 
speculative, while its obstruction is plain and concrete). 
 58. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 780-81 (stating that courts’ distaste for the 
exclusionary consequences of the privilege lead to rejection of new privileges and, 
more often, narrow constructions of existing privileges). 
 59. See, e.g., Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of 
the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 197 (1989) (conducting a survey and 
finding that attorneys, judges, and corporate officials generally responded favorably 
to the privilege); Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1232 (discussing survey results 
that indicate attorneys strongly support the privilege). 
 60. It is this candor or communication that produces, in turn, the social 
benefits—better legal advice, more effective administration of justice, greater 
compliance with the law, and other interests—that outweigh the social costs the 
privilege inflicts. 
 61. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 470 (noting the existence of 
continued academic debate); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1474 (noting 
lack of empirical data to support existence of either the privilege’s putative benefits 
or costs). 
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therefore remain, even though most aspects of the modern 
privilege—including the corporate privilege—are almost certainly 
here to stay.  Despite the lingering controversy, the privilege cannot 
enhance candor or communication if the protection it affords is 
uncertain.  Thus, for society to reap benefits from the privilege, it 
must afford sufficiently certain protection for attorney-client 
communications. 
To promote greater candor and communication, privilege 
protection must remove the disincentives for clients to speak freely 
with their attorneys.  Adherents to the utilitarian justification of the 
attorney-client privilege rely on the “common sense” notion that 
clients would be unwilling, or at least far more hesitant, to discuss 
embarrassing, unpleasant, and otherwise harmful matters in detail 
with their attorneys if such discussions could be used against the 
client in a pending or later proceeding.62 Moreover, attorneys would 
be reluctant to seek or allow full disclosure from clients if such 
disclosures ultimately could harm the clients’ interests. 
This greater willingness on the part of clients and attorneys to 
engage in full and frank communications depends upon their belief 
that the communications will be protected.63  If either client or 
attorney has significant doubts about the communication’s protected 
status, each person will be less willing to engage in the interchange.64 
Thus, in order to enhance communications, the privilege must 
provide protection that is sufficiently certain to allay client and 
attorney concerns regarding future disclosure. 
Courts and commentators adhering to the view that the privilege 
promotes attorney-client candor and communication are virtually 
unanimous in agreement on the need for a concrete privilege.65  
                                                          
 62. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344 (stating that 
utilitarian theory depends in part on the client’s belief that the attorney cannot be 
compelled subsequently to divulge confidential information); GERGACZ, supra note 
12, § 1.10 (stating that encouraging client candor is a valid purpose for the rule 
although there are no “numbers” to prove that the privilege enhances candor); see 
also Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1476 (indicating available data suggests 
that most people would not communicate as freely and completely without a 
privilege). 
 63. See Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1476-77 (arguing that, while 
knowledge of the privilege may not necessarily encourage candor between attorney 
and client, knowledge of the privilege’s absence may deter such candor). 
 64. See Broun, supra note 1, at 793 (postulating that the absence of a privilege 
would make an attorney much less aggressive in seeking information, and that such 
inhibition would adversely affect the quality of representation). 
 65. See, e.g., Eric P. Sloter & Anita M. Sorensen, Corporate Ethics—An Empirical 
Study: The Model Rules, The Code of Professional Responsibility, and Counsel’s Continuing 
Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. CORP. L. 601, 607 (1983) (arguing that the 
attorney-client privilege is an effective legal tool only when the client and the 
attorney are able to predict with reasonable certainty whether a communication is 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court premised its decision in Upjohn largely on 
the need for a predictable and certain privilege: 
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the 
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of 
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.  An 
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results 
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no 
privilege at all.66 
Although some state courts have not accepted the Supreme Court’s 
ultimate holding in Upjohn,67 state courts do not question the basic 
premise that the privilege must be predictable in order to serve its 
purposes.  Many members of the legal community who seek reforms 
in privilege law base their proposals on the need for greater 
predictability and certainty.68 
                                                          
likely to be privileged if later sought through discovery); Glen Weissenberger, Toward 
Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 
899, 918 (1979) (arguing that because a client’s view is prospective, the attorney-
client privilege must be reasonably predictable at the time of attachment, or else the 
privilege fails to serve its intended purpose); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, 
at 1487 (noting that utilitarians commonly assert that the privileges must be easily 
predictable in application to achieve the certainty necessary to modify the behavior 
of communicators and thereby secure the supposed benefits of privilege law). 
 66. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).  Recently, the Court 
reiterated the necessity of certainty in adopting an unqualified psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.  See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (stating that the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege would be eviscerated if the promise of 
confidentiality were contingent upon a trial judge’s post hoc balancing of the relative 
importance of a patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure). 
 67. See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (explaining that some states 
reject Upjohn’s subject matter test and use a control group test to determine the 
extent of attorney-employee corporate privileges). 
 68. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 9, at 944 (noting that the need for certainty and 
predictability have never been the focus of attorney-client privilege cases predicated 
on choice-of-law); Jack P. Friedman, Is the Garner Qualification of the Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege Viable After Jaffee v. Redmond?, 55 BUS. LAW. 243, 281 (1999) 
(advocating abandonment of the balancing test for determining shareholder access 
to privileged communications by corporate personnel); Amy Weiss, In-House Counsel 
Beware: Wearing the Business Hat Could Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 393, 394 (1998) (advocating for reform in the corporate context based on 
greater certainty of privilege protections).  Professor Bradford, for example, calls for 
a territorial approach to conflicts determinations in the privilege setting because of 
the unique need for predictability and certainty in this context.  Bradford, supra note 
9, at 943-44.  He states that the attorney-client privilege encourages communications 
between attorney and client only if both parties know at the time of their 
communications whether the privilege will apply.  Id. at 943.  If the protection is 
uncertain, attorney-client “communications will be chilled, and the purpose of the 
privilege will be entirely defeated.” Id.  He contends that choice-of-law questions in 
the privilege area ought to be resolved differently than those in other areas because 
of the “special need for uniformity, predictability and certainty.” Id. at 945. 
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Almost all of the commentators who question the emphasis on 
certainty are skeptics of the corporate privilege.  Some commentators 
within this group recognize the need for predictable privilege 
protections outside the corporate context, but advocate a qualified 
corporate privilege.69 
Skeptics of the corporate privilege offer a number of related 
arguments for why the privilege does not or cannot enhance 
communication and candor in the corporate setting, thereby making 
privilege protections unnecessary.  For example, some commentators 
contend that the privilege is unnecessary because rational corporate 
decision makers, faced with ongoing compliance obligations and 
legal risks, have adequate incentives to seek legal advice and 
maximize legal counsel’s effectiveness without the protection of the 
privilege.70  Others contend that, even if the privilege fosters greater 
interchange, it creates no incentive for corporate employees to be 
more truthful with counsel.71  Critics further argue that the privilege 
cannot enhance candor and communication within the corporate 
structure because it belongs to the corporation, not the individuals 
communicating with corporate counsel.72  Since employees have no 
                                                          
 69. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 385-89 (noting that the existing limits to the 
corporate privilege, the corporate privilege’s definitional uncertainty, and the need 
for a qualified corporate privilege facilitate an adversary’s discovery); Attorney-Client 
Privilege, supra note 29, at 470-87 (arguing that the distinctions between the “legal” 
and “business” privileges justify the abandonment of any fixed privilege and the 
creation of a qualified privilege in the corporate context). 
 70. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 273 (arguing that the very existence of 
numerous corporate laws and regulations and the omnipresence of attorneys in 
corporate affairs suggests that corporations will encourage open communications 
with counsel in order to comply with the laws regardless of privilege); Rice, Loss of 
Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (arguing that corporate officers will not disregard 
the corporation’s welfare and their own interests if the privilege is not maintained); 
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 175 (1993) (concluding that the rational 
corporation will risk candor to secure the needed legal advice); Attorney-Client 
Privilege, supra note 29, at 473-74 (asserting that corporations will continue to seek 
legal advice regardless of clear certainty or absolute rules of corporate privilege 
because of their frequent, ongoing, legal needs); cf., e.g., Theories and Justifications, 
supra note 30, at 1474 (discussing frequent attacks on the notion that existing 
privileges actually encourage communications).  In addition, some legal scholars 
contend that intelligent attorneys would not place themselves in a situation of 
weakness, whereby they could be surprised by information that would open their 
clients up to unexpected liability.  See Thornburg, supra, at 179-80 (discussing the 
elimination of the corporate attorney-client privilege and the improbability that 
attorneys would probe less thoroughly for information). 
 71. Cf. Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (questioning whether 
corporate employees are candid with attorneys about their own misdeeds). 
 72. As the client, the corporate entity owns the privilege.  The privilege therefore 
is controlled by the corporation’s decision makers, under the assumption that they 
will fulfill their duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.  Corporate 
employees and other agents do not enjoy the benefits associated with the privilege.  
See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20 (noting that, because the privilege belongs to the 
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assurance that the corporation will not later waive the protection or 
otherwise utilize the communications for its own purpose, the 
protection that the privilege affords cannot induce employees to 
communicate with counsel, even if otherwise reasonably certain.73 
Although I agree there are important distinctions between 
corporate and individual clients, the skeptics understate both the 
potential impact of the privilege on corporate decision makers and 
the need for predictable privilege protections in the corporate 
context.  Corporate decision makers have strong incentives to seek 
legal advice, but they would face strong, countervailing disincentives 
in many circumstances if adversaries readily could gain access to 
attorney-client communications.  The specter of adverse parties using 
such communications against corporate interests is more than 
enough to make corporate decision makers and counsel forego 
communications that otherwise may be beneficial in corporate 
compliance and risk assessments.  Indeed, faced with no privilege, or 
a highly uncertain one, both decision makers and counsel would 
discourage all but the most essential communications between 
attorneys and corporate employees.74  Frankly, this conclusion seems 
intuitive enough that I wonder if at least some of the skeptics accept 
                                                          
corporation, corporate employee communications cannot be encouraged by the 
existence or lack of a privilege, but, more likely, by directives from a corporate 
superior or senses of duty to the organization); Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, 
and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
629, 646-47 (1997) (stating that, because the corporation and not the employee 
retains the privilege, it is arguable whether application of the privilege in corporate 
environments actually encourages employee candor and disclosure); Rice, Loss of 
Predictability, supra note 56, at 740-42 (arguing that corporate employees are not 
necessarily candid when properly informed that they are personally liable for their 
misdeeds); Thornburg, supra note 70, at 173-74 (suggesting that the corporate 
employee’s incentive for candor is limited by the fact that the privilege protects the 
corporation and not the employee). 
 73. See, e.g., Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (noting the possibility 
that subsequent circumstances might lead a corporation to waive its privilege and 
thereby destroy the protection that would otherwise inure to the benefit of the 
employee).  Furthermore, corporate counsel is free to disclose the information to 
the employees’ superiors.  Thus, corporate employees can never be certain that their 
communications will remain confidential, and subject themselves to both internal 
and external risks each time they communicate with corporate counsel. Id.; 
Thornburg, supra note 70, at 174. 
 74. See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20 (contending that an uncertain corporate 
privilege creates the specter of corporate attorneys being used by opponents to 
prepare their cases, which will, in turn, create strong disincentives for management 
to require corporate agents to communicate with counsel); cf. Alexander, supra note 
59, at 271 (discussing how attorney-client privilege stimulates a business entity to 
encourage employees to communicate openly with the company’s attorneys); Theories 
and Justifications, supra note 29, at 1475 (stating that actual knowledge of the lack of a 
privilege arguably would be a strong deterrent to communicating).  Indeed, in the 
absence of the privilege, attorneys would be viewed as a threat to the corporate 
clients they serve.  GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20. 
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the notion that some minimum level of certainty is necessary, but just 
disagree as to the amount.75 
The skeptics are correct that the privilege is inherently less 
predictable in the corporate context because an employee ultimately 
has no assurance that the entity will protect the employee’s 
communications, and corporate decision makers have no guarantee 
that they will have the authority to control the privilege in future 
proceedings.76 Yet an otherwise sufficiently certain privilege still can 
enhance candor and communication within the corporate structure.  
First, while the entity owns the privilege, in many circumstances the 
entity, its decision makers, and its employees will have mutual 
interests.77  In addition, even if the privilege does not create an 
incentive for lower-level employees to communicate with corporate 
attorneys, decision makers will have incentives to promote such 
communications and can compel employee cooperation.78  Also, 
while corporate decision makers always face the risk that they will not 
control the entity’s privilege in the future, that risk alone does not 
defeat the potential effectiveness of the privilege.  As long as decision 
makers can assess the risk that future decision makers will use 
corporate-attorney communications against them, the assessed risk is 
low, and the privilege’s protections otherwise are sufficiently certain, 
                                                          
 75. For example, two of the commentators who argue that greater certainty is 
unnecessary and, therefore, the corporate privilege could be qualified, seem to 
acknowledge, at least implicitly, that some degree of predictability is needed.  See 
Alexander, supra note 59, at 385-89 (disputing the contention that the corporate 
privilege depends on a high degree of certainty and arguing for a qualified 
approach, but defending the qualified approach on the grounds that it may enhance 
certainty and that the privilege rarely will be pierced); Attorney-Client Privilege, supra 
note 29, at 470-87 (questioning the need for total certainty in privilege protections 
and advocating a post hoc balancing approach to apply the privilege, although 
implicitly recognizing that some level of certainty should be preserved). 
 76. For example, by the time of the litigation, the entity’s interests may have 
changed, or the business may be under new management or the authority of a 
bankruptcy trustee.  Moreover, as discussed more fully in Part II.B, infra, in some 
circumstances, shareholders may attain the right to access and use the 
communications. 
 77. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 189, at 343 (explaining that 
the effects of corporate ownership of the privilege do not automatically result in 
divergent interests between the corporation and the employee); Alexander, supra 
note 59, at 262 (noting that most corporate executive employees assume that their 
individual interests and the interests of the corporation are the same). 
 78. See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20 (stating that a policy of corporate candor 
relates to and encourages a corporation’s use of its attorneys, and does not pertain to 
an individual’s decision to communicate with an attorney).  Cooperation does not 
ensure candor, but, in addition to perceived mutual interests, employees may be 
truthful to avoid discipline or because they believe it is the right thing to do.  
Moreover, in many circumstances, employees will see no reason to avoid the truth, 
because they will not know the legal implications of the information they 
communicate to counsel. 
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decision makers are likely to continue to encourage communications 
with counsel.79 
Of course, the debate over the privilege’s effect on candor and 
communication cannot be resolved definitively because the actual 
impact of the privilege on participant behavior is unverifiable.80  
There have been a few attempts to seek empirical verification of the 
effects of the privilege.81  Although most of these studies suggest that 
attorneys and laypeople tend to believe the privilege helps to 
enhance client candor or at least attorney-client communication in 
both the corporate and individual contexts,82 this research ultimately 
is inconclusive as to the privilege’s actual impact.83  Furthermore, the 
                                                          
 79. At least one empirical study suggests that executives who are aware that the 
entity owns the privilege still believe fairly strongly that the privilege promotes 
candor.  Alexander, supra note 59, at 251, 262. 
 80. Cf. GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.06 (asserting that inconclusive empirical 
results do not diminish the long-held view that a person with assured confidentiality 
will be less likely to hide certain facts). 
 81. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 193 (reporting the results of a survey of 
corporate and legal professionals concerning the privilege); Sloter & Sorensen, supra 
note 65, at 625 n.139 (noting responses of corporate managers to a bar query 
regarding the correlation between certainty of confidentiality and the extent of 
organizational cooperation with investigations); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking 
Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 373-95 (1989) (discussing privilege studies); 
Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1232 (discussing the results of a survey conducted 
in 1961 by the Yale Law Journal); Paul R. Rice, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Study 
Reveals Corporate Agents Are Uninformed; What They Don’t Know Can Destroy the Privilege, 
ACCA DOCKET (1998), at http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/accorpstudy.htm. 
 82. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 232-33, 241-46 (discussing previous studies 
and own survey results that indicate the privilege plays a role in enhancing candor 
and communication in the corporate context); Sloter & Sorensen, supra note 65, at 
625 n.139 (indicating that twelve out of fifteen high-level business executives stated 
that “an assurance of confidentiality” by counsel would increase their willingness to 
comply with an investigation); Zacharias, supra note 81, at 396 (admitting 
confidentiality encourages client use of attorneys and client forthrightness, but 
conceding the proposition may be overstated by proponents); Functional Overlap, 
supra note 12, at 1232 n.38 (stating that 55 of 108 laypersons indicated that they 
would be less likely to make full disclosure to an attorney in the absence of privilege, 
and 90 out of 125 attorneys said that their clients’ awareness of the privilege 
enhanced communications).  Professor Alexander’s survey found that several other 
factors besides the privilege promote candor and that trust and confidence in an 
individual attorney was the most influential single factor.  Alexander, supra note 59, 
at 248.  However, he noted that many respondents qualified their answers by noting 
that the attorney-client privilege creates the environment in which this trust and 
confidence exists.  Id. at 248, 265-66. 
 83. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 260-70 (concluding that the survey’s 
results ultimately were mixed on whether the privilege enhances candor in the 
corporate context); Broun, supra note 1, at 793 (noting the paucity of empirical data 
on the effect of the privilege in promoting the free flow of information within 
protected relationships); Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (noting that 
his survey showed that thirty percent of corporate employees indicated they are not 
candid with corporate counsel); Zacharias, supra note 81, at 352, 295-96 (analyzing 
the Tompkins County study, in which seventy-two percent of the lawyers presented 
with a specific hypothetical responded that they would disclose particular 
information even though the relevant statute requires silence, cautioning against 
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value of such studies is inherently limited. Generic questions to 
attorneys, executives, and employees provide some useful insights, 
but the extent to which the answers mirror real-world, context-
specific behavior is unknown.  And, because attorney-client 
communications must remain confidential to preserve the privilege, 
researchers cannot participate in, or gather information about, actual 
attorney-client discussions.84 
Still, some skeptics argue that, given the current climate of 
uncertainty, particularly in the corporate context, the fact that 
significant attorney consultation and communication with clients 
continues demonstrates either that the privilege is not needed or that 
more certain privilege protections are unnecessary.85  I agree that the 
privilege is highly uncertain, as I argue in Part II, but I disagree that 
the current state of affairs proves that greater certainty is not needed.  
First, we simply do not know the extent to which existing 
uncertainties deter attorney-client communications.86  Moreover, this 
argument presumes that corporate decision makers and attorneys are 
aware of the extent of existing uncertainties.  Yet one of the 
consistent findings in the aforementioned surveys is how little 
corporate executives, other laypeople, and attorneys understand the 
scope and, more importantly, limitations of the privilege.87  Indeed, 
some of the misunderstandings in particular support the conclusion 
that executives, employees, and attorneys speak freely because they 
                                                          
over-reliance on the study, and conceding its limitations); Functional Overlap, supra 
note 12, at 1236 (indicating on the one hand, that most laypeople were misinformed 
or uninformed about the privilege, but on the other hand, that most believe that 
without the privilege, full disclosure would be deterred); Theories and Justifications, 
supra note 30, at 1474 (stating that although the benefits of privileges have not been 
verified, there is no reason to assume that they are small). 
 84. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 345 (admitting the 
difficulty of empirical study of the privilege). 
 85. See, e.g., Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (noting that the 
increased unpredictability of the corporate privilege has not led to a reduction in 
legal advice); Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 473-76 (critiquing “the 
certainty argument” and questioning the need for the privilege in the corporate 
context). 
 86. Again, this cannot be quantified.  Some attorneys with whom I have spoken, 
including in-house counsel, suggest that they avoid certain communications with 
corporate personnel out of concern that such communications ultimately will not be 
privileged. 
 87. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 249 (summarizing survey results that 
demonstrate few in corporate hierarchy know that privilege belongs only to 
corporations); Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42 (finding that 
corporate personnel know little about the limits of  privilege protection); Zacharias, 
supra note 81, at 394 (noting pervasive client misunderstanding of confidentiality); 
Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1236 (finding that most laypeople are 
misinformed about the privilege). 
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believe the communications will remain confidential.88  If these 
misunderstandings are as widespread as the studies suggest, then the 
prevailing uncertainty does not refute the widely held assumption 
that significant uncertainties in privilege protections, if known to 
decision makers and attorneys, would deter communications.89 
All of this makes a fairly straightforward point: while there are 
lingering doubts about the impact of the privilege, particularly in the 
corporate context, the privilege is of little use unless the protection it 
provides is predictable enough to convince clients, corporate 
decision makers, and their attorneys that their communications will 
not be disclosed in the future.  An uncertain privilege, if known to 
attorneys and clients, cannot promote client communication and 
candor or any of the resulting benefits.  Moreover, such uncertainty, 
which either deters attorney-client communication or allows 
unforeseen disclosure of such communications, also harms the other 
interests—avoiding self-incrimination, respect for privacy and dignity, 
facilitating professionalism and loyalty—that the privilege serves. 
Because the privilege—including the corporate privilege—is here 
to stay in one form or another,90 ensuring that the protection it 
affords is predictable must be a priority for courts and policy makers.  
This true particularly in light of the privilege’s extraordinary costs;  
we may never be able to verify whether the social benefits of the 
privilege outweigh its social and transaction costs, but we know that 
we cannot achieve such benefits without sufficiently certain 
protections. 
                                                          
 88. See, e.g., Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42 (concluding that 
one of the most significant reasons why corporate employees continue to speak with 
corporate attorneys is their mistaken belief that the privilege will protect them); 
Zacharias, supra note 81, at 396 (attributing clients’ reliance on confidentiality to 
attorneys who overstate the scope of confidentiality or who close their eyes to client 
misperception of confidentiality’s limits). 
 89. Skeptics may counter that the corporate privilege depends on such ignorance 
because employees would not communicate with corporate attorneys if they knew 
that the corporation owned the privilege.  Professor Rice states that one of the most 
significant reasons why corporate employees continue to speak with corporate 
attorneys is their mistaken belief that the privilege will protect them and their 
communications.  Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42.  As discussed 
previously, however, this may not always be the case, and, even if lower level 
employees resist, corporate decision makers can compel cooperation.  See supra note 
87 and accompanying text. The ignorance of corporate decision makers and 
attorneys is more important than that of lower level employees.  If those who control 
the entity knew how uncertain the privilege is, they would be discouraged from 
facilitating or allowing communications with counsel. 
 90. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 275 (noting that suggestions of abolishing the 
corporate privilege would be “heresy”).  Even Professor Rice, who is among the most 
persuasive critics of the corporate privilege, has not advocated that it be abandoned.  
See Rice, Evidence Project, supra note 7, at 346-47 (including the corporate privilege 
within a proposed privilege rule). 
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Given that sufficient certainty is necessary, the more vexing issue is 
how much certainty is sufficient.  There is no general agreement on 
the level of certainty that is required to ensure the privilege is 
effective.91  Indeed, many practitioners and judges assume or believe 
that current privilege protections are sufficiently certain,92 while many 
commentators—including myself—contend that they are not. 
Also, assuming that the privilege can promote attorney-client 
candor and communication, the level of certainty required most 
likely varies by client and circumstance.  Some clients may be 
unwilling to engage in full and frank communications with their 
attorneys unless they are absolutely certain the communications will 
not be subject to disclosure later.  No privilege regime will satisfy this 
group, since—given the inherent complexity of aspects of privilege 
doctrine and the corresponding possibility of erroneous 
applications—absolute certainty is unachievable.  Other clients may 
be willing to communicate openly with their attorneys with minimal 
assurance that their communications will be protected.  Most clients 
probably fall between these two extremes; for them, sufficient 
certainty exists when the benefits of communication outweigh the 
risk of future disclosure multiplied by the resulting harm of such 
disclosure.93  This calculation will depend on the circumstances—the 
perceived benefit of a particular communication and how 
embarrassing or harmful the communication is likely to be if 
disclosed. 
Thus, the level of certainty that is sufficient to promote client 
candor and communication cannot be delineated with precision, nor 
can it be generalized for all clients and all circumstances.  But, more 
certainty is better than less, as long as other competing values—such 
as preventing the use of the privilege to facilitate crimes—are not 
sacrificed.94  Policy makers therefore should strive to ensure the 
                                                          
 91. See supra notes 69 and 75 (discussing how some commentators believe that 
the existing privilege or even a qualified corporate privilege may be certain enough 
to enhance candor and communication). 
 92. See supra note 85 (calling into question the need for attorney-client privilege 
in the corporate context). 
 93. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 247-48 (suggesting clients engage in a 
cost-benefit analysis in determining whether and how to communicate information 
to attorneys). 
 94. By advocating greater certainty, I am not suggesting that the scope of the 
privilege should be expanded or given its broadest interpretation.  Indeed, I agree 
with some commentators that the protection may be too broad in some contexts.  
There are strong social policies in favor of various limitations and exceptions, which 
always must be considered in fashioning privilege doctrine.  See Clark v. United 
States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (recognizing the need for conditions or exceptions in 
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highest level of certainty achievable, while recognizing that the 
competing interests at stake will require some doctrinal complexity, 
and that no legal doctrine, including privilege law, is entirely 
predictable or without nuances in application.  This level of certainty 
would maximize the potential benefits of the privilege. 
Moreover, while seeking the highest level of certainty achievable, 
policy makers should be unsatisfied with any regime that does not at 
least provide what I call “reasonable certainty.” As a general matter, 
reasonable certainty is lacking if a competent attorney well-versed in 
privilege law cannot predict with substantial accuracy,95 at the time of 
an attorney-client communication, whether the communication will 
be immune from future disclosure, assuming the communication is 
kept confidential and the client does not knowingly and voluntarily 
waive the protection.  Although the goal of the privilege is to 
promote client communication, we should evaluate the certainty of 
privilege protections from the perspective of a competent attorney 
well-versed in privilege law, not the client.  Attorneys are responsible 
for, and capable of, assessing how likely it is that particular 
communications will be protected, given the existing legal landscape, 
and then relating this assessment to the client.96  Reasonable certainty 
will allow the attorney to counsel the client as to the benefits and risks 
of the communication, and potentially foster fuller and franker 
communication when the attorney determines that the 
communication is safe from disclosure. 
Similarly, privilege protections ought to be actually reasonably 
certain to the competent, well-versed attorney, not merely apparently 
reasonably certain.  The appearance of certainty in privilege 
protections may be sufficient to induce some clients and attorneys to 
engage in full and frank communication, even if the protections are 
uncertain.97  Indeed, as discussed previously,98 if the privilege is as 
                                                          
the privilege where the policies supporting it run afoul of other social policies).  
Nevertheless, legal policy makers must determine the appropriate scope of the 
privilege and then ensure that the protection it affords is certain. 
 95. I cannot delineate “substantial accuracy” with precision, but it is fair to say 
that fifty percent accuracy falls far below this standard while ninety percent accuracy 
probably satisfies it. 
 96. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1477 (stating that the behavior 
of professionals, including attorneys, is more significantly affected by the privilege 
than the behavior of nonprofessionals because the professional is more likely to 
know about and act upon applicable privilege law).  Of course, attorneys may fail to 
educate their clients adequately.  See Zacharias, supra note 81, at 396 (finding that 
client reliance on confidentiality may be attributable to an attorney’s exaggeration of 
the scope of confidentiality or the attorney’s choice to ignore client misperception of 
confidentiality’s limits). 
 97. See Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1489 (suggesting that the 
appearance of certainty may be enough to encourage communication). 
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uncertain as other commentators and I argue, the extent to which 
the privilege enhances candor and communication today often may 
be attributable to the fact that many attorneys and their clients 
believe that privilege protections are more certain than they actually 
are.99  In fact, a regime that provides only apparently certain privilege 
protections may be superficially appealing: it encourages attorney-
client communications while allowing judicial and other decision 
makers to provide access to such communications once the privilege 
is challenged.100 
Yet policy makers should not be satisfied with apparent certainty.  
Although apparent certainty promotes some candor and 
communication, it is both unseemly and counterproductive.  By 
promoting ultimately unprotected communications, such a regime 
actually facilitates adversaries’ use of attorney-client communications, 
and hence, the attorney-client relationship, against the client.  
Apparent certainty therefore renders legal assistance less effective, 
defeating one of the primary social benefits greater client candor and 
communication are supposed to produce.101  Similarly, the mere 
appearance of certainty will promote attorney-client communications 
that, if ultimately unprotected, will harm the other social interests 
that the privilege serves: criminal defendants may unknowingly 
incriminate themselves, an adversary’s use of the attorney against 
client may irreparably damage their relationship of trust and 
confidence, and disclosure of the communications may defeat the 
client’s legitimate expectation of privacy.102  Apparent certainty also 
leads to a troublesome dichotomy: unwitting or poorly advised clients 
will communicate more—and more than they should—with their 
attorneys, while the privilege will not promote candor and 
communication between well-advised clients and their attorneys.  
                                                          
 98. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II. 
 99. See Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42 (arguing that whatever 
success the corporate privilege may have had is attributable at least in substantial part 
to the mistaken beliefs of corporate officers and employees); see also supra notes 87-88 
and accompanying text (same). 
 100. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 469-73 (suggesting that allowing a 
reasonable balancing of interests post hoc is better than providing absolutely certain 
privilege protections); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1489 (accepting as 
sufficient the mere appearance of certainty to encourage communication). 
 101. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 214 (arguing that an attorney who is called 
on to testify to a client’s damaging admission is disqualified from serving as trial 
advocate, and such disqualification both interferes with the client’s freedom to 
choose counsel and delays the progress and efficacy of litigation). 
 102. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1488 (suggesting that apparent 
certainty, on the one hand, will not encourage those who recognize the uncertainty 
to communicate, while on the other hand, will allow judges to manipulate the 
uncertainty to reach arbitrary results). 
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Thus, despite its initial appeal, apparent certainty actually harms the 
interests the privilege is supposed to serve and produces unsavory 
results that policy makers should not tolerate. 
In addition, apparent certainty increases transaction costs.  
Misperceptions about the privilege will lead to unwarranted 
assertions of the privilege and, hence, more litigation.  Likewise, 
when privilege doctrine is unclear or undefined, both sides have a 
strong incentive to litigate the privilege, further increasing expenses. 
Finally, the appearance of certainty cannot last forever when 
protections are, in fact, uncertain.  Eventually, courts, commentators, 
and practitioners will become aware of the actual level of uncertainty, 
a phenomenon that has been building over the last two decades.103  
And, because appearances can cut both ways, attorneys and clients 
who become aware of various uncertainties in privilege doctrine may 
view privilege law as a whole, as uncertain, and be deterred from 
communicating, even if some protections are in fact fairly certain. 
In conclusion, the ultimate benefits of the privilege are in dispute, 
but the essential precondition for realization of any such benefits is 
clear.  To promote candor and communication, privilege protections 
must be sufficiently certain to assure that clients and attorneys can 
fairly predict whether their communications will be subject to later 
disclosure.  Since absolute certainty is not attainable, policy makers 
should seek to ensure that privilege doctrine provides at least 
reasonably certain protections, thereby allowing well-versed, 
competent attorneys, and hence their clients, to assess accurately 
whether various communications will be protected. 
II. THE LACK OF REASONABLE CERTAINTY 
In order for privilege protections to be reasonably certain to a 
competent attorney looking forward from the time of the 
communication, the protections must satisfy at least three conditions.  
First, the scope of the protection that the privilege affords must be 
clear: confusing, ambiguous, or flexible privilege standards do not 
offer predictable protection.  Second, reasonably certain protections 
must be generally—or at least predictably—applicable.  The attorney 
must have confidence that protections will apply regardless of the 
forum—state, federal, or nonjudicial—and the nature of the 
proceeding or substantive claims that ultimately give rise to assertion 
of the protections.  Finally, privilege protections remain wholly 
uncertain if they are qualified or otherwise subject to post hoc 
                                                          
 103. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87. 
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abandonment or revocation.104 
The current privilege regime fails to satisfy each of these 
conditions in many circumstances.  There is a substantial amount of 
confusion over a number of fundamental aspects of the attorney-
client privilege.105  Indeed, there are numerous, lingering ambiguities 
and unresolved doctrinal issues within particular jurisdictions.106  In 
addition, there is no guarantee that the privilege protections afforded 
in one jurisdiction, forum, or type of proceeding will apply in 
another.107  To the contrary, there is no generally applicable set of 
privilege rules and, perhaps surprisingly, limited convergence on key 
aspects of attorney-client privilege doctrine.  These significant inter-
jurisdictional conflicts in the law, combined with varying and often 
unpredictable governing choice-of-law principles, result in uncertain 
protections.  Moreover, modern business, litigation, and conflict 
resolution practices make it increasingly difficult for an attorney to 
predict, at the time of a communication, whether the allegedly 
privileged status of the communication will be challenged in a 
particular state or federal court, in a proceeding governed by state or 
federal privilege law, or in a nonjudicial forum, such as arbitral, 
regulatory, or congressional proceedings.  Finally, in many 
circumstances, privilege protections are tentative or qualified: 
substantive privilege doctrine sometimes allows decision makers to 
override, abrogate, or ignore privilege protections, while at other 
times, attorneys or their clients waive the privilege permanently by 
involuntary disclosure or by stumbling into one of the traps for the 
                                                          
 104. See Berger, supra note 1, at 275 (finding troublesome lower federal courts’ 
endorsement of a qualified privilege, which permitted the court to find, on balance, 
that disclosure should be ordered).  The Supreme Court has emphasized the need 
for absolute privilege protections that are not subject to a post hoc balancing of 
interests or values.  See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (holding that the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege would be eviscerated if made contingent upon a 
judge, after the fact, weighing the relative importance of a patient’s interest in 
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure).  Indeed, to the extent privilege 
doctrine allows individual judges or decision makers to ignore protections in given 
circumstances, those protections become wholly unreliable and, hence, uncertain.  
See Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1245 (recognizing that discretionary privilege 
protections would cause uncertainty and that the full disclosure objective therefore 
would be “deeply undercut”).  I therefore disagree with those commentators and 
courts that suggest that a qualified privilege that allows judges to balance competing 
interests post hoc can be reconciled with the purposes of the modern privilege.  See 
supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing commentators who have advocated 
for a qualified corporate privilege). 
 105. See Broun, supra note 1, at 786 (stating that most unresolved issues relating to 
testimonial privileges invoked in federal courts surround the attorney-client privilege 
rather than other privileges). 
 106. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 107. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002  1:29 PM 
2002] FEDERALIZING PRIVILEGE 87 
unwary lurking below the surface of apparent protection.108 
Thus, the protections that the modern privilege affords often are 
uncertain.  The story of the uncertainty in today’s privilege most 
appropriately begins in the early 1970s, when Congress had a real 
opportunity to provide national leadership on privilege doctrine but 
chose not to act.109  Congress had its reasons for not taking the lead a 
quarter century ago, but, in hindsight, its inaction ultimately was a 
major cause for the current, intolerable state of privilege doctrine.  
Since then, continuing disagreements among state and federal 
jurisdictions, judicial inattention, flawed judicial policy making, and 
changing economic, litigation, and dispute resolution practices have 
contributed to the problem.110 
A. How We Got Here:                                                                             
The Federal Rules of Evidence and State Privilege Law 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the 
federal courts had no single set of evidence rules.  Evidentiary 
privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, were creatures of 
state and federal common law.  In 1972, after years of discussion, the 
Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence pursuant 
to the Court’s authority under the Rules Enabling Act.111  These rules 
were then submitted to Congress for tacit approval or explicit 
rejection.112 
As originally proposed, Article V of these rules would have codified 
the law of privileges.113  These rules would have provided for nine 
specific privileges including the attorney-client privilege, waiver of 
privilege by voluntary disclosure, protection of privileged matters 
disclosed under compulsion, and prohibition of negative inferences 
drawn from a party’s assertion of privilege.114  Proposed Federal Rule 
                                                          
 108. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 109. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 216-20 (describing 
congressional refusal to codify a federal privilege law, preferring instead that the 
privilege be guided by the common law and applicable state law); see also discussion 
infra Part II.A. 
 110. See discussion infra Part II.A-C. 
 111. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure, and rules of evidence for cases in 
the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) 
and courts of appeals.”), repealed by Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994) (retaining the original language of the Rules 
Enabling Act); see also Broun, supra note 1, at 772-79 (discussing the history of the 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 112. Broun, supra note 1, at 772. 
 113. FED. R. EVID. art. V (Proposed Draft 1972). 
 114. Id.  at 502-13. 
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of Evidence 501 would have provided that only those privileges set 
forth in Article V could be recognized by federal courts, thereby 
explicitly superseding contrary state and federal common law.115 
Congress, however, displaying rare interest in the proposed rules 
and the rule-making process, rejected Article V in its entirety.116  The 
proposed privilege rules proved too controversial for a number of 
reasons.  In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress did not look 
fondly upon proposed Rule 509, which redefined—and arguably 
expanded—the scope of the secrets of state and official information 
privileges.117  In addition, Article V narrowed some common-law 
privileges and omitted others, such as the physician-patient, spousal 
communications, and journalistic privileges.118 
Perhaps most importantly, however, various commentators, 
members of Congress, and a former Supreme Court Justice expressed 
concern that the proposed privilege rules—and the governing state 
and federal standards that they were designed to replace—were 
substantive in nature.119  Indeed, despite the Advisory Committee’s 
                                                          
 115. Id.  at 501. 
 116. Indeed, the proposed testimonial privileges contained in Article V almost 
doomed the entire set of evidence rules.  See Broun, supra note 1, at 772-77 
(describing the opposition to the draft rules from various judicial, academic, and 
civic commentators, who particularly criticized the proposed rules on privilege).  
This was the first time Congress exercised its retained power to revise evidentiary and 
procedural rules proposed by the Supreme Court.  Committee on Federal Courts, supra 
note 10, at 148-49. 
 117. FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1972); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
12, § 169, at 214; Broun, supra note 1, at 776-77; see also S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6 
(1974) (stating that the focus of congressional disagreement regarding Rule 509 was 
whether the rule was or was not merely codifying existing law with respect to state 
and official information privileges). 
 118. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 214; Broun, supra note 1, at 
776.  A related criticism offered by some commentators was that Article V would 
eliminate the ability of courts to formulate new privileges if the circumstances 
warranted.  See Broun, supra note 1, at 776 (noting the opposition from the academic 
community to the proposed elimination of the judiciary’s ability to create new 
privileges). 
 119. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 774 (discussing such criticisms of Article V, 
including Former Justice Goldberg’s criticism that the privilege rules were rule-
making incursions into substantive matters); Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 
10, at 150-52 (discussing the pervasive effect of privilege rules on the substantive 
behavior of citizens); Arthur J. Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Rules of 
Evidence, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 667, 681-84 (1974) (arguing against Article V because 
of its implications for substantive rights); see also Paul Carrington, Learning from the 
Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 299-300 (1994) (stating 
that, at the time Congress considered the proposed rules, there were concerns about 
the displacement of state privilege rules, which were “too substantive” in nature); 
Jack B. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 370-73 (1969) (discussing the independent 
substantive impact of privilege rules and arguing that state privilege rules therefore 
should apply in cases predicated on state substantive law). 
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and the Supreme Court’s contrary view,120 Article V’s critics 
contended that evidentiary privileges reflected substantive policy 
judgments regarding and regulating certain relationships.121  
Therefore, the argument continued, unlike other types of evidentiary 
rules designed merely to facilitate reliability in the fact-finding 
process, the proposed Article V rules could not be viewed as 
procedural in nature.122  Thus, according to the critics, evidentiary 
privileges were not appropriate subjects for judicial rule making 
under the Rules Enabling Act because judicially-crafted rules may not 
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”123 Moreover, 
contrary to the views of the Advisory Committee,124 the rules’ critics 
believed that because the proposed privileges would have applied 
even in diversity cases and other cases in which state law supplied the 
rules of decision in federal court, they would offend the principles 
                                                          
 120. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965) (holding that Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its progeny do not preclude application of a 
federal rule that was promulgated by Congress in accordance with its constitutional 
mandate to create rules governing the practice of federal courts); see also Goldberg, 
supra note 119, at 678-84 (describing the viewpoint of the Supreme Court and the 
Advisory Committee). 
 121. See sources cited supra note 119. 
 122. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6-7 (noting the controversy surrounding the 
codification of privilege as superceding substantive state law); MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 175, at 263 (stating that privilege law seeks to 
implement policies which are wholly extrinsic both to the litigation and the fact-
ascertaining policy underlying most evidence law).  Former Supreme Court Justice 
Goldberg opposed Article V because of the substantive nature of privilege rules, 
stating that the rules of privilege represent “real changes in the substantive rights 
and duties of persons throughout the country.” Goldberg, supra note 119, at 669. 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), repealed by Judicial Improvements and Access to 
Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994); Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 
10, at 151-52; see also S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 8 (describing concerns about the 
substantive nature of privilege protections and indicating that some commentators 
believed that the law of privilege should be a subject for the legislative rather than 
rule-making process).  Former Justice Goldberg best summarized these reasons for 
opposition to the privilege rules: 
The reason rules of privilege are substantive for both the Rules Enabling Act 
and the Erie doctrine is that they are designed to protect independent 
substantive interests that the state has regarded as more significant than the 
free flow of information.  Thus, their intrinsic objective is to protect 
communications that the state deems inviolate. 
The substantive nature of rules of privilege can be more clearly seen when 
contrasted with other rules of evidence.  Most evidentiary rules, including 
the admission and exclusion of evidence, examination of witnesses, judicial 
notice, competency of witnesses and relevance, are designed to facilitate the 
fact-finding process.  Rules of privilege, however, do not help elicit the truth.  
Rather, they impede the truth-seeking process in order to serve extrinsic 
social policies. 
Goldberg, supra note 119, at 682-84. 
 124. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 216 (summarizing the 
Advisory Committee’s view that privileges were appropriate subjects of rule making 
by the Supreme Court, and that the Erie doctrine did not prevent such rule making). 
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embodied in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins125 and federalist values.126 
Congress ultimately decided that, if codified privilege rules were to 
be adopted for the federal courts, it, rather than the judiciary, should 
adopt them.127  Nevertheless, Congress chose not to replace the 
proposed privilege rules.  Rather, Congress opted to enact new 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides as follows: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United 
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a 
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof 
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience.  However, in civil actions and proceedings, 
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State 
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
determined in accordance with State law.128   
The legislative history of Rule 501 makes clear that Congress’s 
rejection of Article V did not constitute a disapproval of specific 
privileges.129  Rather, Congress left federal privilege law where it had 
found it. 
                                                          
 125. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 126. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6 (noting congressional dissatisfaction with 
the policy of the Court’s rule because it contravened the result many legal scholars 
deemed mandated by Erie in which the Court required application of state 
procedural law in civil actions where the underlying issues were governed by 
substantive state law); Broun, supra note 1, at 775 (expressing displeasure at the 
proposed codification of federal privilege law that would ignore state privilege law, 
particularly in diversity cases); Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 151 
(noting critics’ contention that federalist principles underlying the Erie doctrine 
supported the continued application of state privilege rules); Note, Development in the 
Law—Privileged Communication: I. Introduction: The Development of Evidentiary Privileges 
in American Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1467 (1985) (discussing how Erie objections 
and federalist values supported application of state privilege law in diversity cases).  
See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §§ 169, 175 (explaining in detail 
why privilege law implicates the Erie doctrine and discussing Congress’s concerns 
with regard to Erie).  In 1969, Judge Weinstein wrote that Congress should consider 
limiting privilege rules to federal question cases precisely for this reason.  Weinstein, 
supra note 119, at 373-74.  He discussed different treatment for privileges because 
privilege rules are designed to make an “independent substantive impact.” Id. at 370. 
 127. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 213-20 (discussing the 
legislative history of the privilege rules).  Indeed, the original Federal Rules of 
Evidence were statutory.  See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 5 (stating that Congress delayed 
the effective date of the evidence rules so that it had time to review them in detail). 
 128. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 129. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 215; see also S. REP. NO. 93-
1277, at 6-10 (continuing to recognize the existence of privileges despite controversy 
as to their scope). 
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Rule 501 embodies two congressional choices that have 
significantly affected the application and development of the law of 
privilege in federal courts.  First, Congress decided that state law 
governing privileges should continue to apply in civil cases in federal 
court in which state law supplies the rules of decision.130  Thus, there 
is not a single law of privilege that governs civil cases in federal court: 
federal privilege law governs federal question cases and, as later 
clarified by the courts, cases with federal and state claims, while state 
privilege law governs in diversity cases.131  Second, Congress left 
formulation of federal privilege rules in the hands of the courts, 
stating that privileges shall continue to be governed by the common 
law.132  Unlike virtually all other areas of federal evidence law, 
privileges—their recognition, limitations, and application—would 
continue to evolve through the common-law process.  How much 
freedom federal courts should exercise in recognizing new and 
modifying established privileges remains unresolved.133 
Arguably, Congress’s decision to enact Rule 501 rather than 
specific privilege rules also has had a profound effect on the 
development of privilege law in the states.  Since Congress enacted 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, state evidentiary law has become far 
more uniform, as many states have followed the federal lead.134  Yet, 
because Congress chose not to codify rules governing the attorney-
client and other privileges, there has been no clear federal model for 
the states to follow.  Some states have adopted the original or revised 
versions of Uniform Rule of Evidence 502,135 which governs the 
attorney-client privilege.136  However, few of these jurisdictions have 
                                                          
 130. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 131. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 177, at 280-81 (discussing post-
Rule 501 authority asserting that federal privilege doctrine governs when there are 
federal and state claims in a single action). 
 132. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 133. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed its reluctance to recognize new 
privileges. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (stating that although it 
has the authority to develop new rules of privilege, it is not inclined to exercise this 
authority expansively).  But see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (recognizing 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege). 
 134. See Broun, supra note 1, at 789-90 (stating that, since the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were enacted, thirty-nine states have adopted evidence rules based on 
them); Berger, supra note 1, at 256 (discussing the trend toward codification 
following adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 135. UNIF. R. EVID. 502; see supra note 19 (setting forth Rule 502). 
 136. Uniform Rule 502 was originally based on the attorney-client privilege rule 
proposed to Congress, but was subsequently amended in 1986 and 1999.  UNIF. R. 
EVID. 502 (amended 1986 & 1999), 13A U.L.A. 150-59 (2000 & Supp. 2002); 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 75, at 313; Broun, supra note 1, at 799 
n.191.  Sixteen states and Puerto Rico have adopted all or part of Original Uniform 
Rule 502, UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974), and seven states have adopted all or part of 
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adopted either version of Uniform Rule 502 in its entirety.137  Many 
others have maintained their own statutory or common-law privilege 
regimes.138  While various jurisdictions have borrowed from the 
federal common law in interpreting their privilege rules, there is less 
uniformity in the attorney-client privilege area than in most other 
areas of evidence law.139  Thus, Congress’s decision not to act 
affirmatively in the privilege area has affected the development of 
privilege law across jurisdictions.140 
After the original Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, 
Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act to provide for future 
changes to these rules through the rule-making process.141  
Interestingly, however, Congress expressly exempted privileges, 
stating that any rule “creating, abolishing, or modifying an 
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by 
                                                          
Revised Uniform Rule 502, REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (amended 1986). 
 137. For example, only six states that have adopted Original Uniform Rule 502, 
UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974), also have adopted the rule’s definition of “representative 
of the client.”  Action in Adopting Jurisdiction, 13A U.L.A. 150-59 (2000) 
(identifying Alaska, Arkansas, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and 
Oklahoma).  Other states either omit the definition or have modified it. Id. 
(reporting Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming omit the definition, while 
Idaho, Mississippi, and Oregon have modified the definition).  Similarly, among the 
states that have adopted Revised Uniform Rule 502, REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502 
(amended 1986), only Texas has adopted verbatim the rule’s definition of 
“representative of the client.” Id. 
 138. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 75, at 313.  New York, for example, 
has resisted adopting a general code of evidence for more than 100 years.  Broun, 
supra note 1, at 801.  Instead, New York has a statute that recognizes the privilege, 
but the statute provides no details on elements, limitations, or application. N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 4503 (Consol. 2002).  Also following its own path, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court, which has promulgated a modified version of Original Uniform Rule 502, 
UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974), has declared that legislatively-enacted privileges are invalid 
under the New Mexico Constitution.  Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d 
1354, 1357 (N.M. 1976). 
 139. See supra notes 1, 134 and accompanying text. 
 140. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 76, at 313-14. 
[T]he failure of Congress to enact specific rules of privilege for the federal 
courts effectively precluded any immediate prospect of substantial national 
uniformity in this area. It is arguable that, in light of the strength and 
contrariety of views which the subject generates, hope for such consensus was 
never realistic.  In any event, the present form of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 
perpetuates a fluid situation in the federal law of privilege and affords the states 
little inducement to adopt identical or similar schemes of privilege.  The 
variegated pattern of privilege in both federal and state courts, described below, 
thus seems likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. 
Id. 
 141. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(a) (1994) (providing a procedure for delivering proposed rules for 
congressional consideration). 
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Act of Congress.”142  This exception for privileges reflects Congress’s 
continuing view that any codification of evidentiary privileges is 
Congress’s own prerogative rather than that of the Supreme Court.  
Ironically, as a result, the actual development of federal privilege 
doctrine is left to the common law, which resides in the hands of the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts.143 
B. Conflicts and Confusion in Attorney-Client Privilege Law 
In the quarter century since Rule 501 was enacted, Congress has 
addressed or referenced the attorney-client privilege—or privileges 
more generally—only in a few specific contexts.144  Congress has made 
no attempt to codify a law of attorney-client privilege, either 
preemptively or for the federal courts.  A lack of attention on the part 
of both Congress and the Supreme Court has left unaddressed widely 
diverging applications of the law of privilege and resultant substantial 
uncertainty.  At the most general, doctrinal level, there is much 
consensus among federal and state courts with regard to the attorney-
client privilege.145  For example, all jurisdictions—whether they have 
adopted one of the versions of Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 or 
not—cling to the same basic elements, recognize the crime-fraud 
exception, require the person asserting privilege to demonstrate its 
application, and adhere to some form of the subject matter waiver 
doctrine.146  Not far below this superficial level of agreement, 
                                                          
 142. Id. § 2074(b). 
 143. Cf. Berger, supra note 1, at 276. 
If the limitation on rule-making rests on a separation of power rationale as 
well as the perception that privileges affect primary conduct and should be 
subjected to empirical fact-finding and legislative accountability, then 
Congress’ action in passing [this limitation] and approving the formulation 
in Rule 501 is tantamount to locking the barn after first having arranged to 
turn over the key to a horse thief. 
Id.  
 144. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a) 
(2001 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the communications otherwise privileged do not 
lose their privileged character simply because they are subject to electronic 
surveillance pursuant to or in violation of the restrictions on such surveillance 
contained in the act); I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2002) (extending attorney-client privilege 
protections to communications between taxpayers and federally authorized tax 
practitioners); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) 
(2000) (ensuring protection of intercepted but otherwise privileged wire, oral, or 
electronic communications). 
 145. According to one leading treatise, the statement of the scope of the privilege 
contained in Revised Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 (1986), see supra note 19, is now 
generally accepted.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 347. 
 146. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 368-69, 380-81 (stating 
that it is well-settled both that the privilege belongs to the client and that the 
privilege does not protect communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud); 
GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 5.16 (noting wide acceptance of subject matter waiver 
rules). 
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however, looms an extraordinary amount of inter-jurisdictional 
conflict and intra-jurisdictional confusion.  Indeed, given the current 
state of privilege law, application of the privilege in any given case is 
likely to be ad hoc.  An examination of developments in the federal 
and state courts since 1975 reveals this stark reality. 
1. The lack of Supreme Court leadership 
As the final and only national arbiter of federal common law, the 
Supreme Court holds the potential for clarifying the law of privilege 
in federal criminal cases and civil cases involving federal questions.  
Yet the Supreme Court has shown little interest in the attorney-client 
or other privileges.  Prior to 1975, the Court rarely addressed the 
privilege: in a smattering of decisions, the Court recognized the 
existence of the privilege, its purpose, and occasionally addressed 
some more specific aspects of its contours.147  Since 1975, when 
Congress expressly directed the courts to continue to develop the 
common law of privilege, the Supreme Court has confronted 
testimonial privilege questions only a few times, and the attorney-
client privilege even fewer; indeed, the Court has directly addressed 
attorney-client privilege issues only five times in the last quarter 
century.148 
In Fisher v. United States,149 the Court’s first post-Rule 501 decision 
discussing the attorney-client privilege, the Court addressed only the 
narrow issue of when papers in the possession of the client’s attorney 
are obtainable by a summons directed to the attorney.150  The Court 
held that the summons was enforceable against the attorney only if 
the papers in question were obtainable by summons from the 
client.151 Given that the papers were not otherwise privileged,152 the 
Court did not address other aspects of attorney-client privilege 
doctrine. 
The Court’s most important and controversial discussion of the 
attorney-client privilege followed Fisher.  In Upjohn Co. v. United 
States,153 the Court held that the attorney-client privilege protects 
confidential communications between a corporation and its counsel, 
although it recognized that the artificial nature of the corporate 
                                                          
 147. See generally Brian Sheppard, Jr., Annotation, Views of United States Supreme 
Court as to Attorney-Client Privilege, 159 A.L.R. FED. 243 (2000) (discussing the Court’s 
less than comprehensive treatment of the attorney-client privilege). 
 148. See infra notes 149-86 and accompanying text. 
 149. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 150. Id. at 404-05. 
 151. Id. at 405. 
 152. Id. at 414. 
 153. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
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entity creates complications.154  Specifically, the Court addressed 
whether communications to Upjohn’s corporate counsel by 
corporate employees outside the corporation’s “control group” may 
be privileged.155  The Court held in the affirmative, rejecting the 
position taken by the court below that the privilege applies only to 
communications to counsel by employees in a position to control, or 
take a substantial part in, a decision that the corporation may make 
on the advice of counsel.156  Thus, the Court found that the privilege 
applies to communications from mid-level and even lower-level 
employees to counsel.157 
In rejecting the “control group” approach, the Court reasoned that 
the test overlooks the fact that lower level employees can, by their 
actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the 
corporation in serious legal difficulties.158  The Court also noted that 
the control group test frustrates the purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information 
by employees to corporate counsel seeking to render legal advice to 
the corporate client.159  Moreover, the Court stated that the narrow 
approach threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel 
to ensure the client’s compliance with the law.160  Finally, the Court 
rejected the control group test as difficult to apply in practice.161  
Indeed, the Court emphasized the need for a test that provides some 
level of predictability, declaring that an uncertain privilege “is little 
better than no privilege at all.”162 
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the employee 
communications at issue were privileged because they were made to 
corporate counsel at the direction of the employees’ superiors in 
order to secure legal advice, the communications concerned matters 
within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties, and the 
employees were aware that they were being questioned so that the 
corporation could obtain legal advice.163  Nevertheless, despite 
emphasizing the need for certainty, the Court refused to articulate a 
general rule for determining which employee communications to 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 389-90. 
 155. Id. at 390. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 391. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 392. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 393. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 394. 
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corporate counsel are privileged.164  Thus, although the Court clearly 
indicated that the control group test is too narrow, it did not offer an 
alternative analytical approach.  As discussed in more detail below, 
Upjohn has failed to end the confusion regarding the application of 
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, nor has the 
decision gained universal adherence in state courts.165 
Five years later, in Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub,166 
the Court again confronted the privilege in the corporate setting, this 
time in the context of a bankrupt corporation.167  Rather than address 
the scope of protection, the Court tackled the issue of who is entitled 
to assert and then waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation.168  
For solvent corporations, the power to waive the privilege on behalf 
of the entity rests with the corporation’s management, usually its 
officers and directors.169  When control of the corporation passes to 
new management, this authority to waive the privilege passes along 
with it.170  The Court held that this principle applies when a 
corporation enters bankruptcy: the bankruptcy trustee assumes the 
powers of the previous management and therefore gains the 
authority to waive the entity’s privilege.171  Weintraub, however, 
provided no additional guidance on when the corporate privilege 
attaches in the first place, or who has the authority to assert or waive 
the privilege in other contexts. 
In its 1989 decision in United States v. Zolin,172 the Supreme Court 
discussed the evidentiary and procedural requirements for 
establishing the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege.173  The crime-fraud exception prevents 
clients from using the privilege to shield from disclosure otherwise 
privileged communications when those communications are made 
for the purpose of furthering or facilitating the commission of a 
fraud or crime.174  The Court first stated that trial courts may test a 
proponent’s claims of privilege through an in camera review of the 
                                                          
 164. See id. at 396 (declining to comment on a broader rule because the Court 
only decides issues before it and because the attorney-client privilege is best left to a 
case-by-case review). 
 165. See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text. 
 166. 471 U.S. 343 (1985). 
 167. Id. at 345. 
 168. Id. at 348. 
 169. Id. at 348-49. 
 170. Id. at 349. 
 171. Id. at 353. 
 172. 491 U.S. 554 (1989). 
 173. Id. at 565-72. 
 174. Id. at 562-63.  The Court had first recognized the crime-fraud exception in 
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). 
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allegedly privileged documents.175  Turning to the crime-fraud 
exception specifically, the Court held that a court should engage in 
an in camera review of the allegedly privileged communications only 
if the party opposing the privilege on the crime-fraud ground 
demonstrates a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief 
by a reasonable person that an in camera review may reveal evidence 
that the exception applies.176 Finally, the Court held that the 
threshold showing to obtain an in camera review may be satisfied by 
using any relevant evidence that a court has not adjudicated to be 
privileged.177 
The Court’s discussion in Zolin provides some guidance to lower 
federal courts confronting opposition to claims of privilege based on 
the crime-fraud exception.  Like Upjohn, however, Zolin left many 
questions unanswered.  For example, the Court specifically stated 
that it would not decide questions relating to the quantum of proof 
necessary to establish applicability of the crime-fraud exception.178 
Moreover, as discussed below,179 Zolin offered no guidance on what 
constitutes a communication made for the purpose of furthering a 
fraud.180 
Finally, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States,181 the Court recently 
resolved the narrow but ongoing dispute over whether the privilege 
survives the death of the client.182  The Court held that the privilege 
does survive the client’s death, concluding that survival is the better 
rule after surveying various authorities and emphasizing, as it did in 
Upjohn, the need for certainty in privilege protections.183 
Thus, since Rule 501 was enacted, the Court has rarely addressed 
the privilege.  When it has, it either has addressed a relatively narrow 
question184 or has taken on larger doctrinal issues185 with little in the 
                                                          
 175. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556-57. 
 176. Id. at 572.    
 177. Id. at 575. 
 178. Id. at 563 & n.7 (noting that the question presented for review was narrow, 
and thus, the case was “not the proper occasion to visit” the question of evidentiary 
threshold). 
 179. Infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 180. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563-64 (focusing instead on the type of evidence that 
can be used to prove such an accusation). 
 181. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
 182. See id. at 402 (applying the privilege to communications between White 
House Counsel Vincent Foster and his attorney nine days before Foster committed 
suicide). 
 183. See id. at 407-09 (noting that a client might fear posthumous disclosure just as 
much as disclosure during the client’s lifetime).  Most notably, the Court rejected the 
invitation to allow federal courts to balance ex post the purposes against the need for 
access to the communications in criminal matters.  See id. at 409 (noting that such 
balancing would introduce substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application). 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80 (discussing the Court’s decision in 
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way of detail or guidance for lower federal courts.  The Supreme 
Court’s inattention to the privilege doctrine is particularly ironic, 
since, as previously discussed, the Court has reiterated several times—
in Upjohn, Jaffee, and Swidler & Berlin—that certainty is necessary to 
foster the aims of the privilege.186 
2. Intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts and confusion 
Intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts and confusion in the law of 
the attorney-client privilege are rampant.  Indeed, it would be 
impossible to discuss all of the ways in which privilege law is 
unresolved or disputed in the courts.  However, by focusing on a few 
areas of ambiguity and disagreement, I hope to demonstrate the 
depth and scope of the problem.  The areas of confusion and dispute 
fall into three general categories: (1) the basic elements of the 
privilege;187 (2) the crime-fraud exception;188 and (3) the ways in 
which the privilege protections may be waived, abandoned, or 
ignored.189 
Although most of the discussion focuses on inter-jurisdictional 
conflicts, many jurisdictions have not resolved these issues 
internally.190  Indeed, the foregoing review of the Supreme Court’s 
privilege decisions shows how few issues have been resolved 
definitively in the federal system.191  More generally, these issues 
receive limited appellate attention because privilege determinations 
usually occur at the discovery stage of litigation, and hence are 
interlocutory.192  Thus, in most federal circuits and most state court 
                                                          
Zolin). 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83 (discussing the Court’s decision in 
Swidler). 
 186. See supra notes 66, 183  and accompanying text. 
 187. See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 188. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 189. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 190. See infra Part II.B.2.a-c.  In addition, although many of the cases cited are 
federal cases (because federal district court opinions are more likely to be published 
than decisions from lower state courts), those in which jurisdiction is based solely on 
diversity jurisdiction apply state privilege law.  19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4512 (2d ed. 1987). 
 191. See supra Part II.B.1.  Many jurisdictions, moreover,  have not resolved 
definitively the scope of the corporate privilege.  See infra notes 217-23 and 
accompanying text.  A brief review of the various and conflicting approaches of 
Pennsylvania state and federal courts cited below provides some indication of how 
unclear the privilege is within specific jurisdictions.  See infra notes 199-200 and 
accompanying text. 
 192. Indeed, given that privilege is a defense to discovery and not just 
admissibility, privilege determinations often occur even earlier in the litigation than 
many other evidence determinations.  The major exception is the subpoena 
enforcement action, in which the entire controversy involves whether to compel 
disclosure.  See generally 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 45.04 
GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002  1:29 PM 
2002] FEDERALIZING PRIVILEGE 99 
systems, privilege determinations are rarely subject to immediate 
appeal.193  In addition, unless privilege decisions are appealed 
immediately, they are likely to evade appellate review because most 
cases are resolved before final judgment, and if not, some privilege 
issues may be mooted once “the cat is out of the bag.”194 Definitive 
appellate resolution of lingering controversies, therefore, is often 
elusive.195 
a. The elements of the privilege 
As most commonly articulated, the attorney-client privilege 
protects confidential communications between the client and 
attorney made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
advice.196  Although this statement appears straightforward, each 
                                                          
(3d ed. 1999) (discussing procedures and standards for receiving and complying 
with subpoenas). 
 193. In the federal courts and most state court systems, an order or other action of 
the trial court is not appealable unless it satisfies the “final judgment rule,” or one of 
its narrow exceptions. See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: 
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 182-202 (2001) 
(discussing the final judgment rule and its various, narrow exceptions).  Virtually all 
of the federal system privilege determinations made during discovery are appealable 
only in extremely rare circumstances: (1) when the district court certifies the 
question for immediate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and the circuit court 
accepts such review; (2) when the circuit court grants a   of mandamus; or (3) 
pursuant to the doctrine in Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), when the party 
seeking to prevent discovery is a third-party intervener.  See Glynn, supra, at 192-202 
(discussing the various exceptions to the final judgment rule).  The Third Circuit has 
held that orders denying protection for allegedly privileged communications are 
appealable as a matter of right under the collateral order doctrine.  See Bacher v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 53-55 (3d Cir. 2000) (reaffirming In re Ford Motor Co., 
110 F.3d 954, 957-64 (3d Cir. 1997)).  However, other circuits have expressly rejected 
this extension of the doctrine, and the remaining circuits and the Supreme Court 
are not likely to adopt the Third Circuit’s view.  See Glynn, supra, at 215-16 & n.154 
(citing cases and discussing the Third Circuit view).  The only other avenue to 
immediate appeal as a matter of right is for the person (party or nonparty) resisting 
discovery to refuse to abide by an order to compel and subject himself or herself to 
contempt.  Id. at 190 n.55.  As a practical matter, however, few persons are willing to 
subject themselves to contempt and its corresponding risks. 
 194. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 963 (stating that, even if an 
appellate court decides to “send the case back for re-trial without use of the 
protected materials,” that would not be enough to remedy a breach of 
confidentiality); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, P.L.C., 964 F.2d 
159, 164-65 (2d Cir. 1992) (granting mandamus review to address concerns about 
application of the privilege by lower courts in part because few privilege decisions are 
reversed on appeal and, in the particular case, the benefit of confidentiality would be 
lost but for an immediate appeal); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 825 F.2d 231, 
234 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding privilege issues were moot after disclosure of those 
materials to a grand jury because “the cat has been out of the bag” and there was no 
effective relief the appellate court could grant). 
 195. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 72, at 633-40, 645-46 (discussing jurisdictions in 
which the scope of the corporate privilege has not been definitively resolved). 
 196. E.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE 
UNDER THE RULES § 5.13 (2d ed. 1999); see also supra notes 134-39 and accompanying 
GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002  1:29 PM 
100 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:59 
element continues to produce controversy. 
The modern trend is toward a privilege covering all confidential 
communications between the attorney and client.197  Some courts, 
however, continue to insist that the privilege does not apply to 
communications from the attorney to the client, except to the extent 
that those communications would reveal confidences of the client.198  
For example, seeking to apply Pennsylvania privilege law, a federal 
district court in the Third Circuit recently adopted the narrower view, 
rejecting a contrary view contained in dicta from the Third Circuit.199 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, like many others, has yet to resolve 
this issue.200 Other courts have limited the privilege to attorney 
                                                          
text (noting variety among states of versions of the privilege). 
 197. See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 929 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Ark. 1996) (stating that the 
attorney-client privilege extends to statements made by the attorney and the client, 
and includes “self-initiated attorney communications intended to keep the client 
posted on legal developments and implications”) (quoting Jack Winter, Inc. v. 
Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971)); Titmas v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 803, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The attorney-client privilege covers all forms 
of communication, including transactional advice and advice in anticipation of 
threatened litigation . . . .”); Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 
1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that “the privilege is not narrowly confined to the 
repetition of confidences that were supplied to the lawyer by the client.”); Harris v. 
State, 56 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App. 2001) (explaining that the statements and advice 
that an attorney gives to the client are just as protected as the statements that the 
client makes to the attorney); State ex rel. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 
460 S.E.2d 677, 687 n.13 (W. Va. 1995) (stating that it is irrelevant whether the 
attorney or client made the communication, or whether the communication was 
written or oral); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 185, at 323-24 (stating that 
some courts extend the privilege to legal advice given by the attorney, regardless of 
whether it would reveal a confidential client communication, and noting the trend 
among courts to recognize that the privilege is “a two-way privilege covering all 
confidential communications between the attorney and the client in the course of 
legal representation”); see also Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing 
Confusion About Attorney Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of 
the Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 973-79 (1999) [hereinafter Rice, 
Continuing Confusion] (discussing the trend more generally, and criticizing courts for 
extending the privilege beyond its traditional boundaries). 
 198. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. UCB Films P.L.C., No. 95C 6351, 1998 WL 
703647, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (holding that communications from an 
attorney to a client are privileged if the statements would reveal the essence of  
confidential communications by the client); Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Christian 
Coalition, 178 F.R.D. 61, 66 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that the privilege extends to 
attorney communications to the client if those communications reveal client 
confidences); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 185, at 323 (discussing similar 
cases); Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 973-79 (discussing additional 
similar cases). 
 199. See Coregis Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d 
567, 574 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (rejecting the more lenient approach adopted in dicta by 
the Third Circuit in In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 965 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997)); see 
also Garvey v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 167 F.R.D. 391, 395 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(finding that a communication from an attorney must be based on confidential 
information received from the client in order to be privileged). 
 200. Compare, e.g., Nelson v. Himes, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 748, 749 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
1973) (stating that the privilege only attaches to a client’s communications to an 
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communications that reveal client confidences or responsive legal 
advice.201  Thus, there are lingering doubts over the fundamental 
question of whether and when communications from an attorney to a 
client that do not reveal client confidences are privileged.  This is no 
small matter, particularly in ongoing attorney-client relationships in 
which attorneys often give legal advice that cannot be traced to 
specific client requests or communications. 
In addition, there is an enormous amount of confusion over when 
communications satisfy the confidentiality requirement.202  Generally 
speaking, courts require privilege claimants to demonstrate that 
confidentiality was anticipated, accomplished, and preserved.203  The 
significant uncertainties surrounding preservation of confidentiality 
are addressed below in the discussion of various waiver doctrines.204  
Whether the privilege initially attaches, however, depends on 
whether the client intended to keep the communication confidential 
and took steps to maintain such confidentiality.205  There is much 
                                                          
attorney), with Northampton Borough Mun. Auth. v. Remsco Ass’n, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 
541, 550 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1981) (privilege attaches to an attorney’s communications 
only “where the very purpose of the privilege would be contravened by disclosure”), 
and City of Shamokin v. W. End Nat’l Bank, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 232, 234 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pl. 1982) (stating that it has always been assumed that the privilege attaches to 
attorneys’ communications, to the extent they are based on confidential facts 
provided by the client).  Pennsylvania’s Superior and Supreme Courts have provided 
no recent guidance to resolve this disparity.  See also S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 
632 So. 2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. 1994) (noting an unresolved divergence of views between 
the “narrow view” and the “broad view” of attorney-client privilege).  
 201. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 68 F.3d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the privilege applies only to legal advice and does not apply more 
generally to attorney communications with the client that do not reveal client 
confidences); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 
242, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the federal courts do not extend the attorney-
client privilege to attorney communications except when based on confidential 
information of the client); Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 
18-19 (Conn. 2000) (holding that a communication from an attorney to a client on a 
matter of fact is not privileged “unless it were shown to be inextricably linked to the 
giving of legal advice”) (quoting Ullmann v. State, 647 A.2d 324, 332 (Conn. 1994)); 
see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 975-76 & n.30 (discussing 
additional cases with similar holdings). 
 202. See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Indirect Recognition of Limited 
Waiver, ACCA DOCKET (Apr. 2000), at http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/ 
docket7.html (arguing that the requirement of confidentiality imposes heavy costs 
on the litigation process).  In another article, Professor Rice argues that there is little 
logic in the courts’ requirement that attorney-client communications remain secret 
in order to preserve the privilege.  Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding 
Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L. REV. 853, 856-57 (1998) 
[hereinafter Rice, Eroding Confidentiality]. 
 204. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 205. See, e.g., Sherry L. Talton, Mapping the Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail 
and the Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information, 20 REV. LITIG. 271, 288-89 
(2000) (noting the courts typically focus on such efforts, as well as the parties’ 
reasonable expectations of privacy). 
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disagreement over what this actually means. 
For example, courts have not agreed on the privileged status of 
drafts of documents that the client submits to an attorney for legal 
advice but ultimately intends to disclose to the public or third 
parties.206  Some courts have suggested that the client’s intent to 
disclose some version of the content of the draft means that the 
privilege never attaches.207  Other courts have held that those portions 
of the draft that do not appear in the final, published version are 
privileged.208  Still other courts disagree, treating the entire draft—
including portions that ultimately appear in the final version—as a 
confidential communication between an attorney and client that was 
never intended to be published.209  The implications of this 
                                                          
 206. Compare, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 354-55 (4th Cir. 
1994) (holding that, where a client retains an attorney for the purpose of advice on 
publication, drafts are not privileged), with State ex rel. Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan 
& Arnoff, L.L.P. v. City of Rossford, 746 N.E.2d 1139, 1144-45 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding information appearing in draft bond documents privileged, except that 
information which was later released to the public). 
 207. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(finding irrelevant the fact that no prospectus was ever actually issued, because the 
information given to the attorney was to assist in preparing the prospectus for public 
circulation); Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., No. 95-C-0673, 1996 
WL 732522, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996) (holding that the privilege does not protect 
the draft of a contract where no attorneys were involved in the communication); 
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 618 (E.D.N.C. 1992) 
(holding that draft patent applications are not privileged); see also Abramian v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 93-5968-C, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 598, at 
*9 (Mass. Super. Ct.  Nov. 29, 2001) (holding attorney-client privilege inapplicable to 
draft versions of a report that Harvard intended to release to the public); Gordon v. 
Newspaper Ass’n of Am., No. LF-768-3, 2000 WL 14693, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5, 
2000) (ordering the production of all preliminary drafts and communications 
“necessary to the preparation” of a non-privileged letter), vacated in part on other 
grounds, No. LF-768-3, 2000 WL 140602, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 2000); Rice, 
Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 999-1000 (citing additional cases). 
 208. See, e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that the 
privilege is not waived for communications not disclosed in the final draft); Brossard 
v. Univ. of Mass., No. 961036, 1998 WL 1184124, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 
1998) (finding drafts privileged, but ordering the production of “segregable portions 
of drafts which are identical to the final versions of the same documents” that were 
previously released); State ex rel. Benesch, 746 N.E.2d at 1144-45 (holding information 
appearing in draft bond documents  privileged, except that information which was 
later released to the public).  Several courts have followed the approach taken in von 
Bulow.  See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 1003-05 (discussing von 
Bulow and its progeny). 
 209. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (reasoning that the confidentiality of drafts is not waived when the client 
sends the final document to another party because the client intended to maintain 
confidentiality of drafts in sharing them with attorneys); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. 
Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a client may intend to 
permit the release of the final version of a document without waiving the right to 
keep confidential all communications with the attorney prior to the finalization of 
the document); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 
1995 WL 557412, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 1995) (concluding that an attorney’s drafts 
of documents are privileged if they are created as part of confidential 
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disagreement are enormous given the number and variety of 
documents—prospectuses, press releases, contracts, product 
instructions, warnings, and advertisements—clients have attorneys 
review prior to disclosure.210 
Similarly, some courts have held that oral or written 
communications from an attorney or client are not privileged if the 
underlying information communicated is not confidential.211  Other 
courts have disagreed, adopting the traditional and better view that 
the privilege protects confidential communications, even if the public 
or third parties know some of the underlying information conveyed 
in those communications.212  Like the confusion over drafts, this 
                                                          
communications concerning legal advice); Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. 
Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 26 (Conn. 2000) (finding a preliminary draft of environmental 
report to be submitted to state was protected by the attorney-client privilege because 
consultant’s engagement letter contemplated strict confidentiality); Tompkins Indus. 
v. Warren Tech., Inc., 768 So. 2d 1125, 1125-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding 
that a draft letter that the plaintiff sent to counsel for advice before sending it to the 
defendant was covered by the attorney-client privilege); Kobluk v. Univ. of Minn., 
574 N.W.2d 436, 443 (Minn. 1998) (holding that certain communications can 
remain confidential even if the facts communicated are later disclosed); Va. Elec. & 
Power Co. v. Westmoreland-LG & E Partners, 526 S.E.2d 750, 755 (Va. 2000) 
(concluding privilege attached to a draft letter sent to counsel for legal advice on 
whether it should be mailed); see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 
1003-04 (arguing that written drafts should be afforded the same protections as the 
oral communications in von Bulow). 
 210. See, e.g., Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 1001 (“To conclude 
that the disclosure of an attorney’s final written product, after a series of exchanges 
with the client, results in the loss of all privilege claims for all prior exchanges would 
destroy the privilege protection in a large percentage of instances where legal 
assistance is rendered.”). 
 211. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (denying 
attorney-client protection to portions of letters from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel 
to field personnel because the letters contained legal conclusions based on 
information gathered from taxpayers); United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37-38 
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the privilege does not attach to facts communicated 
from an attorney to a client where the client—a criminal defendant—chose to make 
this same information available to the government prosecutor); Burke v. Tenn. 
Walking Horse Breeders’ & Exhibitors Assoc., App. No. 01A01-9611-CH-00511, 1997 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 378, at *29 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 1997) (“The privilege applies 
only to the extent that the attorney’s communications to a client were specifically 
based upon a client’s confidential communication or would otherwise, if disclosed, 
directly or indirectly reveal the substance or tenor of a confidential 
communication.”); see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 979-82 
(discussing decisions in which courts have (erroneously) found that communications 
are not privileged because of the public nature of the facts contained within the 
communications). 
 212. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 303-04 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that documents containing attorney-client communications are 
privileged even though attorney and client thought processes and findings were 
known to third parties); Ippoliti v. Town of Ridgefield, No. CV 990337600S, 2000 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2020, at *13-14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2000) (stating that a 
communication from attorney to client solely regarding a matter of fact may be 
privileged only if it is “inextricably linked” to rendering legal advice); A.W. 
Chesterton Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-4871, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 16, at *4-5 
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dispute has implications for an enormous number of attorney-client 
communications. 
It is often unclear how far the circle of confidentiality extends and 
how guarded the attorney and client must be with their 
communications.  For example, some courts have held that attorney-
client communications are not confidential if persons other than the 
attorney and client—including agents, close advisors, or relatives—
are present, unless these persons are indispensable or otherwise 
necessary to facilitate the communications.213  Other courts have been 
less restrictive.214  Moreover, largely because the scope of the 
corporate privilege remains unresolved, as discussed below, it is 
                                                          
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2001) (declaring that factual portions of a privileged 
communication are themselves privileged); Stout v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int’l, 
Inc., 681 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that legal consultations 
regarding the estate of Andy Warhol that included “incidental, not otherwise 
privileged matters,” were covered by attorney-client privilege); Spectrum Sys. Int’l 
Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that the presence 
of non-privileged information in an otherwise privileged communication does not 
destroy attorney-client privilege for the entire document); see also Rice, Continuing 
Confusion, supra note 197, at 982-83 (criticizing courts for failing to recognize that the 
privilege focuses on the communication, and is not affected by the facts).  Professor 
Rice summarizes why courts that have found otherwise have failed to recognize the 
distinction between communications and information: 
The privilege focuses on the communication.  It is not concerned with, and 
does not affect, the facts within the communication, as the facts exist outside 
the box.  The privilege does not bestow an independent protection on such 
information, and the information’s nature (factual or technical) or status 
(public or private) does not affect the privilege.  The information does not 
have to be confidential for the communication in which it is incorporated to 
be confidential, and therefore, privileged. 
Id. at 982-83.  Professor Rice likewise states that the source of the information 
contained within the communication is irrelevant.  Id. at 985. 
 213. See, e.g., Nat’l Educ. Training Group, Inc. v. Skillsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8680, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999) (finding no confidentiality in the notes 
of an associate at a board meeting in which the board discussed legal advice of its 
counsel because the associate’s presence at the meeting was not necessary and thus, 
New York’s narrow agency exception did not apply); In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 
794 (Ill. 1988) (finding no confidentiality because communications were made in the 
presence of the client’s mother and fiancé); State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 85 
(Minn. 2001) (privilege does not attach when a client makes statements to an 
attorney in the presence of a spouse); People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (N.Y. 
1989) (holding that presence of co-defendant as translator for defendant’s 
communications with attorney destroyed the privilege because codefendant was not 
present for the purpose of building a joint defense with defendant). 
 214. See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that 
the presence of client’s father did not destroy the privilege); State v. Blacknall, 760 
A.2d 1151, 1153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) (holding that the privilege extends 
to any agent of either the attorney or the client, including necessary intermediaries); 
Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 266-67 (R.I. 1995) (finding that the presence of 
adult client’s parents at meeting with attorney did not waive attorney-client 
privilege); Hoffman v. Conder, 712 P.2d 216, 216-17 (Utah 1985) (holding that the 
appropriate standard is whether the presence of a third party is “reasonably 
necessary,” and, therefore, finding that the presence of a nurse did not destroy 
privilege). 
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unclear when communications widely dispersed within an 
organization or revealed to agents or consultants are privileged.215  
Indeed, courts have differed significantly on what steps a client must 
take to preserve the confidentiality of the privilege—and prevent 
eavesdropping—to satisfy the intent and maintenance 
requirements.216 
In addition, two decades after Upjohn, there continues to be 
enormous confusion and disagreement regarding the identity of the 
client in the corporate or organizational setting.217  Some states have 
declined to follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Upjohn, and continue 
to adhere to the control group or modified control group test for 
determining who within the corporate structure constitutes the 
                                                          
 215. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement 
regarding the identity of the client in the corporate context); see also Edward C. 
Brewer, III, The Ethics of Internal Investigations in Kentucky and Ohio, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 
721, 763-64 (2000) (discussing how the Upjohn principle may extend to non-
employee agents in certain situations, but cautioning that this view is not universally 
shared). 
 216. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that 
clients seeking to preserve the privilege must treat the communications “like jewels” 
and that, short of court-compelled disclosure or other extraordinary circumstances, 
the court will not engage in an analysis of degrees of voluntariness); Suburban Sew 
‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding a 
failure to maintain confidentiality after adverse party found otherwise privileged 
documents in trash dumpster); Floyd v. Coors Brewing Co., 952 P.2d 797, 808-09 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (adopting an ad hoc approach that considers several factors 
when determining whether an alleged inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver of 
privilege), overruled on other grounds, 978 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1999); Blumenthal v. 
Kimber Mfg., Inc., 795 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding that the 
attorney-client privilege is sacrosanct and cannot be waived unless a party knowingly 
and intentionally waived it); In re Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 681 
N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997) (requiring reasonable precautions to prevent 
eavesdropping); Commonwealth v. Petty, No. SUCR 95-10524, 1995 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 42, at *3-4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 1995) (finding that the burden of 
demonstrating a socially recognized expectation of privacy in the location where the 
communication took place rests with a defendant); Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. 
Excom Realty, Inc., 652 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (adopting 
the liberal approach, whereby privilege cannot be waived through inadvertence); 
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 838 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Or. 1992) 
(adopting a strict approach under which intent to waive privilege may be inferred by 
disclosure, even if inadvertent); see also infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text 
(discussing inadvertent disclosure doctrine).  At least one state supreme court has 
held that the mandatory presence of a deputy at the trial preparations of a defendant 
in police custody waives the attorney-client privilege as to communications between 
the defendant and defendant’s counsel.  Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 918 (Wyo. 
1992), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Haworth v. Shillinger, 852 F. Supp. 961 (D. Wyo. 
1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 217. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 72, at 654 (concluding, after surveying 
disparate state approaches prevailing after Upjohn, that there is tremendous 
uncertainty and inconsistent application); Thornburg, supra note 70, at 166 
(discussing the uncertainty in whether a communication to corporate counsel will be 
privileged). 
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client.218 Other states have affirmatively adopted Upjohn or what 
appears to be a similar “subject matter” approach.219 Still others have 
adopted subject matter approaches more narrow than that suggested 
in Upjohn.220  Most states have yet to resolve this issue definitively—by  
statute, rule, or supreme court opinion—although lower court 
opinions within these jurisdictions tend to apply some form of the 
subject matter test.221  Moreover, because Upjohn held that the 
privilege must extend beyond the control group to lower level 
employees, but did not articulate a test for determining which 
communications by such employees would be protected, there is a 
substantial amount of inconsistency in how federal and state courts 
interpret and apply Upjohn and the subject matter approach to 
analyzing communications between employees and corporate 
counsel.222  Also, the debate continues to rage over whether and when 
                                                          
 218. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 254-58 
(Ill. 1982) (adhering to the control group test and rejecting Upjohn).  Besides 
Illinois, a number of states—including Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, Oklahoma, and South Dakota—have adopted statutory or rule-based 
formulations of the control-group test based on Uniform Rule 502.  See REV. UNIF. R. 
EVID. § 502 (amended 1986), 13 U.L.A 150-59 (Supp. 2002); see also Hamilton, supra 
note 72, at 633-40, 644-45 (discussing states’ statutory and common-law treatment of 
the privilege when dealing with corporate clients). 
 219. Some states—including Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont—have adopted Upjohn or a subject matter test 
that appears to conform to its teachings.  A compilation of these states’ statutes, 
rules, and case law is on file with the author.  See also Hamilton, supra note 72, at 633-
41 (discussing states’ statutory and common-law treatment of the privilege in the 
corporate setting).  As of 2001, only Texas has expressly adopted the Revised Rule 
502(a)(2) (1986) and its broad subject matter test, which defines “representative of 
the client” as one who has the authority to obtain legal services; act on the legal 
advice rendered; or, “for the purpose of effectuating legal representation for the 
client, makes or receives a confidential communication while acting in the scope of 
employment for the client.” UNIF. R. EVID. 502; see also id. & cmt. 150-59 (describing 
treatment of the rule and variations in jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence). 
 220. See, e.g., S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994) 
(adopting a subject matter test but requiring that the communications of lower-level 
employees with attorneys be at the direction of a corporate supervisor); Chadbourne, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 388 P.2d 700, 709-10 (Cal. 1964) (applying a subject matter 
test that covers only communications within an employee’s duties and requires an 
intent on a part of the initial communicator); see also Hamilton, supra note 72, at 641-
44 (discussing the California, Florida, and Utah modified subject matter 
approaches). 
 221. See Hamilton, supra note 72, at 633-40, 645-46 (reporting that fourteen states 
had adopted the subject matter test). 
 222. Although an exhaustive discussion of the subtle and not so subtle distinctions 
between approaches in different state and federal jurisdictions is beyond the scope of 
this article, others already have provided detailed accounts of these disparate views. 
See generally Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Determination of Whether a Communication 
is from a Corporate Client for Purposes of the Attorney-Client Privilege–Modern Cases, 26 
A.L.R.5TH 628 (1995) (summarizing disparate approaches to the attorney-client 
privilege in federal and state courts); RICE, supra note 14, § 4.11 (providing specific 
state examples of attorney-client privilege law); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
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former employees may reveal or discuss corporate confidences with 
outsiders.223 
Similarly, there is much conflict over who is entitled to control—
and, hence, choose to preserve or waive—the privilege on behalf of 
the corporate client.  For example, courts disagree over whether and 
when corporate decision makers can assert the privilege with regard 
to communications with corporate counsel in an action brought 
against the decision makers or on the corporation’s behalf by 
                                                          
12, § 189, at 344 (discussing the split in authority in the wake of Upjohn); Michael L. 
Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, 28 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 473 (1987) (discussing the long history of the corporate attorney-
client privilege and exploring why the proper scope of the privilege has been so 
problematic); Thornburg, supra note 70, at 166 (discussing the uncertainty in 
whether a communication to corporate counsel will be privileged).  By way of 
example, Alexander Black, in addition to summarizing the various state court 
approaches, discussed the disparate approaches in federal courts in the wake of 
Upjohn: 
The courts in many pre-Upjohn cases, including the leading subject matter 
test cases, took the view that a communication is the corporate client’s if it 
concerns matters within the scope of the communicator’s employment and 
is made at the direction of a corporate supervisor, and some post-Upjohn 
cases have continued to apply that test.  Other courts require only that the 
communication concern matters within the scope of the communicator’s 
employment.  One court has held that a privileged communication must 
concern matters within the scope of either the communicator’s duties or 
the duties of the communicator’s subordinate.  Another court has held that 
a communication is the corporate client’s if it is made at the direction of 
the communicator’s corporate superior.  A court has held that a privileged 
communication must concern matters within the scope of the 
communicating employee’s employment and must concern information 
necessary for legal decision making.  According to another court, a 
privileged communication must concern matters within the scope of the 
communicator’s employment and the employee must be aware that 
information is provided for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the 
corporation.   Another court has held that a privileged communication 
must relate to the communicating employee’s duties and must be at the 
corporation’s behest, and that the employee must know that the 
communication was made for purposes of obtaining legal advice.  One 
court has held that a communication is the corporate client’s if it advises 
corporate personnel who can act on the advice or provides necessary 
information to corporate counsel. Other or unspecified criteria were used 
in a few cases to find communications privileged or not privileged. 
See Black, supra, at 628 (cross-references and corresponding citations omitted). 
 223. See, e.g., Charles A. Weiss, Lawyers Bypassing Lawyers, 2 LITIG. 42, 43-44 (2002) 
(identifying the controversy and examining the arguments asserted on each side); 
Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Does the Corporation’s Privilege Protect 
Communications Between Corporate Counsel and Former Employees?, ACCA DOCKET (June 
2000) (same), at http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/docket9.htm; Mark A. 
Buchanan, Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees: An Update on Rule 4.2 of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 THE BRIEF 48, 49 (Winter 1999) (same). 
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shareholders.224  In the leading case, Garner v. Wolfinbarger,225 the Fifth 
Circuit set out various criteria for abrogation of the privilege in a 
derivative action.226  Yet some state courts and federal district courts in 
other circuits have rejected or questioned Garner’s approach, and 
commentators also have criticized the decision.227  To add to the 
confusion, federal courts disagree as to whether the Garner approach 
or “fiduciary duty exception” should apply in individual shareholder 
actions.228  Similarly, courts have differed on how to treat privilege 
                                                          
 224. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
 225. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 226. See id. at 1104 (holding that shareholders can gain access to the 
communications by demonstrating “good cause” for the information, which includes 
demonstrating the bona fides of their claim, the percentage of shareholders 
represented, and their need for the information). 
 227. See, e.g., Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D. Neb. 1995) (declining to 
follow Garner because it had not been adopted by the Eight Circuit); Lefkowitz v. 
Duquesne Light Co., Civ. A. Nos. 86-1046, and 86-2085, 1988 WL 169273, at *6 (W.D. 
Pa. June 14, 1988) (rejecting Garner because “a hasty resort to Garner concepts will 
confuse who corporate counsel’s clients realistically are, and ignore the genuine 
need of management in the ordinary course [of] confidential communication and 
advice”) (quoting Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389, 391 (D. Conn. 
1986)); Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 
897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that California courts have refused to carve out a 
shareholder exception to the statutory attorney-client privilege applicable to 
corporations); Hoiles v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984) (refusing to pierce the privilege based on Garner in the closely held corporate 
context because the exception is not statutory); Agster v. Barmada, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th 
353, 363 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1999) (stating that Garner’s approach to shareholder 
litigation, in which the attorney-client privilege may be pierced for good cause 
shown, is inconsistent with Pennsylvania case law’s application of the privilege); 
Broun, supra note 1, at 786-87 (citing federal cases and commentators); Fredrick R. 
Ball, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Director and Shareholder Litigation, 89 ILL. B.J. 537, 
537 (2001) (stating that the scope of the privilege varies dramatically from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on whether state or federal law applies, and 
how willing the court is to pierce the privilege); Paul J. Sigwarth, It’s My Privilege and 
I’ll Assert It if I Want To: The Attorney-Client Privilege in Closely-Held Corporations, 23 J. 
CORP. L. 345, 352-55 (1998) (discussing Garner and its progeny, the confusion that 
followed, and critical commentary); Brewer, supra note 215, at 770-72 (discussing 
state and federal courts’ differing views on Garner).  See generally Friedman, supra note 
68, at 281 (criticizing Garner and questioning its viability after Jaffee). 
 228. Compare Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(applying Garner to non-derivative shareholder actions but stating that in such 
actions a showing of good cause is subject to a more “careful scrutiny”), and Picard 
Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 951 F. Supp. 679, 687 (W.D. Mich. 
1996) (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that Garner does not only apply to shareholder 
derivative actions, and stating that “[t]he fact that shareholder-plaintiffs seek 
recovery for themselves may only render their motives more suspect than if they 
bring a derivative action.”) (citing Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 131 (6th Cir. 
1992)), and In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 92 Civ. 9076 (GLG), 1993 
WL 760214, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1993) (following the approach of the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits), with Cox v. Adm’r, United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 
1416 (11th Cir. 1994) (declining to follow Garner because the plaintiffs sought 
damages for their personal benefit, at the expense of the Union rather than on 
behalf of the Union), and Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 
18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981) (limiting Garner to shareholder derivative suits because “[t]he 
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claims in disputes between directors of closely held corporations.229  
Moreover, some jurisdictions now extend the fiduciary duty 
exception to other contexts in which the person seeking to prevent 
disclosure owes a fiduciary duty to the person seeking access to the 
communications,230 while other jurisdictions have resisted this 
                                                          
Garner plaintiffs sought damages from other defendants [on] behalf of the 
corporation, whereas Weil [sought] to recover damages from the corporation for 
herself and the members of her proposed class.”), and Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F. 
Supp. 646, 651 (D. Neb. 1995) (stating that Garner “has no applicability where the 
plaintiff stockholder asserts claims primarily to benefit himself, particularly where 
such claims will undoubtedly harm all other stockholders if successful.”); see also Rice, 
Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 736 (citing cases that disagree on the use of the 
privilege in the corporate context); Friedman, supra note 68, at 281 (citing cases that 
support the abandonment of the balancing test on the corporate context); Sigwarth, 
supra note 227, at 355, 366-67 (discussing the various contexts in which Garner has 
been applied). 
 229. Compare Carnegie Hill Fin., Inc. v. Krieger, No. 99-CV-2592, 2000 WL 10446, 
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2000) (holding that a corporation may not assert the attorney-
client privilege against former officers and directors), and Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 
F.R.D. 241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992) (stating that present board of directors could not 
assert privilege against a former director because the situation is analogous to one 
where parties with a common interest retain the same attorney, but when they later 
become adverse, neither is allowed to claim privilege), and Harris v. Wells, No. B-89-
391 (WWE) & B-89-482 (WWE), 1990 WL 150445, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 5, 1990) 
(defendant-director could not claim privilege against other plaintiff-directors), and 
Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Cordant Holdings Corp., Nos. 13911 & 14595, 1996 WL 
307444, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 4, 1996) (holding under Delaware law that “a 
corporation may not assert the attorney-client privilege against its own directors to 
deprive them of access to information discussed at board meetings, including legal 
advice furnished to the board,” during the directors’ tenures), and Kirby v. Kirby, 
Civ. A. No. 8604, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 463, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 29, 1987) (stating 
that privilege cannot be invoked against a corporation’s own directors because 
directors should be “treated as the ‘joint client’” when they receive legal advice for 
the corporation), with Milroy, 875 F. Supp. at 649-50 (finding that a dissident director 
is not management and, therefore, cannot pierce the attorney-client privilege if it 
would conflict with the will of management), and Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 
640 N.W.2d 788, 813 (Wis. 2002) (concluding that, based on the reasoning in Milroy 
and the entity rule, the plaintiff’s status as a former director does not allow him to 
waive the privilege, or preclude the defendant’s board of directors from asserting the 
privilege against him); see also Sigwarth, supra note 227, at 357-64 (discussing cases in 
which courts have treated such privilege claims differently). 
 230. See, e.g., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 475 
n.5 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that general partners owed appellants a fiduciary duty 
and, therefore, cannot assert the privilege against the appellants); Lawrence v. Cohn, 
No. 90 Civ. 2396 (CSHMHD), 2002 WL 109530, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2002) 
(applying the fiduciary exception in the trustee-beneficiary context without recourse 
to the Garner “good cause” test); Wessel v. City of Albuquerque, 48 Fed. R. Serv.3d 
349, 351 (D.D.C. 2000) (applying fiduciary exception in suit brought by nonunion 
employees against a union); Nellis v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 144 F.R.D. 68, 71 (E.D. Va. 
1992) (applying fiduciary exception in suit by union members against union for 
breach of fair representation duty); Ferguson v. Lurie, 139 F.R.D. 362, 365 (N.D. Ill. 
1991) (considering the “good cause” factors of Garner after finding that general 
partners have a fiduciary obligation to the limited partners in limited partnerships); 
Martin v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 140 F.R.D. 291, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying 
the fiduciary exception in the trustee-beneficiary context without recourse to the 
Garner “good cause” test); Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of 
Wis., 131 F.R.D. 63, 68-69 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying the Garner exception to an insured 
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expansion.231 
Yet another substantial disagreement exists over when 
communications are made for the purpose of obtaining or providing 
legal advice, particularly when the client may be seeking business or 
other nonlegal advice in addition to legal advice.232  This 
                                                          
and an excess insurer subrogee); Wash.-Balt. Newspaper Guild v. Wash. Star Co., 543 
F. Supp. 906, 909 (D.D.C. 1982) (applying the fiduciary exception in the trustee-
beneficiary context without recourse to the Garner “good cause” test); Donovan v. 
Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding that corporate 
shareholders, as well as pensioners and potential recipients of fund assets, need 
access to information to determine whether a fiduciary is exercising authority as 
contemplated); Metro. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 
No.Civ.A.18023-NC, 2001 WL 1671445, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2001) (explaining 
that the Garner doctrine has been extended so that limited partners can access the 
corporation’s privileged communications); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., No. 
Civ.A.15539, 1999 WL 66528, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1999) (extending fiduciary 
exception to limited partnership as long as there is “mutuality of interest” between 
limited and general partners and showing of “good cause”); see also Rice, Loss of 
Predictability, supra note 56, at 736-37 (discussing Garner and various “fiduciary duty 
exception” cases, including partnership, trust, union, and shareholder divorce 
cases). 
 231. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 596 (Cal. 2000) 
(holding that a trustee may assert the attorney-client privilege against trust 
beneficiaries); Smith v. Laguna Sur Villas Cmty. Ass’n, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321, 324 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to carve out a fiduciary exception because “courts ‘do not 
enjoy the freedom to restrict California’s statutory attorney-client privilege based on 
notions of policy or ad hoc justification.’”) (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, 990 P.2d at 
596); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Turney, No. 1D00-2803, 2001 WL 1485659, at *11 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2001) (refusing to decide whether Florida has a fiduciary 
exception to the attorney-client privilege); Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 924-25 
(Tex. 1996) (declining to adopt fiduciary exception approach). 
 232. For example, some courts require that the particular communication be 
“primarily” or “predominately” of a legal character.  See, e.g., Stephenson Equity Co. 
v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99 CIV 113951RWS, 2002 WL 59418, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
16, 2002) (stating that the privilege does not attach because, although reports 
investigating insurance claims on behalf of insurance company were prepared by 
attorneys, such reports were prepared “as part of the regular business of the 
company” and therefore were not of a primarily or predominately legal character); 
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding 
that a communication must be predominated by legal advice to be protected); 
Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 
Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991)); Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 692 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (App. Div. 
1999) (holding that defendants are not protected by the attorney-client privilege 
because the communications pertained mainly to commercial concerns, and were 
not primarily of a legal character), leave to appeal dismissed, 726 N.E.2d 483 (N.Y. 
2000); cf. Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 25 (Conn. 2000) 
(adopting an approach that resonates with the “primarily” or “predominately” legal 
approach by applying the privilege where the communications at issue are 
“inextricably linked” or “necessary” to the giving or obtaining of legal advice).  Other 
courts apply a “but for” test: the claimant must demonstrate that the communication 
with counsel would not have been made but for the client’s need for legal services.  
See, e.g., Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D.N.J. 1994) (finding that the 
claimant failed to show that the materials in question were prepared in a manner 
other than the ordinary course of business, and that the communication would not 
have occurred but for the client’s need for legal advice) (quoting First Chicago Int’l 
v. United Exch. Co., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)); Doe v. Archdiocese of the 
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disagreement is most pronounced in the in-house counsel context, 
since in-house attorneys often serve multiple roles within the business 
and the potential for abuse of the privilege may be greater in this 
context because businesses often funnel many communications and 
proposals through in-house attorneys.233  Although the American Bar 
Association and some courts have taken the position that in-house 
counsel should not be subjected to stricter privilege standards than 
outside counsel,234 other state and federal jurisdictions have 
                                                          
Catholic Church of Miami, 721 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (listing the 
“but for” requirement as one of five criteria that needs to be established in order to 
be entitled to privilege) (citing S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d. 1377, 
1383 (Fla. 1994)).  But see In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 966 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(applying the “for the purpose of securing legal advice” test broadly by allowing the 
assertion of the attorney-client privilege over communications at a Policy and 
Strategy Committee meeting that included both legal and business decisions, so long 
as the business decisions were reached after the committee examined the legal 
implications of doing so).  One federal circuit court has taken the view that, once a 
matter is committed to an attorney, it is presumptively for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice and, therefore, within the privilege absent a clear showing to the 
contrary.  In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. 
Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that when a person hires an 
attorney for advice, regardless of the subject of the advice, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the attorney is hired to give legal advice, but the presumption is 
rebutted when the attorney was hired without reference to his knowledge and 
discretion in the law) (citations omitted); Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 
93.C.4899, 1996 WL 288511, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1996) (holding that a 
communication between a corporation and its attorney concerning whether and how 
the corporation should make a variety of employment and legal decisions was 
privileged); In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 170 B.R. 331, 354 (S.D. Ohio 1994) 
(holding that there is a prima facie assumption that a communication committed to 
an attorney was sought for the sake of legal advice).  In many circumstances, courts 
have been vague about when mixed legal and business advice is protected.  See, e.g., 
Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1990) (appearing to apply a 
“but for” test, while at the same time asserting that “the court’s inquiry is focused on 
whether ‘the communication is designed to meet problems which can fairly be 
characterized as predominately legal.’”) (quoting Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 
198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)); Mark C. Van Deusen, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege for 
In-House Counsel When Negotiating Contracts: A Response to Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF 
Manufacturing Corp., 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 1398 (1998) (stating that courts 
have failed to articulate clearly when the privilege protects communications 
containing mixed legal and business advice). 
 233. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 68, at 394, 398-400 (discussing the role of in-house 
counsel and the potential for abuse that have led some courts to take a dim view of 
the privilege in the in-house context); Van Deusen, supra note 232, at 1398 
(discussing the precarious status of communications with in-house counsel).  This is 
no small matter, since, according to an American Bar Association publication, over 
ten percent of attorneys serve as in-house counsel.  Barry F. McNeil, Internal Corporate 
Investigations: Conducting Them, Protecting Them, 1997 A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG. REP. 120. 
 234. See Weiss, supra note 68, at 394 (stressing the importance of in-house 
attorneys being able to communicate freely with their clients); see also Weeks, 1996 WL 
288511, at *2 (asserting that the attorney-client privilege is not vitiated when an 
attorney weighs business considerations in rendering legal advice); Note Funding 
Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., No. 93 Civ. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL 662402, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 9, 1995) (holding that, because it is common for commercial entities to use 
attorneys who have training and experience in analyzing “alternative business 
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scrutinized in-house communications more strictly.235  Moreover, 
those courts that apply a stricter standard to communications 
between clients and in-house counsel apply varying standards, some 
of which provide little meaningful guidance.236 
                                                          
strategies,” a corporation can assert attorney-client privilege over communications to 
an attorney that encompass both legal and commercial considerations); In re 
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 170 B.R. at 354-55 (holding that an attorney’s tax 
planning advice was legal advice and, therefore, communications relating to this 
advice were covered by the attorney-client privilege, regardless of whether the 
attorney also weighed business considerations in giving the advice). 
 235. See generally United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C-94-1885 SBA, 1996 WL 
264769, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996) (refusing to assume that all communications 
to in-house counsel are primarily related to legal advice because in-house counsel 
usually are involved in a company’s business decisions); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994) (subjecting a corporation’s attorney-client 
privilege claims to a heightened level of scrutiny to hinder the corporation’s attempts 
to cloak information with the privilege and avoid discovery). 
 236. For example, some courts require that the party seeking protection of 
communications between in-house counsel and the party demonstrate that the 
communications are primarily legal or made for the primary purpose of seeking or 
providing legal advice.  E.g., Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 
609, 633 (M.D. Pa. 1997); Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 
115 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Chevron Corp., 1996 WL 264769, at *3; Kramer v. Raymond 
Corp., Civ. No. 90-5026, 1992 WL 122856, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1992); N.C. Elec. 
Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C. 
1986); Sicpa Holdings S.A. v. Optical Coating Lab., Inc., Civil Action No. 15129, 1996 
WL 636161, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 1996); Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 
N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. 1989); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 385.  Of 
course, these standards are vague; it is difficult to discern when communications 
involve primarily legal advice, and how to determine the primary purpose of the 
communications.  See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 68, at 398-400 (discussing and criticizing 
these standards in part because they fail to explain when communications will be 
sufficiently legal in nature).  Other courts have limited the in-house counsel privilege 
more severely to circumstances in which in-house attorneys are acting solely in a 
“professional legal capacity.” See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 
1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001). 
Where . . . in-house counsel appears as one of many recipients of an 
otherwise business-related memo, the federal courts place a heavy burden 
on the proponent to make a clear showing that counsel is acting in a 
professional legal capacity and that the document reflects legal, as opposed 
to business, advice. 
Id.; Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc., 174 F.R.D. at 633 (stating that the privilege only applies 
when an attorney is acting in the role of legal advisor, not business advisor or 
corporate administrator); Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. G.A.F. Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 CIV 
5125 (RPP), 1996 WL 29392, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (explaining that the 
communications from in-house counsel to management involve difficult fact specific 
questions); Chevron Corp., 1996 WL 264769, at *4 (holding that there must be a clear 
showing that in-house counsel was giving advice in a professional legal capacity); Lee 
v. Engle, Nos. Civ.A.13323 & Civ.A.13284, 1995 WL 761222, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 
1995) (stating that the privilege only applies to advice given by an attorney in a 
professional legal capacity); Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 541 S.E.2d 782, 791 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that in-house counsel for an insurance company is not 
protected by the privilege unless acting as a legal advisor at the time of the 
communication).  Still others have adopted modified subject matter tests, allowing 
privilege claims where communications are made in the course of seeking legal 
services and, indeed, would not have been made but for contemplation of such 
services, as long as other aspects of the subject matter test is satisfied.  See, e.g., Deason, 
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There are countless other differences among jurisdictions 
regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege and lingering 
unresolved issues within jurisdictions.237  Thus, while the basic 
elements of the privilege are largely undisputed, there is enormous 
conflict over what the basic elements actually require. 
b. The crime-fraud exception 
The crime-fraud exception is the most significant exception to the 
attorney-client privilege.238 This exception, like the privilege itself, is 
usually justified in utilitarian terms: society would incur harm if the 
privilege protected attorney-client communications that assist clients 
in furthering a crime or perpetrating a fraud.239  Like the privilege 
itself, the scope of the exception is unresolved. 
The Supreme Court recognized the crime-fraud exception in Clark 
v. United States,240 stating that the law will not help any client who asks 
an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a 
fraud.241  Under Clark’s articulation of the exception, a party seeking 
                                                          
632 So. 2d at 1382-83 (explaining that the subject matter test, which potentially 
extends to communications of al employees and not just officers, adds a condition to 
corporate privilege that more completely addresses the problems in corporate 
cases); see also Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1990) 
(appearing to apply a “but for” test); cf. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D. 
270, 272 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (adopting the modified subject matter test, articulated in 
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), which allows 
protection by the attorney-client privilege over a corporation’s communications that 
were made for the purpose of securing legal advice, so long as other prongs of the 
test are also met); Marriott Corp. v. Am. Acad. of Psychotherapists, Inc., 277 S.E.2d 
785, 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that Diversified’s modified subject-matter 
test “best strikes an appropriate balance”). 
 237. For example, there is continuing confusion over the application of the 
privilege when the client discloses non-privileged, pre-existing documents to the 
attorney during the course of a communication.  See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra 
note 197, at 989-95 (reviewing cases and suggesting an (appropriate) analysis).  In 
addition, there is much debate over the proper scope of the “joint defense” or 
“common interest” doctrines, addressing protection of communications shared 
among a group of parties with common interests.  E.g., John J. Faley, Jr. & Valerie K. 
Frias, The Corporate Joint-Defense Privilege: For Defense Lawyers, a Shield or a Sieve?, 1 BUS. 
CRIMES BULL. 3 (Feb. 2002).  There is also continuing controversy over whether and 
when the identity of the client is privileged.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, 
§ 90, at 360-63. 
 238. There are other exceptions, including the “common interest,” breach of duty 
(by attorney or client), and attestation exceptions. See generally MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §§ 196-1 98, at 374-79 (reviewing breach of duty, claim 
through decedent client, and attorney as attesting witness exception).  Although 
these exceptions arise less frequently than the crime-fraud exception, they are not 
free from controversy.  Id. 
 239. See, e.g., Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1508-10 (discussing why, 
from a utilitarian perspective, attorney-client communications intended to further a 
crime or fraud should not be privileged). 
 240. 289 U.S. 1 (1933). 
 241. Id. at 15. 
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otherwise privileged communications must make a prima facie 
showing that the client sought the attorney’s advice or representation 
for the purpose of furthering wrongful conduct.242  Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s test requires a showing of wrongful intent, or 
knowingly wrongful behavior, on the part of the client.243  As 
discussed above, the Court then provided in Zolin that trial courts 
should engage in an in camera review of the allegedly privileged 
communications if those opposing the privilege on the crime-fraud 
ground demonstrate a factual basis adequate to support a good faith 
belief by a reasonable person that an in camera review may reveal 
evidence to establish the claim that the exception applies.244 
Although all jurisdictions recognize this exception, they differ on 
both its application and scope.  For example, Zolin never clarified the 
quantum of proof required to vitiate the privilege, and since then, 
courts have articulated disparate standards.245  Moreover, some lower 
federal courts and courts in other jurisdictions have abandoned 
Clark’s requirement that the party seeking discovery make such a 
showing of client intent—namely, that the client consulted an 
attorney for the purpose of committing or furthering a crime or 
fraud.246  These courts have simply required a showing of a crime or 
                                                          
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.; see also Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1512 (discussing how 
many courts have “scrupulously follow[ed]” the Clark requirement of a prima facie 
showing that the client intentionally sought the advice to perpetuate a crime). 
 244. See sources cited supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. 
 245. See, e.g., Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 31 (Conn. 
2000) (finding that a court may abrogate the privilege under the crime-fraud 
exception only when the court finds there was probable cause to believe that the 
privileged communications were made with the intent to perpetrate and further a 
civil fraud); Am. Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997) (holding that the party opposing the privilege based on the crime-fraud 
exception must produce evidence of fraud beyond a preponderance of the evidence, 
and the party asserting the privilege must then give the court a reasonable 
explanation for the communications or conduct in order to keep the privilege); 
Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 726-27 (Ky. 2002) (stating that Zolin’s disclaimer 
regarding the requisite quantum of proof “can only mean that lower federal courts 
are free to fashion other and better tests than the ‘prima facie case’ standard to 
overcome a claim of privilege,” a preponderance of evidence test); Purcell v. Dist. 
Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Mass. 1997) (applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, but stating that the court retains discretion 
to conduct an in camera review if the facts support a reasonable belief that the review 
would establish that the exception applies).  Compare United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 
1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that government must submit evidence that, if 
reasonably believed, would establish elements of an ongoing violation), and Haines v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a party seeking 
discovery under the exception must present evidence that, if believed, would be 
sufficient to support a finding in its favor on each element of the privilege), with 
United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that a party seeking 
discovery need only demonstrate something “giv[ing] color” to the crime or fraud). 
 246. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (adding that 
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fraud and a nexus or relationship between the crime or fraud and the 
potentially privileged matters.247  By removing the intent requirement, 
this approach, which has received some criticism,248 vastly expands the 
potential scope of the exception.  In addition, courts are in conflict 
over whether the crime-fraud exception applies to statements made 
in furtherance of intentional torts other than fraud.  In the federal 
system, for example, two circuit courts have held that the exception 
should not extend beyond criminal or fraudulent activities, while a 
number of other courts have reached contrary conclusions.249 
                                                          
requiring a greater showing creates administrability concerns); X-Corp v. Doe, 805 F. 
Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Va. 1992) (expressing hope that the approach would prevent 
use of privilege to shield information learned collaterally during representation). 
 247. See, e.g., Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 814-15 (stating a court must find only some 
relationship between the privileged communication and the prima facie violation to 
defeat the privilege); X-Corp, 805 F. Supp. at 1307 (holding a communication falls 
within the crime-fraud exception if it merely “reflects” an ongoing or future illegal 
scheme); People v. Superior Court (Bauman & Rose), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 741 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995) (stating that, in order for the crime-fraud exception to apply, the 
party opposing privilege must establish a prima facie case of fraud and a “reasonable 
relationship” between the fraud and the communication between attorney and 
client) (citing Cunningham v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1412-16 (S.D. 
Cal. 1994) (crime-fraud exception applied to allegedly privileged letter because 
insurance company established a prima facie case for finding that the letter was 
reasonably related to a future or on-going fraud)); Privileged Communications, supra 
note 26, at 1512 & n.64 (citing cases in which courts have applied the crime-fraud 
exception to work-product doctrine). 
 248. See John J. Mulderig et al., Tobacco Cases May Be Only the Tip of the Iceberg for 
Assaults on Privilege, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 16, 26-27 (2000) (noting potential for 
application of exception to privileged and work product documents unrelated to 
crime or fraud); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1513 (describing 
application of a reduced standard as particularly troubling where clients face 
ambiguous or complex laws, which are more readily violated despite good-faith 
attempts to comply). 
 249. Compare Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that crime-fraud exception is limited to legal advice in furtherance of a 
crime or fraud and, under Oklahoma and federal law, the exception does not extend 
to tortious conduct generally), and Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 
342 (5th Cir. 1972) (declining to take the further step of also excepting the 
commission of a tort from the privilege), and Ferrara & DiMercurio, Inc. v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 7, 13 (D. Mass. 1997) (refusing to extend the exception 
to unfair and deceptive trade practice claims), with In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 
234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying the exception to other intentional torts, in addition 
to crimes and fraud), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 
524 U.S. 399 (1998), and Sprague v. Thorn Am., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1372 (10th Cir. 
1997) (holding that the privilege does not extend to communications where there is 
sufficient evidence that the communication was made to enable or aid in a crime or 
tort), and Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(recognizing that the crime-fraud exception applies to intentional torts “moored in 
fraud” and does not require actual fraud), and In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that attorney-client communications are made in 
furtherance of a “crime, fraud, or other misconduct” when the evidence shows a 
pervasive and systematic plan to destroy evidence), and Coleman v. Am. Broad. Cos., 
106 F.R.D. 201, 209 (D.D.C. 1985) (indicating willingness to expand the scope of 
crime-fraud exception but finding extension not warranted in this case because the 
party alleging the misconduct failed to make a prima facie showing that such 
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c. Waiver and post hoc qualification 
At the time of the attorney-client communication, attorneys and 
their clients obviously do not intend to waive the privilege.  However, 
the likelihood that the client may waive or mistakenly waive the 
privilege, or might otherwise be denied protection for initially 
privileged communications must be part of an attorney’s assessment 
of how safe attorney-client communications will be from compelled 
disclosure.250  Thus, even if the elements of the privilege and the 
parameters of its exceptions were clear, which they are not, the 
protection that the privilege affords would still be highly uncertain if 
there exist unpredictable or unforgiving waiver rules or other 
doctrines that make application uncertain and which might strip 
otherwise protected communications of their privileged status.  
Unfortunately, the current regime is riddled with such unpredictable 
doctrines. 
First, although some courts are forgiving with regard to inadvertent 
disclosures of attorney-client communications, other courts are not.  
Indeed, there is lingering disagreement over whether and when an 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications to an adversary 
or third party constitutes a waiver of the privilege.251  A few courts 
have suggested that waiver occurs regardless of the circumstances of 
the disclosure, including situations in which no blame can be 
attached to either the attorney or the client.252  Most have looked at 
                                                          
misconduct occurred), and Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(holding that there is an exception to the attorney-client privilege for 
communications made in furtherance of intentional torts other than fraud, namely, 
in this case, intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 250. But see Zacharias, supra note 81, at 365-66 (suggesting that flexible exceptions 
in fact may not affect client decisions whether or not to communicate with counsel). 
 251. See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the federal 
courts’ disparate approaches to inadvertent waiver); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
supra note 19, § 93, at 372 (stating that opinions in the area have been divergent); 
MUELLER  & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 202, at 401 (same); Talton, supra note 205, 
at 290-95 (discussing the disparate views of inadvertent waiver doctrine); Ken M. 
Zeidner, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to the Work 
Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1318-19 (2001) (outlining the 
divergent approaches to inadvertent disclosures in the federal courts). 
 252. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that clients 
seeking to preserve the privilege must treat the communications “like jewels” and 
that, short of court-compelled disclosure or other extraordinary circumstances, the 
court will not engage in an analysis of degrees of voluntariness); FDIC v. Singh, 140 
F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (applying a strict rule); see also United States v. Ryans, 
903 F.2d 731, 741 n.13 (10th Cir. 1990) (appearing to adopt the strict view); New 
York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.98-1233 (CKK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7684, at *9 
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2002) (holding that disclosure of otherwise-privileged materials 
waives the privilege, regardless of whether the disclosure was unintentional); Int’l 
Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449-50 (D. Mass. 1988) 
(holding that, even after inadvertent disclosure, information is no longer 
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the circumstances of the disclosure or have applied multi-factor tests 
in determining whether inadvertent production was careless or 
unreasonable enough to constitute waiver.253  Still others have been 
far more forgiving, concluding that waiver occurs only when attorneys 
or clients have voluntarily disclosed confidential communications, or 
have been reckless or extremely careless in guarding against 
disclosure.254 
In addition, the state and federal courts are split over whether a 
client’s voluntary sharing of privileged communications with 
                                                          
confidential regardless of the disclosing party’s intention and that the adequacy of 
the precautions taken to avoid such disclosure is immaterial).  Compare Ares-Serono, 
Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 160 F.R.D. 1, 10 (D. Mass. 1994) (explaining that the strict 
rule ensures that attorneys will “more diligently” protect the secrecy of patent 
applications), with Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 292 
(D. Mass 2000) (declining to adopt the strict rule, which effects a waiver of the 
privilege regardless of the disclosing party’s inadvertence or intent, and instead 
adhering to a “middle test,” which takes into consideration the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications, 
such as whether adequate steps were taken to ensure a document’s confidentiality). 
 253. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 186 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(adopting a case-by-case fairness approach); Gray, 86 F.3d at 1484 (adopting—
purportedly under Missouri law—the “middle of the road approach,” which takes 
into account a number of factors to determine whether unintentional disclosures 
constitute waiver); Alldread v. Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that waiver must be determined on a case-by-case basis); Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger, 
116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (applying a five-factor test including 
consideration of the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure, the 
number of inadvertent disclosures, the extent of the disclosure, delays in rectifying 
disclosures, and the overriding interests of justice); Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying a four-factor test 
which includes consideration of reasonable precautions taken, the scope of 
discovery, the amount of time to correct the error, and the extent of disclosure); see 
also Broun, supra note 1, at 787-88 (adding that federal courts also are divided on 
whether privilege applies to communications from an attorney to a client). 
 254. See, e.g., Desai v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, No. 91 Civ. 7735, 1992 WL 110731, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1992) (holding that there is no inadvertent waiver in the 
absence of extreme carelessness); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 
F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that the privilege is not waived unless 
disclosure was intentional and knowing); Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. 
Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990) (finding no waiver where counsel’s actions did not 
constitute more than simple negligence); Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 47 Conn. 
Supp. 378, 381-82 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001) (stating that the privilege is “sacrosanct” 
and a party cannot waive it without a knowing and intentional act); Chrysler Corp. v. 
Sheridan, No. 227511, 2001 WL 773099, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 10, 2001) 
(holding inadvertent disclosure does not waive the privilege); State v. Blacknall, 760 
A.2d 1151, 1155 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) (concluding that inadvertent 
statements by independent investigator, characterized as the result of “mere 
negligence or misfortune,” did not waive defendant’s privilege because investigator 
was not aware that statements were privileged) (quoting Trilogy Communications, 
Inc. v. Excom Realty, Inc., 652 A.2d 1273, 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1994)); Doe 
v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 986 (Utah 1999) (stating that Utah courts will not find a 
waiver of the privilege if the disclosure was voluntary or excusably inadvertent); see 
also KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 919 (9th Cir. 1987) (assuming 
that, under both California and Hawaii law, an inadvertently disclosed document was 
still privileged because disclosure was not voluntary). 
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government agencies or independent auditors waives the privilege 
absolutely, or only as to the agency or auditor with which the 
information was shared.255 This “limited waiver” doctrine is 
unresolved in most jurisdictions, since few appellate courts have 
addressed the issue.256  
Courts also have disparate views on the scope of the “at-issue,” 
“issue injection,” or “implied waiver” doctrine. In essence, this 
doctrine removes otherwise privileged communications from the 
scope of the protection when a party proffers a claim or defense in 
litigation that puts such communications at issue.257  Yet courts have 
adopted various approaches to determining when communications 
are implicitly waived by issue injection.258  An increasing number of 
courts have adopted a narrow view of “at issue” waiver, finding that 
the exception applies only where the attorney’s advice is directly 
placed at issue as an essential element of the claim.259  A majority of 
jurisdictions adhere to a somewhat broader approach to the 
exception, requiring the party asserting the privilege to undertake 
                                                          
 255. Compare United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 
1997) (rejecting limited waiver), and Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 
1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding absolute waiver), and In re Martin Marietta Corp., 
856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting limited waiver), and Fid. & Cas. Co. of 
N.Y. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 625 N.E.2d 151, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (rejecting 
limited waiver for documents previously turned over to the United States Attorney), 
and People v. Calandra, 467 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (rejecting limited 
waiver except when the right to assert the attorney-client privilege in subsequent 
proceedings is specifically reserved at the time of the disclosure), with Diversified 
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (adopting limited waiver 
approach), and Danielson v. Superior Court, 754 P.2d 1145, 1147 & n.1 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1987) (following Diversified Industries in adopting limited waiver of physician-
patient privilege, and noting that Arizona analyzes physician-patient privilege and 
attorney-client privilege similarly).  See also Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Does 
Sharing Privileged Communications With Government Agencies Waive the Privilege 
Protection?, J. AM. CORP. COUNS. ASS’N (Mar. 2000) (discussing the split in authority on 
the limited waiver doctrine). 
 256. RICE, supra note 14, § 9:87. 
 257. See T. Maxfield Bahner & Michael L. Gallion, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Via Issue Injection: A Call for Uniformity, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 199, 200 (1998) (describing 
issue injection as one of two subcategories of implied waiver). 
 258. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) 
(discussing the conflicting approaches to at-issue waiver in federal and state courts); 
Bahner & Gallion, supra note 257, at 201-06 (tracing the various ways in which courts 
have applied the at-issue exception).  See also cases cited infra note 259. 
 259. E.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 415-16 (D. 
Del. 1992); Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 So. 2d 368, 374-75 (Ala. 2001); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1179 (Ariz. 2000); Smith v. 
Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1145-46 (La. 1987); Aranson v. 
Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (N.H. 1995); Lyons, 10 P.3d at 173; Mueller v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Pa. D. & C.4th 23, 35-36 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1996); see also 
Bahner & Gallion, supra note 257, at 204-05 (referring to this approach as the 
“anticipatory waiver test” and citing cases). 
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some affirmative action making the privileged information relevant 
to the dispute and vital to the opposing party’s defense.260  In a third, 
related approach, some courts balance the necessity of discovering 
protected information against the importance of the interests served 
by maintaining the attorney-client privilege.261  Still other courts have 
applied the doctrine in a more draconian fashion, finding an 
automatic waiver of the privilege when a party’s assertion of a claim, 
counterclaim, or affirmative defense raises an issue to which a 
privileged communication is merely relevant.262 
Likewise, courts have not reached agreement on the scope of 
“subject matter waiver.” Subject matter waiver is a form of implied 
waiver that allows the party attacking the privilege to seek all 
privileged communications on a particular topic once one privileged 
communication on the subject matter has been disclosed.263  Some 
courts limit the doctrine to circumstances in which a party uses 
privileged communications strategically in litigation as a “sword,” 
                                                          
 260. E.g., Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 
269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975); State 
ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 22 P.3d 124, 142 (Kan. 2001); State v. Roeder, 636 N.W.2d 
870, 876 (Neb. 2001); Ward v. Graydon, Head & Ritchey, No. CA2001-03-038, 2001 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5340, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2001); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n, 784 P.2d 1373, 1378-79 (Cal. 1990); Pappas v. Holloway, 787 P.2d 30, 
36 (Wash. 1990); see also Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Donaghy, 858 F. Supp. 391, 395 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no waiver but suggesting that waiver will occur if privileged 
information is used to “bolster” an essential claim); Bahner & Gallion, supra note 
257, at 202-04 (1998) (stating that this view is favored by a clear majority of courts 
and citing numerous cases). 
 261. E.g., Greater Newbury Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d 
13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1988); Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1205 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987); Sedco Int’l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing 
Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 
1981), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118 
(1982); Darius v. City of Boston, 741 N.E.2d 52, 59 (Mass. 2001); see also Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (declining to decide 
between applying the Hearn test and the balancing test, but noting that a substantial 
showing of need is required to overcome privilege under either test); Bahner & 
Gallion, supra note 257, at 202 (referring to this approach as the “balancing test” and 
citing cases). 
 262. E.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 260, 
262 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Ghana Supply Comm’n v. New Eng. Power Co., 83 F.R.D. 
586, 593-94 (D. Mass. 1979); Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 277-79 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); see also People v. Ullery, 984 P.2d 586, 589 (Colo. 1999) (finding 
Colorado’s statutory waiver of physician-patient privilege for pleas of not guilty by 
reason of insanity extends to waiver of attorney-client privilege as well); People v. 
Edney, 350 N.E.2d 400, 403 (N.Y. 1976) (automatic waiver of attorney-client privilege 
when defendant asserts an insanity defense); State v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1036 
(Wash. 1982) (defense team’s mental health expert not covered by attorney-client 
privilege when defendant raises an insanity defense); Bahner & Gallion, supra note 
257, at 201 (referring to this approach as the “automatic waiver rule” and citing 
cases). 
 263. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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while seeking to utilize the privilege as a “shield” to prevent access to 
other communications regarding the same subject matter.264  Other 
courts, however, construe the doctrine more broadly, finding waiver 
in circumstances in which a party has revealed some but not all 
privileged communications on a particular subject matter, even if the 
party revealed those communications outside the litigation context or 
gained no strategic advantage from disclosure.265  Indeed, some courts 
have stated that careless but inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
communications waives the privilege for all communications on the 
same subject.266 
Moreover, courts disagree on the fundamental question of whether 
the attorney-client privilege provides absolute or qualified protection.  
The privilege provides absolute and unqualified protection if, 
assuming communications fall within its scope and are otherwise not 
waived, a court or other decision maker cannot disregard the 
protection based on a post hoc balancing of policies, interests, or 
harms.267  In Swidler & Berlin,268 the Supreme Court made clear that 
the federal attorney-client privilege is absolute, rejecting the 
government’s argument that, in the criminal context, a court ought 
to balance the policies supporting the privilege against the need for 
the information.269  Other courts that have addressed the issue tend to 
agree,270 but there are significant exceptions.  Courts in some 
                                                          
 264. See, e.g., id. (refusing to extend subject matter waiver to circumstances in 
which the initial disclosure was made extrajudicially and without prejudice to the 
opposing party); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, No. M8-85, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2927, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997) (stating that a complete subject matter waiver 
applies when a party seeks to use the privilege selectively, as both a sword and a 
shield in litigation). 
 265. See Browne of N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (stating that, where a party has voluntarily disclosed some but not all 
privileged communications on a subject, the privilege is waived as to that entire 
subject, and the opposing party need not demonstrate prejudice or that the 
privileged communications were put at issue in the litigation). 
 266. See, e.g., Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84 
(1st Cir. 1995) (finding that waiver premised on inadvertent disclosure is deemed to 
encompass all other communications on the same subject) (citing Weil v. 
Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24-25 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 267. See cases cited infra note 271. 
  268. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
 269. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407-09 (1998).  In Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), the Court rejected similar calls for a qualified 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  See id. at 17-18 (noting the importance of privacy 
to effective psychotherapy and stating that allowing for post-communication 
balancing of patient’s need for confidentiality with the need for disclosure would 
render the privilege useless). 
 270. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 594-96 (Cal. 2000) 
(stating that California courts are bound by statutes delineating the attorney-client 
privilege and may not abrogate the privilege for policy or other reasons); Pub. Serv. 
Co. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 170-71 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to engage in ad hoc 
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jurisdictions—including Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey—
expressly reserve the authority to balance interests at the time the 
privilege is asserted, and have, in certain circumstances, allowed 
discovery of otherwise privileged materials based on the need for the 
materials in the particular litigation or based on other policy 
interests.271 
C. Choice of Law and Privilege 
Because there is no single law of privilege, and because there are 
significant doctrinal differences between jurisdictions, potential for 
conflicts in governing standards exists whenever more than one 
jurisdiction may have an interest in the claimed privilege.  The most 
prominent example is the circumstance in which the attorney-client 
communications sought to be protected occurred in one state, while 
the suit in which the protection is sought proceeds in another state, 
and the two jurisdictions treat the privilege differently in some 
relevant respect.272 
A coherent choice-of-law regime would have no effect on the 
uncertainty created by either intra-jurisdictional confusion regarding 
                                                          
waiver analysis or rule making); Mueller v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Pa. D. & 
C.4th 23, 31 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1996) (rejecting need-based arguments and stating 
that, in Pennsylvania, the attorney-client privilege is absolute). 
 271. See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996) (recognizing that, under New York law, the privilege is not absolute, and 
ordering disclosure in part because of the “compelling public policy interest” in 
protecting public health); Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 100 (D.N.J. 1990) 
(noting that the party seeking to pierce the privilege must show, under New Jersey 
law, the relevance and materiality of the communications, a legitimate need to 
obtain the communications, and that the substance of the communications is not 
available through other means) (citing In re Kozlov, 398 A.2d 882, 887 (N.J. 1979)); 
Cloutier v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV 900278184S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 593 
at *5-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 1998) (discussing previous Connecticut decisions 
allowing a balancing of interests in the criminal context and extending this approach 
to the context of a bad faith claim against an insurer); see also McGranahan v. Dahar, 
408 A.2d 121, 125-39 (N.H. 1979) (stating that the attorney-client privilege may not 
be absolute where there is a compelling need for the information but finding no 
compelling need under the instant circumstances); Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 
544, 555-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that a third party can compel disclosure 
of privileged information by showing a reasonable possibility of the occurrence of a 
continuing or future crime likely to result in serious bodily injury or death).  Some 
states allow or require attorneys to disclose client confidences in certain 
circumstances, such as to prevent a future crime that is likely to result in serious 
injury or death.  See Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 557. 
 272. Professor Bradford indicates that there may be other jurisdictions with an 
interest in applying their privilege law, including, for example, the interest of the 
state where the underlying cause of action arose, the state in which the client is 
domiciled, and the state in which the attorney practices.  See Bradford, supra note 9, 
at 913.  There are added complexities when subpoenas for documents or deposition 
testimony are issued in jurisdictions outside the forum. 
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the privilege or vertical conflicts between state and federal law.273  
Nevertheless, a uniform approach to choice-of-law doctrine that 
produces predictable outcomes at least would address the corrosive 
effect that inter-jurisdictional conflicts have on reasonable certainty.  
Yet, like the underlying substantive law governing privilege, 
jurisdictions take divergent approaches to selecting which privilege 
rules apply.  The regime as a whole affords little, if any, predictability 
to attorneys and their clients, attempting to determine—at the time 
of a potential communication—whether the communication will be 
protected. 
In his 1991 article, Professor Bradford discusses six methods that 
courts have employed or commentators have suggested for making 
horizontal, that is, state to state, choice-of-law determinations where 
potentially interested jurisdictions have conflicting privilege rules.274  
Two of these approaches almost always result in application of the 
forum’s privilege law.275  Courts adhering to choice-of-law principles 
set forth in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws tend to apply 
the privilege law of the forum state because they view privilege as a 
question of evidence or procedure to be resolved by forum law.276  In 
addition, the few courts that have applied a public policy analysis to 
conflicts in privilege law have decided that public policy favors forum 
law.277 
                                                          
 273. As discussed previously, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and interpretive case 
law essentially supply vertical choice-of-law rules for privileges in federal court.  See 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 177, at 280-81 (discussing post-Rule 501 
authority that has taken the position that, when there are federal and state claims in 
a single action, federal privilege doctrine governs).  Federal privilege law applies in 
federal question cases, federal criminal cases, and cases in which both state and 
federal law supply the rules of decision.  Id.  State privilege law applies in diversity 
cases.  Id.  However, there is no corresponding, consistently-applied, vertical choice-
of-law regime in state courts.  One commentator has suggested that state courts 
ought to apply federal privilege law in cases in which the underlying claims concern 
areas of strong federal interest.  See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1832-36 (1994) 
(discussing the growing federal interest in regulating the attorney-client privilege 
because of the growth of federal litigation and federal regulation in various fields 
and suggesting that the implication is that federal privileges should apply 
preemptively even in state court when the dispute involves federally regulated 
activity). 
 274. Bradford, supra note 9, at 915-16.  In determining the applicable state law of 
privilege in diversity cases, federal courts look to the forum state’s choice-of-law rules 
pursuant to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Man. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). 
 275. Bradford, supra note 9, at 916-18. 
 276. See id. at 916-17 (noting that procedure is always determined by the forum 
law under the Second Restatement test, where “procedure” and “evidence” are 
defined broadly) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 596, 597 
(1934)). 
 277. See id. at 917-18 (noting that, because courts using the public policy approach 
have not set guidelines, policy interests are always strong enough to justify 
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Other courts apply multi-factored interest or relationship tests.  
Some of these courts apply an interest analysis, focusing on the policy 
interests underlying the laws of each case.278  Under this approach, 
courts usually apply the law of the state in which the communications 
occurred, although their reasoning is often far from clear.  Other 
courts apply the “most significant relationship” test set forth in 
section six of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.279  Section 
six does not define “most significant relationship,” but rather lists a 
number of factors that a court should consider in determining which 
law to apply.280  Still other courts apply Professor Leflar’s five choice-
of-law considerations.281  These considerations are (1)  predictability 
of results, (2) maintenance of the interstate and international order, 
(3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum’s 
governmental interests, and (5) application of the better rule of 
law.282  Although the first four of Leflar’s considerations are similar to 
factors listed in section six, courts following this approach often 
emphasize the last consideration—the “better rule of law.”283 
Finally, section 139 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
contains a section specifically addressing choice of privilege law, 
although this approach had not been widely adopted at the time 
Professor Bradford published his article.284  Section 139 provides as 
follows: 
                                                          
application of the forum law). 
 278. Id. at 919-32. 
 279. Id. at 932-39. 
 280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1969).  The factors 
courts consider in making the determination are (a) the needs of the interstate and 
international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies 
of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified expectations; (e) 
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability, 
and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the 
law to be applied.  Id. 
 281. Bradford, supra note 9, at 941-42 (citing generally Robert A. Leflar, Choice-
Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); Robert A. 
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584 
(1966)). 
 282. Id. 
 283. See id. at 942 (noting that Leflar, unfortunately, provided no guidance for 
determining which rule of law is the better rule, and, accordingly, courts have simply 
chosen the rule of law originating within the court’s own jurisdiction). 
 284. Some courts had utilized this approach prior to 1991.  See, e.g., Anas v. 
Blecker, 141 F.R.D. 530, 531-32 (D. Fla. 1992) (noting that other courts had utilized 
section 139 to resolve choice-of-law questions regarding privileges); Consolidation 
Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ill. 1982) (discussing how the 
lower court had applied section 139 and applied forum privilege law rather than the 
law of Wisconsin).  Section 139 has received more attention since then, although 
courts often refer to it and then apply a standard “most significant relationship” 
analysis. 
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(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state 
which has the most significant relationship with the 
communication will be admitted, even though it would be 
privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the admission of 
such evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of the 
forum. 
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state 
which has the most significant relationship with the 
communication but which is not privileged under the local law of 
the forum will be admitted unless there is some special reason why 
the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect.285 
Application of section 139, absent one of the exceptions, results in 
the selection of the law that favors disclosure.286  The exceptions 
contained in the two subparts of section 139 provide little guidance 
on when a court should otherwise opt for the stronger privilege law. 
Indeed, Professor Bradford suggests that these exceptions are 
sufficiently subject to manipulation that courts may simply revert to a 
forum preference rule.287  Moreover, these exceptions are supposed 
to be applied only in “rare” circumstances.288 
Professor Bradford details, persuasively, the flaws in all of these 
approaches.289  Choice-of-law rules that always result in the choice of 
the forum’s privilege law fail to foster certainty because attorneys and 
clients often cannot predict, at the time of the communication, the 
forum in which the privilege may need to be asserted.290  The multi-
factored interest and relationship approaches likewise do not 
produce predictable outcomes, provide little concrete guidance to 
                                                          
 285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1969). 
 286. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 939 (noting that, under each of the subparts of 
the test, evidence is admitted unless admission violates “strong” forum policy). 
 287. Id. at 941 (noting that, if forum policy considerations are deemed broad 
enough, a state court can always apply its own law). 
 288. See Christopher F. Dugan, Foreign Privileges in U.S. Litigation, 5 DETROIT C. L.J. 
INT’L  L. & PRAC. 33, 38 (1996) (stating that, absent some strong public policy or 
special reason, section 139 favors a policy of wide admissibility). 
 289. Professor Bradford explains why the existing approaches to privilege conflicts 
foster uncertainty: 
Forum law rules are inherently unpredictable; attorney and client usually do 
not know when they communicate what the forum will be.  Interest analysis, 
the most significant relationship test, section 139 of the Second Restatement, 
and the better law approach all require post hoc judgments concerning the 
weight of state policy interests.  Such tests are inherently uncertain, more 
than one alternative is often logically justifiable, and attorney and client 
cannot reasonably predict which law any given court will choose.  Thus, a 
flexible approach like interest analysis might achieve better results in 
particular cases, but only at the expense of the policies the attorney-client 
privilege was meant to serve. 
Bradford, supra note 9, at 945-46. 
 290. Id. at 945. 
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courts, and are easily manipulated.291  Similarly, section 139 fosters 
uncertainty because, not only is the forum fortuitous, but the 
approach is subject both to the least protective doctrine and to 
exceptions, which, if applied, are as unwieldy as the other balancing 
approaches.292 
In response, Professor Bradford proposes a territorial rule: where 
there is a conflict between attorney-client privilege doctrines, the 
court should apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the attorney 
involved in the communication practices.293  He contends that this 
approach is the best way to enhance certainty and predictability in 
application of privilege law in the context of conflicts.294 Professor 
Bradford’s approach also is superior to approaches that default to the 
rule of the forum because it recognizes the true nature of the 
privilege: it provides substantive protection of extra-judicial 
communications designed to serve extrinsic interests.295 
Despite its potential appeal, no court has explicitly adopted 
Professor Bradford’s proposal.296  To the contrary, since 1991, courts 
have continued to apply the foregoing, troublesome approaches to 
choosing among conflicting privilege doctrines.297 
                                                          
 291. Id. at 945-46. 
 292. Id.; see also Russell J. Weintraub, The Silver Anniversary of the Second Conflicts 
Restatement: “At Least, To Do No Harm”: Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the 
Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284, 1305 (1997) (criticizing section 139). 
 293. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 948-49 (noting that the forum in which the 
communication takes place, the state in which the attorney practices, and the state of 
the client’s domicile are all options, but that these options could conflict in any given 
case). 
 294. Id. 
 295. See id. at 948 (noting that the privilege is intended to foster open 
communication between attorneys and clients). 
 296. Two courts have mentioned Professor Bradford’s territorial approach but 
have not adopted it.  VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 16 n.4 (D. Mass. 
2000); Rivera v. Periodicos Todo Bayamon, Nos. 108 & 113, 1997 WL 43202, at *3 
(D.P.R. June 23, 1997). 
 297. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 200 F.R.D. 401, 405 (N.D. 
Ill. 2001) (holding that local Illinois law governs the attorney-client privilege); 
Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (purporting 
to apply New York choice-of-law rules to hold that New York’s “greater interest” 
requires application of New York privilege law because the plaintiffs were from New 
York and the defendant sold, marketed, and advertised its products in New York); In 
re Best Lock Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 16281, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, at *20-
22 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2000) (holding, pursuant to the “most significant relationship” 
test, that Delaware law on the accountant-client privilege applies largely because the 
party seeking privilege protection chose to incorporate in Delaware); Lee v. Engle, 
C.A. No. 13323, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 149, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 1995) (choosing 
Delaware rather than Illinois law on the accountant-client privilege after finding that 
Delaware had the most significant relationship to the communications despite the 
fact that accountants practiced in Illinois); Barnes v. Confidential Party, 638 So. 2d 
283, 289 (Miss. 1993) (applying the “center of gravity” approach and finding that 
Georgia law of privilege applied based on greater contacts with the underlying 
dispute, even though the privilege issues surfaced in a dispute over depositions taken 
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D. Extrajudicial Proceedings 
Although controversy swirls around the attorney-client privilege, 
the discussion tends to focus only on state and federal courts’ 
treatment of the privilege doctrine and privilege claims.298  A few 
scholars, however, have criticized members of Congress for failing to 
respect privilege claims by persons appearing before them,299 and 
after some earlier controversy, there also seems to be consensus that 
the privilege generally applies in federal agency proceedings.300  Yet, 
beyond these particular settings, there has been little in-depth 
discussion of the application of privileges in most nonjudicial 
settings, including arbitral, administrative, and legislative 
proceedings.  Until now, no one has discussed the overall impact of 
the availability of these nonjudicial fora on the certainty of the 
attorney-client privilege.  This question, however, is becoming 
evermore important because an increasing number of adversarial 
proceedings are occurring outside of the traditional courtroom 
setting.301 
                                                          
from a Mississippi resident in Mississippi); Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 
647 (Tex. 1995) (holding that the most significant relationship test applies in 
determining which state’s privilege law applies); cf. Tartaglia v. Paul Revere Life Ins. 
Co., 948 F. Supp. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying, in a subpoena enforcement 
action, New York privilege law after undertaking a relationship or contacts analysis, 
but limiting that analysis, appropriately, to the subpoenaed party and its confidential 
communications). 
 298. Cf. Glenn A. Beard, Congress v. the Attorney-Client Privilege: A “Full and Frank” 
Discussion, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 121-36 (1997) (describing as “sporadic” debates 
over the application of the privilege to the congressional context). 
 299. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Rich, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Congressional 
Investigations, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 145, 145-46, 170-72 (1988) (discussing Congress’s 
refusal to recognize the privilege and arguing that Congress should be bound by the 
privilege and should enact legislation accordingly); James Hamilton, The Attorney-
Client Privilege and Congress, ABA J. SEC. LITIG., Winter 1986, at 3 (criticizing the view 
in Congress that the attorney-client privilege is applicable in congressional 
investigations at the discretion of the investigating sub-committee and discussing 
examples of when Congress has refused to recognize the privilege); see also Beard, 
supra note 298, at 121-36 (recognizing that Congress has the authority to exercise its 
discretion in determining whether to respect the privilege, but advocating that it 
adopt procedural rules to govern that discretion). 
 300. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 
(1915) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission could not examine 
confidential communications between the railroad and its attorneys); Civil 
Aeronautics Bd. v. Air Trans. Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 318, 319 (D.D.C. 1961) (holding 
that, when an agency has the power to compel testimony, the privilege nevertheless is 
applicable, unless there is a statutory directive to the contrary); Gene A. Petersen, 
Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 67, 68-
70 (1969) (concluding that the privilege remains available in federal agency 
proceedings); Rich, supra note 299, at 168 (noting that the privilege is generally 
respected in federal agency proceedings). 
 301. See Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 75 (1994) (discussing the growing number of administrative law 
judges and stating that there are well over a million administrative matters or cases a 
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The first issue is whether the privilege even applies in these 
nonjudicial settings.  Again, the legal community seemingly agrees 
that federal agencies must respect the privilege,302 and many federal 
agencies must resort, in any event, to subpoena enforcement actions 
in federal court to compel disclosure.303  In addition, some state 
statutes and courts have made clear that privilege protections apply in 
state administrative and agency proceedings.304  Similarly, some 
leading arbitral organizations, including the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”), the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”), and the Center for Public Resources (“CPR”) Institute for 
Dispute Resolution have adopted rules providing that the privilege 
applies in their proceedings.305 
Yet, in other settings, the status of the privilege is far from clear.  
Members of Congress, for example, have refused to honor attorney-
                                                          
year); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms 
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1290-1303 (1998) 
(tracing the recent, dramatic growth of litigation alternatives and forms of ADR, 
including binding arbitration). 
 302. See sources cited supra note 300. 
 303. See Mobil Exploration & Producing United States, Inc. v. Dep’t of Interior, 
180 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that administrative subpoenas are not 
self-executing, and, therefore, require an order of the federal district court 
compelling disclosure); see also In re Ramirez, 905 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 
cases suggesting that a party wishing to challenge the enforceability of an 
administrative subpoena should refuse to comply with the subpoena and await an 
enforcement action by the issuing agency in federal district court). 
 304. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503(a) (Consol. 2002) (making clear that the privilege 
applies in administrative and legislative proceedings); Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 
530 N.W.2d 678, 683-84 (Iowa 1995) (assuming that the attorney-client privilege 
applies in agency proceedings); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 784 P.2d 1373, 
1376-77 (Cal. 1990) (holding that, absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the 
privilege applies against state agencies); Davis v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 480 
So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. App. 1985) (concluding that the privilege applies in agency 
proceedings).  The Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides that 
privileges relating to evidence apply equally to agencies.  MODEL STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-212(a) (1981). 
 305. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 33(c) (1999) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n) 
(providing that principles of privilege apply to arbitration conducted under 
association rules); National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Notice to Members 
99-90, para. II.B (Nov. 1999) (recognizing objections to production of documents 
based on “an established privilege”); INST. ARBITRATION R. 11.2 (1997) (Ctr. for Pub. 
Res.) (calling for application of attorney-client privilege and the work-product 
protections); see also James H. Carter, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Arbitration, 
CURRENTS, Winter 1996/1997, at 15 (discussing the formal recognition of the 
application of privileges in some arbitration proceedings and how the few courts that 
have reached the issue have suggested that it should be honored).  Moreover, parties 
can include a provision in the arbitration agreement making clear that the privilege 
will apply.  See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 1 (noting that parties may amend the 
rules applicable to them under rules by agreement); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(a), (c) 
(2001) (providing for liberal application of privilege principles in arbitrations and 
mediations conducted under the Act, but allowing for parties to agree otherwise). 
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client privilege claims.306  In other jurisdictions, it is uncertain 
whether privilege doctrine applies in some administrative and 
legislative proceedings.307  Indeed, although rarely discussed by courts 
and commentators, some state agencies and administrators insist that 
the privilege cannot be asserted against them.308  The reluctance of 
state agencies and administrators also is evident in state court 
decisions requiring compliance with state privilege law.309  Federal 
agencies have shown similar reluctance to respect the confidentiality 
of privileged communications,310 as have arbitral tribunals, which are 
not governed by arbitration rules recognizing the privilege.311 
Even when privilege protections extend to these proceedings as a 
formal matter, the scope of the protection is left undefined.  For 
example, various state statutes and arbitration rules simply provide 
that the privilege applies, without articulating what the privilege is.312  
Thus, nonjudicial decision makers, like judges, must decide which 
privilege doctrine to apply before determining whether the privilege 
protects the particular communications at issue.  These decision 
makers are left to choose among conflicting approaches between 
jurisdictions and courts, and to decide for themselves, when the law is 
unclear, how to balance properly the competing interests in defining 
the scope of protection, and whether to accept various arguments for 
                                                          
 306. See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 193 F.R.D. 73, 77-79 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(describing how a member of Congress released to the public documents that the 
tobacco defendants maintained were privileged, while the litigation over the status of 
the documents continued). 
 307. Cf. Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 206 F.R.D. 630, 642 (S.D. 
Iowa 2001) (advising that courts should carefully scrutinize assertions of privilege 
that would reduce the effectiveness of legislatively-mandated administrative 
investigations); United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420, 430 (N.D. Ill. 1972) 
(similarly suggesting privilege may be relaxed or waived where administrative 
agencies pursue investigations under legislative authority). 
 308. I have been unable to locate commentary precisely on this point.  
Nevertheless, anecdotally I am aware of at least one circumstance in which a party 
encountered such a refusal by a state agency.  
 309. See cases cited supra note 304. 
 310. See, e.g., Brune, supra note 2 (noting the Justice Department’s recently 
promulgated rule allowing government agents to monitor conversations between 
post-September 11 detainees and their attorneys); Petersen, supra note 300, at 69 
(discussing the Civil Aeronautics Board’s reluctance to recognize the privilege in 
proceedings before it). 
 311. E.g., Evan J. Spelfogel, New Trends in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, ARB. 
J., Mar. 1993, at 6, 13 (stating that the attorney-client and work-product privileges are 
not always viewed as binding in arbitral fora); Carter, supra note 305, at 15 (noting 
that, before the American Arbitration Association’s adoption of a privilege rule, the 
association had found that some arbitrators had ruled that the privilege does not 
apply in arbitral proceedings). 
 312. E.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 33(c) (1999) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n) 
(providing for the application of principles of privilege, but only referring loosely to 
“confidential communications”); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 4-212(a) (1981) 
(lacking a privilege definition). 
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waiver or qualification.313 
This situation creates an enormous amount of uncertainty.  
Attorneys and clients often cannot predict at the time of the 
communication the forum—judicial or nonjudicial—in which they 
may have to assert the privilege.  Even if they recognize the possibility 
of having to assert the privilege in a nonjudicial forum, it is often 
unclear whether the decision maker will recognize the privilege.314  If 
governing rules or law mandate recognition of the privilege, the 
decision maker is left to decide the scope of protection.  Many of 
these decision makers must make such determinations without the 
benefit of legal training, legal assistance, or extensive briefing.  And, 
in many circumstances, judicial review of privilege decisions is 
unavailable or severely limited, such as in the arbitration context.315  
In other contexts, resort to the courts may be impossible as a 
practical matter. 
Thus, as nonjudicial forms of dispute resolution grow in 
importance, the unpredictability of privilege protections grows with 
them.  In many jurisdictions, this reality has largely eluded privilege 
policy makers or is simply outside their control.316 
E. Today’s Uncertain and Unpredictable Privilege 
Once the three previous subsections are considered together, the 
largely uncertain and unpredictable nature of the attorney-client 
privilege emerges.  There is little Supreme Court leadership on 
privilege doctrine, significant inter- and intra-jurisdictional 
uncertainties and confusion in substantive privilege doctrine, and 
differing and unreliable choice-of-privilege-law principles.  The 
conflicts and confusion in privilege doctrine are not relegated to the 
outer edges; rather, many of the disputes address issues lying at the 
heart of the protection.  In addition, it is becoming harder for 
attorneys and clients to predict at the time of the communication the 
                                                          
 313. See Spelfogel, supra note 311, at 13 (characterizing arbitrators as “piercing 
with respect to privileges,” and willing to forgo the deference to privilege protections  
that might otherwise be accorded in judicial fora). 
 314. See, e.g., id.; Symposium, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration 
in the Securities Industry (November 21, 1994), 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1563-64 (1995) 
(statement of John Peloso) (questioning whether arbitrators recognize and correctly 
evaluate privileges and suggesting a tendency on the part of arbitrators to err on the 
side of allowing discovery). 
 315. See Laurie A. Kamaiko, Reinsurance Arbitrations, 557 PRAC. L. INST. LITIG. 201, 
281 (1997) (discussing how the availability of a judicial remedy for parties in 
arbitration is unclear). 
 316. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (determining that, 
despite a state’s desire to provide judicial review of discovery decisions in arbitration, 
states are preempted from doing so by the Federal Arbitration Act). 
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fora—judicial or otherwise—in which clients ultimately may seek 
privilege protection. 
And it gets worse.  The uncertainty is magnified by the fact that, 
once allegedly privileged communications are revealed, they may lose 
the benefit of the privilege, even if the court’s decision to compel 
disclosure in the first proceeding was erroneous or the protection 
afforded by the original forum is weaker than protections available in 
other fora.317  To illustrate, when a party asserts the privilege 
unsuccessfully, the asserting party must disclose those 
communications to the adverse party.318  At that point, the 
communications are no longer confidential.319  As a formal matter, 
this occurrence calls into question whether the party may assert in 
later proceedings that the communications are confidential, 
particularly if the content is available to the public.320  Some courts 
have held that parties can no longer claim privilege if, as a practical 
matter, third parties or the public know of the allegedly privileged 
communications.321  Moreover, even if a party’s legal right to claim 
                                                          
 317. See, e.g., FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (finding no 
privilege with respect to document disclosed to opposing counsel); Duplan Corp. v. 
Deering Milliken Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1974) (rejecting the 
contention that waiver of the attorney-client privilege requires intentional 
relinquishment); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 
(D.D.C. 1970) (finding that an inadvertently disclosed document loses privilege 
protection when “[i]t’s confidentiality was breached thereby destroying the basis for 
the continued existence of the privilege”); Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 
(Tex. Crim. App.) (stating that telephone operator may testify to the contents of an 
otherwise privileged telephone conversation heard by eavesdropping), cert. denied, 
346 U.S. 855 (1953).  Again, in many circumstances, there will be no opportunity to 
appeal the decision prior to the disclosure.  See supra note 193 and accompanying 
text. 
 318. See generally 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 550-54 
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussing disclosure and attorney-client privilege). 
 319. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 317. 
 320. See, e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that matters 
disclosed in public are not confidential and thus lose their privileged status); see also 
Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1416-18 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (holding that, where a party has been found to have waived the privilege 
inadvertently through careless procedures, the privilege is gone and cannot be 
asserted in another forum).  But see Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 99-100 
(D.N.J. 1990) (refusing to recognize waiver where opposing side actually had 
possession of privileged documents that had been produced previously pursuant to a 
court order).  And, of course, nonmutual issue preclusion may bar the party from 
further litigating the issue of privilege, if the first privilege decision has merged into 
a final judgment.  See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 324-29 (1979) 
(permitting the use of nonmutual issue preclusion by allowing stockholders to 
preclude a corporation and its officers and directors from relitigating issues 
previously decided in an action by the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 321. Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 825 F.2d 231, 234  (9th Cir. 1987) (finding 
privilege issues were moot after disclosure of those materials to a grand jury because 
“the cat has been out of the bag” and there was no effective relief the appellate court 
could grant); see also Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 193 F.R.D. 73, 74-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
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privilege is not lost upon compelled disclosure, the cat is out of the 
bag:  the confidences are no longer secret, and, in complex litigation, 
adversaries in later proceedings may have gained the benefit of 
knowing such confidences whether or not those communications will 
be admissible at trial.322  Thus, a single judge, administrative law 
judge, arbitrator, commissioner, or legislator may destroy privilege 
protections permanently. This is particularly troubling given that 
erroneous privilege decisions are more likely while privilege law 
remains unclear. 
I am not suggesting that privilege protections are never certain 
enough to promote client candor and communication.  Again, many 
attorneys and their clients probably believe, mistakenly, that their 
communications are absolutely safe from disclosure,323 and some 
clients may be willing to speak freely with attorneys even in the face 
of substantial uncertainty.  Also, in some circumstances, parties can 
take steps to reduce the uncertainty.  For example, one can reduce 
the uncertainty arising from inter-jurisdictional conflicts by including 
forum selection clauses in agreements that may someday be the 
subject of litigation.324  In addition, other doctrines, including the 
work product doctrine, may provide additional layers of protection 
for some communications.325 
                                                          
(affirming and incorporating the magistrate judge’s order denying defendant’s 
motion to suppress).  Prior to the New York decision, a Minnesota court ordered 
disclosure of 37,000 documents that the defendants claimed to be privileged.  Id. at 
74.  While the Minnesota decision was stayed, members of Congress who subpoenaed 
the documents released them onto the Internet, over defendants’ objection.  Id. at 
77.  The magistrate judge overseeing discovery in the New York case denied the 
defendants’ motion to suppress discovery, stating that “to the extent th[e] disclosure 
might inhibit candid attorney-client communications, that inhibition already has 
occurred.” Id. at 82.  The district judge then affirmed, noting that a court “should 
not blind itself in the investigative stage of an important litigation to critical facts 
known to the world.” Id. at 74.  While the court left until trial the unresolved 
questions of admissibility, the court suggested that it would look to other factors—
probative force, necessity, and cumulativeness—in making admissibility 
determinations.  Id. at 75. 
 322. Cf. In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the 
court could send the case back for re-trial without use of the protected materials, but, 
practically speaking, the information was now known). 
 323. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing survey results 
suggesting that individual clients and corporate employees may speak freely with 
attorneys because they believe their communications are in fact safe from 
disclosure). 
 324. See generally Young Lee, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in 
Diversity Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 665-75 (discussing the 
factors and application of well drafted forum selection clauses). 
 325. See  Ken M. Zeider, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking 
to the Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1358-64 (2001) 
(discussing work-product protection for disclosed communications). 
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Even given all of the problems discussed above, there is probably a 
kernel of fairly certain protection.  For example, a natural—rather 
than corporate—person who orally communicates with an attorney 
alone, for the purpose of receiving purely legal advice, and intends to 
keep the entire conversation confidential, can be confident that the 
communications will be privileged in a subsequent judicial 
proceeding, provided that the circumstances of the communication 
in no way implicate even a broadly construed crime-fraud or at-issue 
exception, and the client and the attorney are informed and careful 
enough not to involuntarily waive the privilege.326  Yet, once one 
moves slightly away from this core—to include, inter alia, 
communications from a corporate agent to in-house counsel, from an 
attorney to a client, embodied in drafts of documents, circulated to 
representatives or consultants, or which may be “at-issue” in later 
litigation—this confidence should quickly erode. 
Thus, in many contexts, attorneys and their clients have little 
assurance, looking forward from the time of a communication, that 
the communication will be protected.  We have not, therefore, 
achieved reasonable certainty.327  To the extent attorneys and clients 
think their communications are safe from disclosure, the foregoing 
analysis ought to make them think again.  The law governing the 
attorney-client privilege within particular jurisdictions and across the 
country is so conflicted, confused, and underdeveloped, I suggest 
that trial judges and other decision makers are free to make ad hoc 
privilege determinations in many circumstances.  This regime makes 
no sense: an uncertain privilege creates significant transactional and 
social costs—often inhibiting access to the truth—while failing to 
provide the assurance of protection necessary to enhance attorney-
client communication and candor. 
III. THE SOLUTION: FEDERALIZING PRIVILEGE 
Part I discusses the need for reasonably certain attorney-client 
privilege protections.  Part II demonstrates that, despite this need, 
the privilege affords surprisingly and intolerably uncertain 
protection.  Now, more than a quarter century after Congress passed 
                                                          
 326. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1488 (stating that, even 
uncertain rules generally possess at least a core of certainty, surrounded by a 
“penumbra of uncertainty”). 
 327. After discussing the amount of confusion and conflict in the law of privilege, 
a leading treatise reached the following conclusion: “The foregoing state of affairs is 
clearly less than optimum from the standpoint that predictability in the application 
of the privilege, logically indispensable for any utilitarian effect, is largely lacking in 
many areas.” MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 347. 
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on its last opportunity to fashion privilege doctrine, significant 
reform is both justified and needed.  Although the call for greater 
certainty in the privilege area is not new, no existing proposal 
addresses the entire problem.  Indeed, even the best, most ambitious 
proposed reforms—for example, adopting a sensible choice-of-law 
regime or codifying a new set of privilege rules for federal criminal 
and federal question cases—offer only partial solutions that do not 
address key root causes of the existing disarray. 
The only way to achieve reasonable certainty in privilege law is to 
enact federal legislation providing clear, national protections for 
attorney-client communications that will apply regardless of the 
fortuity of the forum—state, federal, or nonjudicial—in which the 
privilege is asserted.  Only a codified, preemptive, and unqualified 
federal privilege can resolve current privilege woes. 
Perhaps contrary to prevailing thought, Congress is the most 
appropriate policy-making body to address the existing problems with 
privilege doctrine.  First, the common-law method has failed to 
develop predictable privilege protections.328  Second, under the Rules 
Enabling Act, only Congress can codify federal privilege 
protections;329 hence, even the more limited proposed reforms—such 
as codifying a set of privilege rules for federal courts—would require 
congressional action.  Although enacting sufficiently detailed 
legislation would require Congress to resolve a number of difficult, 
lingering issues, these issues deserve vigorous debate and resolution.  
Congress is now well-equipped for such policy making: it has far more 
commentary, history, and experience to draw upon than it did a 
quarter century ago,330 as well as established vehicles for receiving 
judicial, scholarly, and other input.331 
Moreover, although privilege protections often are 
mischaracterized as procedural or evidentiary “rules,”332 they embody 
substantive protections or rights promoting extra-judicial interests.333  
Thus, Congress—which already has recognized the substantive nature 
of privilege protections334—has the power under the Commerce 
Clause to enact legislation guaranteeing these protections in all 
                                                          
 328. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 329. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000); see also Zeider, supra note 325, at 1316-38 
(discussing the common-law background, application, and possible codification of 
revised privilege doctrine). 
 330. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 331. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 332. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(defining the attorney-client privilege as an evidentiary rule regulating disclosure). 
 333. See infra notes 395-401 and accompanying text. 
 334. See infra notes 404, 406 and accompanying text. 
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courts and nonjudicial fora, and this exercise of power does not 
offend the Tenth Amendment. 
A. The Need For a Codified, Preemptive, Federal Privilege 
1. The limitations of other proposed reforms 
Since 1975, and particularly since Upjohn, there has been a steady 
stream of critical commentary and proposed reforms.  Many of these 
proposals have sought to increase certainty by altering or resolving 
disputes regarding various aspects of privilege doctrine.335  While 
some calls for change or greater clarity have gained widespread 
adherence,336 others have received only sparse attention,337 and still 
others have been largely ignored.338  Although I support some of 
these proposed changes in privilege doctrine, even widespread 
adoption of any particular proposal would have only a limited impact.  
Despite plenty of attention, uncertainty and confusion in many areas 
of privilege law remain pervasive rather than isolated, and are both 
inter- and intra-jurisdictional.  Thus, the problems with privilege, 
given their pervasiveness and magnitude, cannot be addressed on an 
issue-by-issue basis. 
Recognizing the need for more holistic reforms, other 
commentators have sought to address systemic problems in the 
creation and application of privilege doctrine.  For example, 
Professor Broun and others are seeking to revitalize the movement to 
convince Congress to codify a set of testimonial privileges—including 
the attorney-client privilege—applicable in federal criminal and 
federal question cases.339  Such a codification offers a number of 
potential benefits, including increasing certainty by providing a 
uniform set of privilege rules for federal disputes and promoting the 
convergence of privilege law by providing national leadership on 
privilege doctrine.340  Other reformers have sought to create greater 
certainty not by clarifying or enhancing convergence of substantive 
                                                          
 335. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 68, at 281 (advocating abandonment of the 
Garner approach because its balancing test fosters uncertainty); Talton, supra note 
205, at 301-06 (proposing a single, more predictable standard for determining 
whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes waiver); Weiss, supra note 68, at 394 
(arguing that, to promote certainty, courts should use specified criteria to determine 
which communications between in-house attorneys and their clients are privileged). 
 336. See Zeider, supra note 325, at 1320-33 (outlining popular proposals). 
 337. See id. (discussing such theories as the “subjective intent approach” and the 
“circumstances approach”). 
 338. See id. (alluding to other derivative theories). 
 339. See sources cited supra note 10. 
 340. Broun, supra note 1, at 784-85. 
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privilege rules, but rather by advocating adoption of new choice-of-
law principles that would give attorneys and clients assurance that a 
particular state’s privilege law would apply, regardless of the court in 
which the litigation occurs. Professor Bradford’s approach, which 
calls for federal legislation providing that, when there is a conflict, 
the privilege law of the jurisdiction in which the attorney practices 
governs the privilege determination, is perhaps the most convincing 
of these proposals.341 
Undoubtedly, implementation of such broad reforms would be 
steps in the right direction.342  Nevertheless, the reforms thus far 
proposed cannot address all of the causes of uncertainty, nor all of 
the inadequacies within the current regime.  Professor Bradford 
concedes that his proposal will not address the uncertainty created by 
the vertical differences between federal and state law.343  He also 
acknowledges that his choice-of-law proposal would not address the 
uncertainties and confusion in privilege law within particular 
jurisdictions.344  Moreover, while he suggests intra-jurisdictional 
uncertainties are “around the edges,” the discussion in Part II, supra, 
demonstrates that many unresolved questions are in fact both central 
and common.  Thus, a sensible choice-of-law regime is not a 
complete solution because federal versus state conflicts and 
significant intra-jurisdictional confusion will remain. 
While Professor Broun’s proposal will assist in providing much 
needed clarity in federal privilege law, it alone cannot produce 
sufficient certainty.  His proposed rules for testimonial privileges 
would apply only in federal court, and more particularly, only in 
                                                          
 341. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 945-46 (arguing that, if the attorney-client 
privilege is to serve its purpose to produce certain and predictable results, only a 
territorial rule will allow an attorney and client to know in advance whether their 
communications will be protected).  Professor Bradford offers several reasons why a 
rule centered on the state of practice is superior to other territorial rules—such as 
one based on the state of the communication or the client’s domicile.  See id. at 946-
50 (listing attorney expertise in local privilege law, and the relative ease and cost-
effectiveness of limiting privilege research to the attorney’s local forum).  Because 
his proposal can only enhance predictability if it is widely adopted, he suggests that it 
should be imposed on the states by federal legislation.  Id. at 951. 
 342. For example, even though Professor Bradford’s territorial rule would not 
create uniformity, it would aid the attorney and client in predicting—at the time of 
the communication—whether the communication is privileged.  It would also reduce 
the “cat out of the bag” problem—at least for privilege decisions that are not 
erroneous—because every court would apply the privilege law of the attorney’s state 
of practice. 
 343. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 950 (conceding proposal permits some chilling 
of attorney-client communications because the attorney and client often will not 
know at the time of the communication whether the claim will be state or federal or 
both). 
 344. Id. at 950-51. 
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federal criminal and federal question cases.345  Thus, privilege 
protections will continue to be subject to the fortuity of the forum 
and nature of the underlying claims, unless federal codification were 
to promote significant convergence and clarity in state privilege law.  
However, such convergence would take years and may not be 
forthcoming.  Although I agree with Professor Broun and others that 
an absence of national leadership on the law of privilege—from 
Congress and the Supreme Court—has contributed to the lack of 
uniformity in privilege law, such leadership alone cannot solve the 
problem.  Even in the rare circumstance in which the Supreme Court 
has provided some leadership, such as in Upjohn and decisions 
stressing the need for unqualified protections, states have been slow 
or resistant to follow the federal lead.346  Similarly, state courts and 
legislatures have resisted adopting the original and revised versions of 
Uniform Rule of Evidence 502, despite a general willingness to adopt 
other parts of the Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence.347  Thus, 
federal codification, even if finely crafted, offers an incomplete 
solution unless it extends well beyond federal question and federal 
criminal cases. 
2. Systemic problems with a common-law approach to privilege 
The problems that render these other reforms incomplete—
continuing inter-jurisdictional conflict, lingering intra-jurisdictional 
confusion, and the unlikelihood of convergence—are largely 
attributable to a single source, namely, the common law.  Indeed, 
satisfactory reform requires acknowledging, as few have, that the 
traditional common-law approach to developing privilege doctrine 
has failed and must be abandoned in its entirety. 
Professor Broun, although recognizing the virtues of the common-
law approach,348 accepts the premise that codification will bring about 
                                                          
 345. In deference to objections raised when Congress rejected codification in the 
early 1970s, Professor Broun’s proposal would maintain the current rule that, in 
federal court, state privilege law will govern where state law supplies the rule of 
decision.  Broun, supra note 1, at 934-36, 953-57. 
 346. See supra notes 217-22, 266-70 and accompanying text.  Professor Broun 
suggests that the careful scrutiny state courts have given Upjohn suggests the force of 
federal precedent in the states.  Broun, supra note 1, at 947-49.  However, state 
jurisdictions’ direct or indirect resistance to the Upjohn approach suggests that its 
impact is more limited. 
 347. See supra notes 134-38 (summarizing judicial and legislative treatment of Rule 
502). 
 348. See Broun, supra note 1, at 934 (stating that the common-law approach avoids 
some risks of a legislative approach, including the freezing of privilege at the drafting 
stage and the influence of various special interests). 
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greater certainty, at least as it applies to federal privilege law.349  
Codifying a set of clear privilege rules applicable in federal cases is 
not enough, however, because court-made privilege doctrine 
predominates elsewhere.  In many states, as in federal court, privilege 
law is expressly left to the common law.350  In other jurisdictions, the 
privilege has been codified, but at a level of generality that leaves 
much of the law governing the details of privilege to judicial creation 
and modification.351  Thus, throughout the country, privilege is 
largely a creature of common law. 
The common-law approach cannot foster the needed certainty and 
predictability in the law of privilege for a number of reasons.  First, 
there is the problem of “too many cooks in the kitchen.” Forging 
privilege doctrine with specificity is an enormously difficult task.  
Indeed, many disagreements within and between jurisdictions can be 
attributed in part to the fact that striking the right balance between 
promoting client candor and protecting the truth-seeking function is 
exceptionally challenging.  Courts simply disagree on how this 
balance should be struck and how to fashion privilege doctrine 
accordingly.  In addition, courts do not make policy in a vacuum.  
They make these determinations in specific contexts—that is, 
confronting differing types of communications, parties, and conflicts 
before them—which, added to the competing interests courts must 
consider, naturally lead to disparate conclusions. 
Second, it is axiomatic that the common-law method is ill-equipped 
for developing clearly defined rules.  The flexibility of the case 
method is one of the common law’s enduring strengths.  But, in the 
attorney-client privilege context, in which substantial certainty 
regarding future legal treatment and consequences is not merely 
efficient or preferable, but also essential, the common-law method is 
inadequate. 
Ironically, this problem is made plain in Upjohn, despite the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need for certainty.  After stating 
that a privilege uncertain in doctrine or application “is little better 
                                                          
 349. See id. at 935 (arguing that a more satisfactory set of rules could be 
promulgated governing privilege in cases involving federal law than that developed 
by courts on “a circuit-by-circuit, district-by-district, and case-by-case basis”); id. at 141-
42 (discussing how codification would make privilege doctrine simpler and more 
certain). 
 350. See supra notes 138, 221 and accompanying text. 
 351. Some jurisdictions have adopted all or part of the original or revised versions 
of Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 or similar codifications.  These codifications, 
however, do not provide detailed or clear guidance in many contexts, including the 
general parameters of the privilege, the crime-fraud exception, and waiver doctrine.  
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (Consol. 2002); REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)-(c) (1999). 
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than no privilege at all,”352 the Court went on to state as follows: 
Needless to say, we decide only the case before us, and do not 
undertake to draft a set of rules which should govern challenges to 
investigatory subpoenas.  Any such approach would violate the spirit 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 . . . While such a “case-by-case” basis 
may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the 
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the 
Rules.353  
 The Upjohn Court correctly observed that the limits of its 
holding would undermine certainty, but, for the reasons 
previously discussed, the Court wrongly predicted that the effect 
on certainty would be “slight.”354  Likewise, the Court correctly 
concluded that it was unable to provide greater certainty, but the 
Court was wrong to suggest that Congress imposed the operative 
constraints.  Although I contend that Congress mistakenly left the 
development of the attorney-client privilege to the courts, 
Congress’s view that the privilege would be developed on a case-
by-case basis was simply descriptive of the common-law method.  
Indeed, at the very outset of the Upjohn opinion, the Court all but 
concedes that it is constrained by its own adherence to the 
strictures of the case method, rather than any constraints 
imposed by Congress:   
We are acutely aware, however, that we sit to decide concrete cases 
and not abstract propositions of law.  We decline to lay down a 
broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future 
questions in this area, even were we able to do so.355 
                                                          
 352. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
 353. Id. at 396-97.  The Court did virtually the same thing fifteen years later, when 
it recognized the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law in 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996).  In recognizing the need for an absolute—
rather than qualified—privilege, the Court declared that “[m]aking the promise of 
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative 
importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure 
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege” because the participants in the 
confidential conversation “must be able to predict with some degree of certainty 
whether particular discussions will be privileged.” Id.  Yet, despite its emphasis on the 
need for certainty and predictability, the Court refused to provide guidance on the 
parameters of the privilege, stating that “it is neither necessary nor feasible to 
delineate its full contours in a way that would govern all conceivable future 
questions,” and later conceding that there may be situations in which the privilege 
may give way to other concerns.  Id.  See generally Daniel J. Capra, Communications with 
Psychotherapists and Social Workers, 216 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1996) (critiquing Jaffee and the 
common-law method).  
 354. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text. 
 355. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 386.  In another ironic moment almost a decade after 
Upjohn, the Supreme Court suggested that, despite Rule 501 and the courts’ historic 
role in declaring and defining privilege rules, developing privilege law is best viewed 
as a legislative prerogative.  Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).  While 
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This case-by-case process and the judicial restraint accompanying it 
have not and cannot produce generally applicable, particularized 
privilege rules that provide certainty.356 
Third, the limited efficacy of the common law in developing clear 
governing rules and principles is even more pronounced in the 
privilege area because privilege determinations usually are 
interlocutory.357  As discussed previously, trial courts’ privilege rulings 
therefore are rarely subject to review.358  Also, unless appealed 
immediately, privilege decisions generally evade review because most 
cases are resolved before final judgment, and if not, the particular 
privilege decisions may be mooted, as a legal or practical matter, 
once disclosure has occurred.359  Indeed, once privileged 
communications are available to adversaries, third parties, or the 
public, much of the benefit of the privilege is lost.360 
Thus, the attorney-client privilege receives limited appellate 
attention.361  This leaves trial courts confronting difficult privilege 
questions with few clear and binding precedents to apply, little 
guidance, and almost no oversight.  Clear rules and predictable 
outcomes are unlikely to result in such circumstances; to the 
contrary, a hodge-podge of approaches and quotable “sound bites” of 
doctrine are more likely to emerge, creating a pervasive atmosphere 
of uncertainty. 
                                                          
refusing to create a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials, the 
Court observed: 
[A]lthough Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire “not to freeze the law 
of privilege” but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules 
of privilege on a case-by-case basis, we are disinclined to exercise this 
authority expansively.  We are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in 
an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant 
competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself.  The balancing 
of conflicting interests of this type is particularly a legislative function. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The Court went on to discuss how Congress must have 
considered and approved of access to such materials in passing portions of Title VII.  
Id.  at 190-92. 
 356. In addition, if a court does decide to announce a broad, generally applicable 
rule on privilege, and that broad pronouncement is not necessary to the disposition 
of the case, even lower courts can choose to ignore it later.  See, e.g., Coregis Ins. Co. 
v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(discussing the limits of stare decisis and refusing to follow dicta in an earlier Third 
Circuit opinion that had suggested that the privilege covers all communications from 
an attorney to a client). 
 357. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 317-22 and accompanying text. 
 361. For example, circuit courts rarely grant mandamus review of privilege 
determinations.  Glynn, supra note 193, at 218. 
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Trial judges and magistrates will do their best, but, when largely 
left alone to determine the governing rules of privilege, they face a 
particularly daunting task.  Determining whether a particular 
communication is privileged—in an in camera review, for example—
is surprisingly difficult and extraordinarily time consuming even if 
the governing privilege rules are clear.  Yet trial judges not only must 
apply privilege doctrine, but often also must make it in the first place.  
This burden may lead judges to adopt governing rules or procedures 
that are problematic, insufficient, and unlikely to promote 
certainty.362 
Fourth, trial judges—and perhaps courts in general—may be 
particularly ill-suited to make policy judgments regarding generally 
applicable privilege rules.  Judges are asked to formulate privilege 
rules in the context of the individual cases proceeding before them.  
This requires a careful balancing of the extrinsic values that the 
privilege serves—that is, the aggregate benefits that accrue from 
having privilege protections—against the intrinsic costs of the truth-
seeking process, along with an assessment of how such rules are likely 
to operate in practice.363  Yet, when a court confronts these policy 
issues, the particular communications at issue already exist, while the 
stark, potential costs of recognizing the privilege—namely, shielding 
relevant evidence from discovery—do not.  Realistically, judges 
seeking to do justice in the particular case before them will find it 
difficult to engage in an appropriate balancing of interests and 
analysis of whether various approaches will foster sufficient certainty.  
Faced with the stark costs of the privilege in the case before them, 
judges may discount or ignore the extrinsic values that the privilege is 
                                                          
 362. For example, the sheer volume of allegedly privileged documents can create 
an enormous burden.  Realistically, this burden, in turn, can lead judges to adopt 
questionable procedures for determining whether documents are privileged.  
Defense counsel argues this occurred in the Minnesota tobacco litigation.  See 
Mulderig et al., supra note 248, at 18-23 (criticizing the court for reviewing only 
randomly selected documents among disputed thousands).  Although the Minnesota 
court ultimately may have reached the right decision on many of the disputed 
documents, the sampling procedures it employed, id., were less than ideal.  My 
concern, however, is the significant danger that judges, magistrates, and special 
masters in similarly large cases will allow the overwhelming size of the task—and the 
difficult choice of procedures to employ—to influence their views on what privilege 
doctrine ought to be, rather than focusing on the competing interests and costs of 
the privilege, and the practical effect of a selected doctrine on attorney-client candor 
and communication. 
 363. See, e.g., Capra, supra note 353, at 3 (stating that the determination of 
whether a privilege should exist is based on a necessarily political balance of 
interests); cf. Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1505 (noting that utilitarians 
focus on the systemic benefits of the privilege, but suggesting that there are 
additional, litigant-specific benefits, such as protecting rights, that also should be 
considered). 
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supposed to serve or the level of certainty needed to serve those 
values.364 
Finally, the inadequacy of the common-law approach to privilege is 
made more acute by the fact that more and more disputes are now 
resolved in extra-judicial fora, including arbitration, administrative, 
and legislative proceedings.365  In order for privilege protections to be 
reasonably certain—whether creatures of common law or otherwise—
they must be generally applicable.366  Yet court-made privilege law may 
not be binding in these other types of proceedings.367  In addition, 
even if common-law privilege protections apply—either formally, or 
because nonjudicial decision makers choose to defer to them—in 
some of these proceedings, the decision makers may be free to 
decide among the conflicting privilege rules, to proceed where the 
law is confusing, or to fashion their own rules, exceptions, or 
qualifications.  Again, this is particularly problematic given that these 
decision makers often are not attorneys and, as a legal or practical 
matter, will not have their decisions subjected to appellate or outside 
scrutiny.  Thus, the common-law method is not only internally 
problematic, but it also embodies a court-centered approach to 
privilege protection that fails to address the growing mass of extra-
judicial dispute resolution mechanisms. 
This critique of the common-law method faces a number of 
counter-arguments.  For example, skeptics may contend that my 
                                                          
 364. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 938-40 (suggesting that Congress likes 
privileges better than courts in part because courts recognize that privileges will 
deprive them of relevant and sometimes crucial evidence); Berger, supra note 1, at 
275 (noting the “traditional hostility of the judiciary” toward rules that keep relevant 
information from the courts and the trend toward recognition of qualified privileges 
in the wake of Rule 501).  Also, case-by-case assessments of privilege protections are 
bound to lead some judges to interpret the doctrine as allowing qualifications or 
other post hoc modifications of existing protections that defeat certainty.  Moreover, 
we cannot expect judges to ignore how legal rules will affect the work they must 
perform in a given case.  They will be tempted to fashion rules that fit the 
particularized needs of the case—making the in camera inspection easier or 
otherwise advancing the litigation—rather than adopting rules that seek to strike the 
right balance of interests and foster certainty.  Thus, I disagree with those scholars 
who have suggested that privilege doctrine should be made by judges, 
retrospectively, rather than by policy makers with a prospective viewpoint.  Cf. Miller, 
supra note 10, at 803 (discussing judicial approach to creating an evidentiary 
privilege). 
 365. See sources cited supra note 301. 
 366. I therefore disagree with those scholars who believe that privileges ought to 
be viewed as either procedural in nature or court-centered.  See, e.g., Miller, supra 
note 10, at 795-97 (arguing that privileges are more procedural than substantive in 
nature, and therefore privilege policy making belongs to the judiciary). 
 367. For example, the Federal Arbitration Act does not provide for judicial review 
of arbitrators’ privilege determinations.  See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 
(2002) (setting forth the narrow grounds for vacating an arbitration award). 
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criticism proves too much: given that the attorney-client privilege 
always has been a court-created doctrine, and that attorneys and 
clients always have communicated with one another, I am either 
wrong that the common law cannot produce sufficiently certain 
privilege protections to promote attorney-client communications, or I 
have overstated the level of certainty needed.368 
In response, my critique is limited to contemporary circumstances.  
The common-law method may have provided adequate certainty 
historically, given that parties generally knew the forum that would 
resolve their disputes, discovery was limited, and attorney-client 
communications were less frequent, less varied, and usually occurred 
in the litigation context.369  Circumstances are far different today: our 
modern regulatory regime is enormously complex; courts now 
employ broader discovery rules in civil matters and can extend their 
compulsory process farther than in the past; there is greater 
corporate and interstate activity; and litigation and dispute resolution 
alternatives have grown substantially in both frequency and scope.370  
Thus, clients seek legal advice both more regularly and more 
pervasively than in the past.  Attorney-client communications are 
more likely to fall within the scope of legitimate discovery requests 
and, hence, are more likely to be disputed.  And attorneys and clients 
are less likely to be able to predict whether and where they will end 
up litigating or otherwise seeking to resolve disputes.  In this modern 
environment, the common-law approach cannot provide sufficient 
certainty. 
In addition, I do not believe I have overstated the level of certainty 
that is needed or, at minimum, desirable.  Indeed, while my critique 
of the failings of the common-law approach is more far-reaching, 
other commentators have offered similar criticisms of various aspects 
of privilege doctrine and enforcement.371  Given this steady stream of 
                                                          
 368. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 153 (arguing against 
codification of privileges in part because there is no evidence suggesting a 
compelling need to do so). 
 369. See Michael M. Mustokoff et al., The Attorney/Client Privilege: A Fond Memory of 
Things Past; An Analysis of the Privilege Following United States v. Anderson, 9 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 107, 108-20 (2000) (discussing general evolution of the attorney-client 
privilege). 
 370. National litigation and national law firms have become far more common. 
Broun, supra note 1, at 961; Michael D. Goldhaber, Among 2000’s Lessons: The Big Get 
Bigger, the Small Stay Pretty Small, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 4, 2000, at A1 (discussing how the 
nation’s largest law firms are growing, consolidating, and becoming more national in 
scope). 
 371. See, e.g., Capra, supra note 353, at 3 (criticizing the common-law method and 
advocating a legislative approach in part because “a privilege can probably be made 
more explicit upon legislative enactment than by judicial fiat.”).   
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critical commentary over the last two decades, uncertainty must have 
deterred attorneys and clients from communicating in various 
contexts.372  Many other parties may be unaware of how uncertain the 
protection is and would have been deterred had they known the 
truth.373  Moreover, if I am wrong, and many attorneys and clients 
would engage in full and frank communications even when well-
informed of the doctrinal confusion in various contexts and the other 
risks described in Part II, then one must question—as some privilege 
skeptics do—whether the privilege is useful at all, much less useful 
enough to justify its extraordinary costs. Yet, as discussed previously, 
the privilege probably is here to stay in one form or another, and we 
will never be able to verify its actual effect on attorney and client 
behavior.374  Thus, to achieve its purported benefits, the privilege—
which will continue to exist and inflict costs—must provide 
protections sufficiently certain to convince attorneys and clients, who 
otherwise would curb their communications, to speak freely.  The 
common-law method has not produced such protections. 
Other skeptics of my proposal may argue that, even if the common-
law method does not result in sufficiently certain privilege 
protections, a legislative approach would be no better, or perhaps 
worse.  Many critics may fear that Congress will act inappropriately, 
either by extending privilege protections too far or, conversely, by 
“gutting” needed protections.375  I address these political process 
concerns in the next subpart.  Yet other observers simply may argue 
that legislative bodies, including Congress, are unlikely to produce 
clearer or more predictable governing principles.376  For example, 
many state legislatures or courts have codified privilege protections, 
yet even in these jurisdictions, the details are largely left to common-
law development.   
As an initial matter, legislators are not hamstrung by the 
aforementioned constraints that prevent judicial policy makers from 
crafting generally applicable and sufficiently particularized privilege 
protections.  In addition, the fact that state legislatures have been 
satisfied with less particularized codification models—such as the 
                                                          
 372. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 68, at 408 (arguing that, because the attorney-client 
privilege has not been applied consistently, attorneys are likely to be conservative in 
predicting which communications will be protected). 
 373. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 61, 91, and accompanying text. 
 375. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 788-89 (arguing that the judiciary can be 
more objective than the necessarily partisan legislature because the judiciary is “more 
insulated” from political lobbies). 
 376. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 153 (stating that an 
attempt to legislate the boundaries of privileges would be difficult, if not impossible). 
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Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence—does not mean that legislatures 
in general or Congress in particular are incapable of codifying clearer 
rules.377  This is true given that, to the extent Congress would respond 
to calls for codification, it would act precisely because the law of 
privilege is in need of greater predictability and clarity.  For the 
reasons discussed in the next subpart, Congress now has the tools—
including a wealth of history, commentary, and well-established 
vehicles for receiving expert guidance378—it needs to draft legislation 
that will resolve many of the current problems in privilege law and 
provide far greater certainty.379 
Another commonly expressed concern about a legislative approach 
to fashioning privilege law is that the legislative tack will “freeze” the 
doctrine, preventing positive or necessary development.380  First, I 
                                                          
 377. Indeed, the Uniform Rules of Evidence are conscientiously general and 
flexible.  Similarly, Professor Berger describes the Federal Rules of Evidence as 
“general rules or ‘standards’ rather then inflexible rules of law.” See Berger, supra 
note 1, at 255 (noting that Congress enacted both the very general Federal Rules of 
Evidence  and more detailed regulatory statutes such as the Bankruptcy and Internal 
Revenue Codes, thereby implying a conscious decision on the part of Congress to 
maintain generality and flexibility in the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 378. See infra note 418 and accompanying text.   
 379. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 771 (arguing that codification will bring 
about a more satisfactory set of rules than those created on a case-by-case basis); 
Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond: Where 
Do We Go from Here?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1341 (1998) (insisting that privilege law, 
in particular, is well suited for statutory treatment because it involves policy questions 
and other details of application that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is best 
equipped to address).  In discussing his proposal for codification of various 
evidentiary privileges in the federal courts, Professor Broun argues that the 
codification approach can bring about significant improvements: “[I]f drafted with 
sufficient care and input from the public, the bar and the judiciary, the codification 
can be a significant improvement over the set of rules that have developed in the 
federal courts under Rule 501.” Broun, supra note 1, at 771.  Although Professor 
Broun concedes that codification cannot resolve every potential problem associated 
with privilege law, he nevertheless maintains that the law of privilege could be made 
“much simpler and more certain . . . if there were a federal rule guiding the courts 
through the more predictable and important issues.” Id. at 788-89. 
 380. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 152-53 (arguing against 
codification of privilege rules in the federal courts because the common law allows 
adaptation, flexibility, and gradual delineation of boundaries that is beneficial to 
development of the law of privilege); Miller, supra note 10, at 789-92 (arguing against 
the legislation of a privilege law because the legislative method is less flexible than 
the common-law method and judicial decision makers, unlike legislatures or rule 
makers, have the ability to “fine tune” and modify privilege protections).  Some also 
expressed this concern during the congressional debates over Article V of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  See Broun, supra note 1, at 769, 773-77 (discussing the 
criticism raised by scholars, practitioners, judges, and members of Congress, against 
federal codification of the law of privilege); see also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 
182, 189 (1990) (stating that Rule 501, as currently enacted, reflects a congressional 
desire to maintain flexibility and refrain from freezing the law of privilege).  Some of 
this concern, however, was directed at freezing in or freezing out certain types of 
privileges, rather than specific aspects or particulars of the individual privileges.  See, 
e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 789-95 (stating a preference for common-law creation 
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agree with other commentators who have questioned whether 
codification would have a harmful chilling effect.381  I also question 
whether Congress—once it chooses to enact a privilege law—would 
be slower to respond to particular problems in privilege doctrine 
than judicial decision makers.  For example, despite all of the 
controversy and confusion surrounding the corporate privilege since 
Upjohn, the Supreme Court has yet to provide further guidance, some 
twenty years later.  More importantly, however, the last quarter 
century of limited convergence and doctrinal disarray suggests that 
the law of attorney-client privilege desperately needs to be clarified 
and then “frozen,” at least in substantial part.  Reasonable certainty 
demands that attorneys and clients be able to predict—at the time of 
their communication—the principles that will govern whether the 
communication will be safe from disclosure.  Once Congress codifies 
the law of privilege, modifications in the doctrine should be rare. 
Finally, some critics of my proposal may argue against codification 
because it will create new transaction costs, particularly in litigation.  
To the contrary, codification will substantially reduce transaction 
costs.  Without question, new legislation spawns litigation, even if the 
legislation is carefully drafted.  Yet, provided Congress passes 
appropriate privilege legislation as discussed below, the transaction 
costs of enforcing privilege will decline substantially over time.  
Again, in the current regime, parties often must litigate not only how 
the court should apply privilege doctrine in certain circumstances 
and to certain communications, but also what doctrine governs.382  
Indeed, much of the current privilege litigation—in thousands of 
state and federal cases383—concerns doctrine rather than application.  
Carefully drafted national legislation that resolves many of the 
current disputes and ambiguities and provides a single set of 
governing principles will substantially reduce litigation over doctrine, 
leaving primarily disputes over application.384  In defining privilege 
                                                          
and development of privilege law). 
 381. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 801-03 (noting that the law of evidence has 
neither become inflexible nor “frozen,” as its critics predicted when the Federal 
Rules were enacted in 1975).  Instead, Professor Broun argues, the law of evidence 
“has moved with the times.”  Id. at 802. 
 382. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts and 
confusion in the law of privilege). 
 383. See supra note 7 (indicating the volume of privilege litigation in state and 
federal courts). 
 384. Cf. Berger, supra note 1, at 265 (noting that those subject areas of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence which have undergone the most comprehensive treatment have, in 
turn, produced little litigation).  Clearer and more predictable protections also will 
produce savings prior to litigation: attorneys and their clients will need to spend less 
time and fewer resources on determining how or whether to communicate and what 
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doctrine, a legislative body like Congress can take into account the 
aggregate costs of application, and, to the extent possible given other 
interests, fashion the doctrine to limit such costs.385  Thus, after an 
initial adjustment period, the legislative approach I propose will 
produce a substantial cost savings. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the common-law approach should 
be abandoned.  The common law not only has failed to produce 
reasonably certain privilege protections, but it also is incapable of 
doing so.  Legislation, rather than the common law, ought to be the 
primary source of privilege doctrine.386  Given that the common-law 
approach predominates in most jurisdictions, the only way to ensure 
a legislative approach is to have Congress adopt national privilege 
legislation that preempts contrary state privilege law. 
3. The essential contents of a national privilege law 
The purpose of this article is not to outline the particulars of a 
national attorney-client privilege statute, nor to advocate how 
Congress ought to resolve all disputes and ambiguities in the law of 
privilege.  However, in order to correct the problems in the current, 
largely common-law regime and achieve reasonable certainty, the 
legislation must at least satisfy the three conditions discussed in Part 
II.  Namely, privilege legislation must provide protection that is clear, 
unqualified, and generally applicable. 
The first prerequisite for achieving reasonable certainty is to clarify 
the scope of the protection: confusing, ambiguous, or flexible 
privilege rules and exceptions do not offer predictable protection.  
Obviously, no codification can resolve every possible ambiguity, 
simplify every inquiry or application, or anticipate all interpretive 
questions.  Given the competing interests at stake, some doctrinal 
complexity must remain.387  Yet carefully drafted legislation can 
largely resolve many of the lingering ambiguities and important 
disputes that plague privilege doctrine in the current regime.  For 
                                                          
risks they face if they do communicate. 
 385. For example, Professor Rice argues that the confidentiality/secrecy 
requirement should be abolished.  See Rice, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 203, at 
888-98.  He contends that this requirement is both unnecessary and the cause of a 
substantial portion of the costs of litigating the privilege.  See id.  Congress should 
take these kinds of considerations into account when fashioning privilege doctrine. 
 386. It is worth noting that codification would not harm other interests served by 
the privilege—such as protection against self-incrimination, fostering professionalism 
and loyalty, and preserving privacy and dignity.  All of these interests likewise are 
served by a clear and generally applicable privilege.  See generally Broun, supra note 1, 
at 789-803 (arguing that other interests served by testimonial privileges benefit from 
uniform and predictable privilege protections). 
 387. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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example, the legislation can resolve whether and when 
communications from the attorney to the client are privileged, clarify 
the requirements for intending and maintaining confidentiality, 
provide a uniform and clear framework for determining who is the 
corporate client, address the status of communications to in-house 
counsel, and define the limits of the crime-fraud and at-issue 
exceptions.  Carefully drafted legislation also can clarify the scope 
and applicability of various waiver doctrines, including inadvertent 
disclosure and subject matter waiver.  Such legislation would offer far 
more guidance and predictability than have the common law and 
more generalized state-law codifications.388 
The second necessary element for achieving reasonable certainty is 
that the privilege protections be unqualified and not subject to post 
hoc reconsideration or abandonment.  As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in both Swidler & Berlin and Jaffee, a qualified privilege—
one that is subject to a post hoc balancing of harms or interests—
precludes certainty at the time of the communication.389  To root out 
further lingering doubts about the protection, the legislation should 
prohibit judicially created exceptions and waiver doctrines.  Likewise, 
legislatively recognized exceptions and waiver doctrines must be clear 
and provide strict limits to avoid easy manipulation.390  Thus, to the 
                                                          
 388. Although conceding that codification of the privilege rules will not resolve 
every issue existing in the current common-law privilege doctrine, Professor Broun 
argues that “good, thoughtful drafting can eliminate many of the most troublesome 
areas and at least suggest a generalized approach for dealing with others.” Broun, 
supra note 1, at 786.  In his proposal, Professor Broun discusses a number of 
unresolved issues involving attorney-client privilege as examples of areas of the 
doctrine that can be clarified through codification.  See id. at 786-89 (describing 
privilege doctrines in areas of corporate attorney-client communications, invocation 
of the crime-fraud exception, inadvertent disclosure of privileged matter, and other 
unresolved problems in common-law privilege law). 
 389. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1988) (admitting 
that, at the time of a client’s disclosure to counsel, the client has no ability to know 
whether such disclosure will become relevant, or whether it will hold substantial 
importance  in either a civil or criminal trial at a later juncture).  For this reason, the 
Supreme Court has rejected the use of a “balancing test” to define the contours of 
the attorney-client privilege, pronouncing that “[b]alancing ex post the importance of 
the information against client interests, even [when] limited to criminal cases, 
introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application.” Id. (referring to 
its denial of the balancing test in Upjohn).  See also sources cited supra note 353. 
 390. Again, by “unqualified,” I do not mean without exceptions.  The exceptions 
and other limiting principles simply must be categorical and defined in advance.  See 
supra note 11.  In addition, an appropriate privilege regime would recognize that the 
persons entitled to preserve or waive the privilege on behalf of a corporate or other 
organizational client may change.  For example, I am not suggesting that the same 
set of corporate insiders should always control the entity’s privilege nor that the 
judicial determination of entitlement to control can always be governed by a strict or 
bright-line rule.  I do believe, however, that the standards for making this 
determination should be defined in advance and delineated with more clarity than 
they are in the current regime (Garner and its progeny), so that application of such 
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extent communications fall within the scope of the privilege and 
outside recognized, categorical exceptions, the protection must be 
absolute, since protections remain wholly uncertain when subject to 
qualification or post hoc abandonment.391 
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the legislation must be 
universally applicable.  The attorney and client must have confidence 
at the time of the potential communication that the protections 
afforded by the statute will apply regardless of the fortuity of the 
forum—federal, state, or nonjudicial—the civil or criminal nature of 
the proceeding,392 or the substantive claims giving rise to the dispute 
in which the client may have to assert the privilege.  Universal 
applicability avoids the uncertainties arising from the existence of 
conflicting law, the happenstance of the forum, and the decision 
maker’s choice among privilege rules.393 
To achieve universal applicability, the legislation must ensure that 
privilege doctrine preempts contrary state privilege rules.  In other 
words, the legislation should provide that the client possesses a 
federal substantive right—a “federal privilege right”—to refuse to 
disclose privileged communications during discovery, by resisting a 
subpoena, and by refusing to testify or allowing the attorney to 
testify.394 
Viewing the protection afforded by the privilege as a “substantive 
right” is not as novel as it may seem.  As previously discussed,395 much 
of the criticism of Article V of the Proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence was that privilege protections are substantive in nature.  
Although privileges have been mischaracterized as merely 
evidentiary, testimonial, or procedural rules in the past,396 they do not 
merely govern the manner or means by which courts resolve 
                                                          
standards is as predictable as possible to all constituencies and does not simply 
degenerate into an ad hoc balancing of interests. 
 391. However, to the extent there are strong, countervailing social policies that 
ought to override application of the privilege, those social policies must be taken 
into account in the legislation (by tailoring the limitations and exceptions to the 
privilege accordingly).  Allowing individual decision makers to balance competing 
policies destroys certainty. 
 392. In Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408-09, the Supreme Court observed that no 
case authority exists to support the proposition that the privilege applies differently 
depending on whether in the civil or criminal context.  Id.  
 393. A single source of law also reduces the appearance of uncertainty by 
removing the static that inevitably results from multiple, disparate doctrines. 
 394. This also could be described as a federally recognized immunity to certain 
forms of compulsory process or  disclosure. 
 395. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
 396. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(defining the attorney-client privilege as an evidentiary rule regulating disclosure). 
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disputes.397  Unlike other rules of evidence and procedure, privileges 
defeat, rather than serve, the judicial function of elucidating the 
truth.398  As many commentators have recognized—during the 
debates over the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and 
thereafter—privilege doctrine is substantive because it serves interests 
extrinsic to the particular litigation in which the privilege is 
asserted.399  The attorney-client privilege is concerned with “primary 
conduct and affairs,” in the words of Justice Harlan,400 because its 
purposes are extrajudicial, promoting and protecting 
communications between attorneys and clients, and thereby 
producing various social benefits.  Moreover, Congress implicitly 
recognized the substantive nature of the attorney-client privilege 
when it amended the Rules Enabling Act after passage of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, granting back to the Supreme Court the authority 
to promulgate rules of evidence, but preserving for itself the exclusive 
authority to create, abolish, and modify privileges.401  Thus, my 
proposal is novel not in recognizing a substantive right of privilege, 
but rather in federalizing it. 
Also, while universality requires creation of this federal substantive 
right, it does not mean that Congress must recognize a federal cause 
of action based on that right.  Although Congress could make 
available federal injunctive relief in some circumstances, creating a 
cause of action premised on an assertion of privilege in another 
proceeding would create enormous practical and administrative 
difficulties, incur substantial transaction costs, and raise additional 
                                                          
 397. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
 398. Goldberg, supra note 119, at 683-84 (contrasting evidentiary rules, such as 
those governing the admission and exclusion of evidence, examination of witnesses, 
judicial notice, competency of witnesses, and relevance with privilege rules, and 
finding that, whereas evidentiary rules aid the fact-finding process, privilege rules 
help to hide the truth). 
 399. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg, supra note 
119, at 684 (providing that privilege rules “impede the truth-seeking process in order 
to serve extrinsic social policies”); Weinstein, supra note 119, at 370-73 (discussing 
the substantive nature of privilege rules, how they serve extrinsic policies, and 
therefore how privilege rules differ from other rules of evidence); see also MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §§ 169, 175-176 (discussing why privilege protections are 
substantive rather than procedural).  But see Miller, supra note 10, at 796-97 (stating 
that, although privileges have both substantive and procedural aspects, they should 
be within the realm of the judiciary because their impact is largely procedural). 
 400. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(discussing Erie and noting the difficulties associated with Supreme Court’s choice-of-
law doctrine in federal diversity actions). 
 401. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000) (“Any such rule creating, abolishing, or 
modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by 
Act of Congress.”).  
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constitutional concerns beyond those discussed in the next subpart.402  
Instead, I simply propose that the legislation recognize the right of a 
client, without creating an independent cause of action, to resist 
being compelled to disclose protected attorney-client 
communications in any proceeding in which such communications 
are sought.403  The client would retain this federal right, in any forum 
or proceeding, whether judicial or nonjudicial, unless the client 
waives its application in that forum.404 
Universality does not ensure uniform or perfectly predictable 
application.  For example, even if every judicial and nonjudicial 
decision maker must apply the same privilege law, interpretations 
and outcomes may not always be the same and errors may occur.  The 
danger of erroneous application or interpretation may be particularly 
great in nonjudicial fora, in which the decision makers often are not 
attorneys, and clients may have little or no access to judicial review.  
And, as discussed previously, trial courts applying the doctrine often 
may not be subject to appellate oversight.405 
Perhaps Congress also should consider additional, limited reforms 
to enhance oversight: for example, providing for interlocutory review 
for certain privilege issues arising in federal district court cases,406 or 
amending the Federal Arbitration Act to expand judicial review to 
cover privilege determinations in arbitration.407 Yet, even without 
additional avenues of review, a single, clear set of rules governing the 
attorney-client privilege should simplify greatly the task for most 
decision makers and thereby reduce the frequency of error.  
                                                          
 402. For example, creating a federal cause of action against state decision makers 
seeking to compel disclosure may raise Eleventh Amendment concerns.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI (“[T]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”). 
 403. Again, while this appears novel at first blush, Congress has acted similarly in 
the past.  See, e.g., infra notes 485-89 and accompanying text (noting the similarities 
between the proposed legislation and the substantive protections afforded by the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)). 
 404. Thus, for example, an arbitration panel could not compel the client to 
produce privileged communications unless the client had agreed to forego the 
privilege in arbitration or otherwise had waived it. 
 405. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text. 
 406. See Glynn, supra note 193, at 258-65 (proposing that, to enhance appellate 
review in problem areas such as privilege, rule makers should consider promulgating 
rules allowing for mandatory review of discrete categories of interlocutory orders).  
The provision for interlocutory review need not be permanent: Congress could 
provide that the provision expires after the amount of time it deems sufficient to 
resolve most interpretive issues.  Id. 
 407. Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (setting forth the narrow reasons for vacating an 
arbitration award). 
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Similarly, the clear, unqualified, and universal nature of the 
protection reduces the risk of manipulation.  To the extent 
ambiguities remain, they may be resolved more quickly than current 
controversies, because state and federal courts cannot ignore 
definitive federal interpretations in cases involving state-law claims.  
Indeed, there will be at least the potential for direct federal oversight 
of state-court treatment, because the Supreme Court will have the 
ability to review state-court privilege decisions. 
Furthermore, to combat the corrosive effect of potential errors on 
attorney and client confidence in the privilege, the legislation could 
reduce the “cat-out-of-the-bag” problem by making clear that 
compelled disclosure of privileged communications in any forum 
does not constitute waiver of the protection as against other parties in 
other proceedings.  As a practical matter, clients may lose the full 
benefit of confidentiality in some circumstances, such as when 
opposing counsel represents adverse parties in other cases.  But, by 
ensuring that privileged communications are not legally required to 
remain absolutely secret, such a provision will prevent some of the 
ripple effects that erroneously compelled disclosures cause.408 
While the particulars of a national attorney-client privilege should 
be left to a thorough deliberative process, truly effective legislation 
must contain several fundamental attributes.  No privilege regime can 
provide completely predictable protection, but the type of national, 
preemptive legislation I have described comes far closer than any 
other proposal. 
B. Congress’s Capacity and Power to Federalize Privilege 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the best approach to 
resolve all of the lingering conflicts and confusion in privilege 
doctrine, and thereby provide reasonably certain privilege 
protections, is codification of the law of the attorney-client privilege, 
providing clear, unqualified, and generally applicable privilege 
protections.  Although no legislative outcome is certain, Congress has 
                                                          
 408. A party may still be barred from re-litigating the issue of privilege under the 
doctrine of issue preclusion.  See generally Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 
735 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing how the barriers of issue preclusion and waiver 
doctrine preclude the re-examining of issues except in certain circumstances).  
However, issue preclusion will attach in the later proceeding only if the privilege 
determination is merged into a final judgment.  Id. at 740-41.  Also, to the extent that 
the court in the first proceeding compelled disclosure under an exception or waiver 
doctrine that is inapplicable in the second proceeding, assertion of the privilege will 
not be precluded.  Id.  The legislation should make clear that preclusion applies only 
to judicial proceedings; it should not apply to determinations of nonjudicial decision 
makers. 
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both the capacity and constitutional power to enact such legislation. 
1. Congress’s ability to craft appropriate legislation 
Many who otherwise agree that a single, clear, and generally 
applicable set of rules governing the attorney-client privilege is 
desirable or even necessary might be skeptical of Congress’s 
willingness and capacity to enact the kind of particularized legislation 
that is needed.  For example, Congress had the opportunity to 
address the attorney-client privilege—and privileges generally—in the 
early 1970s, and chose to avoid doing so.409  Other observers simply 
may fear that once Congress takes on the attorney-client privilege, it 
will succumb to political pressures or interests and produce 
legislation that either inappropriately curtails privilege protections or 
extends privilege protections too far.410 
One ought to have healthy doubts and concerns about Congress’s 
ability to address these kinds of issues, and, of course, the ultimate 
outcome of the legislative process is uncertain.  Yet, for a number of 
reasons, both the time and the circumstances are right for Congress 
to enact the type of legislation I propose and, in so doing, strike an 
appropriate balance between competing interests. 
First, Congress’s refusal to codify the proposed privilege rules in 
1975 does not mean that it would refuse to codify the attorney-client 
privilege today.  The legislation I propose does not implicate several 
of the concerns that led Congress to reject Article V.  For example, 
this proposal addresses only the attorney-client privilege, which is 
recognized in all state and federal jurisdictions.  Thus, unlike Article 
V, this proposal does not ask Congress to recognize or expand 
controversial privileges such as the secrets of state and official 
information privileges,411 nor does it seek to narrow or “freeze out” 
other privileges recognized in some states.412  My proposal for 
statutory reform also avoids entirely the concerns about the limits of 
judicial rule-making authority under the Rules Enabling Act that was 
the subject of so much critical commentary during congressional 
hearings in the early 1970s.413 
                                                          
 409. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 410. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 1, at 276 (“Congress is, of course, free to enact 
privileges, but it would then have to make choices between competing groups 
clamoring for the privilege of having a privilege—the very choice it obviously sought 
to avoid by passing rule 501.”). 
 411. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps more importantly, my proposed legislation avoids the Erie 
concerns that troubled commentators and some members of 
Congress during the earlier debate.414  The legislation not only would 
eliminate the need to decide which privilege “rules” should govern in 
diversity actions in federal court, it would abandon a court or 
judicially-centered view of the privilege: its privilege protections 
would apply in all jurisdictions and all nonjudicial fora.  Again, my 
approach recognizes—and indeed is premised upon—the substantive 
rather than procedural nature of attorney-client privilege 
protections.415  As those commentators who were concerned about 
Erie argued during the debates, privilege doctrines are concerned 
with protecting and promoting primary activity and embody rights 
serving interests extrinsic to the dispute and possessed to maintain 
confidentiality.416  My legislative proposal respects the substantive 
nature of these rights; it simply federalizes them. 
Thus, assuming Congress would have the same kinds of concerns it 
had when it rejected the proposed privilege rules and enacted Rule 
501, my proposal would have to overcome only two of the major 
objections to codification discussed a quarter century ago.  Primarily, 
Congress would have to be convinced that it was wrong in concluding 
that (1) the development of privilege law is best left to the courts, and 
(2) state policy choices regarding attorney-client privilege law are 
entitled to deference, at least in disputes involving state law.  That 
Congress erred in both respects is now apparent, as the foregoing 
analysis demonstrates.  Moreover, the likelihood that attorneys and 
clients must consider the implications of inter-jurisdictional conflicts 
has grown because business and communication are more national—
and indeed global—in scope than they were in 1975, and the national 
bar and national litigation have expanded substantially.417  Today, 
more than ever, the need for certainty is a national interest, and can 
be served only by national, legislative reform. 
Second, Congress is more capable today than it was in 1975 of 
resolving lingering ambiguities in attorney-client privilege doctrine 
and drafting clear and particularized language defining the privilege.  
There is now a wealth of history, case law, and scholarship on which 
Congress can draw in making these determinations.  The privilege’s 
most troublesome areas—the confidentiality doctrine, the corporate 
privilege, the crime-fraud exception, and various ambiguities in the 
                                                          
 414. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
 415. See supra notes 392-94 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
 417. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 370. 
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law of waiver—have received an enormous amount of attention and 
have been subjected to extensive scholarly scrutiny and debate.  This 
body of commentary is ripe for legislative review.  Moreover, 
Congress now has well-established vehicles for receiving expert 
guidance on drafting such legislation, including the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the American Bar Association and 
other legal associations, state organizations, and rule-making bodies, 
and the American Law Institute.418  Congress could establish a 
commission—somewhat akin to the Federal Courts Study 
Commission—to conduct hearings and a thorough study of this area 
of the law, make findings, and undertake initial drafting 
responsibilities.  Thus, Congress now has the tools to craft sufficiently 
particularized and effective legislation. 
Third, although political pressures will exist in any legislative 
process, and various interest groups will no doubt seek to influence 
the content of privilege law, I believe there is a good chance that 
Congress can enact appropriately balanced legislation.  In the 
attorney-client privilege context, there seems to be a rare balance of 
highly interested, influential constituencies and, correspondingly, 
strange bedfellows.  For example, well-organized industry groups, 
various legal organizations, and the criminal defense bar are likely to 
prefer strong privilege protections, while law enforcement 
constituencies and the plaintiffs’ bar will prefer strict limitations on 
these protections.419 
In fact, skeptics fearful of subjecting the privilege to the legislative 
process may offer opposing assessments: one contingent may argue 
that Congress will simply capitulate to industry groups and expand 
the privilege inappropriately; the other may contend that Congress 
will simply gut the privilege because the privilege is used to hide the 
truth.  Given the powerful interests on both sides, both fears are 
                                                          
 418. As Professor Broun notes: 
[T]here is a ready-made vehicle for providing judicial input into the drafting 
process.  The Judicial Conference of the United States has standing 
committees set up to consider amendments to rules, including the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  Those committees are composed not only of federal 
judges, but of state court judges, practitioners and academics.  The 
committees hold open deliberative sessions as well as public hearings on any 
proposed amendments to the rules. 
Broun, supra note 1, at 814. 
 419. The presence of well-organized and financed interest groups on both sides of 
the issue reduces the risk, expressed by public choice theorists, that privilege 
legislation will favor a single, organized interest group to the detriment of social 
welfare.  See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’s Temptation to Defect: A Political and 
Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 801, 819-24 (1997) (discussing the impact on legislative development of various 
external political and economic factors). 
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exaggerated.  In particular, capture of privilege legislation by industry 
groups is unlikely at this moment in history, given the recent Enron 
debacle and the resulting public and congressional sentiment for 
greater public disclosure, transparency, and accountability. 
Perhaps the remaining critics—particularly advocates for criminal 
defendants who believe Congress may gut the privilege—have more 
to be concerned about, especially in the wake of the terrorist activities 
of September 11.  Yet I still believe a congressional approach will be 
more measured than these critics fear.  A substantial curtailing of the 
privilege would face significant opposition from legal organizations 
beyond the criminal defense bar.  In addition, if my approach is 
followed, there will be no distinction between the privilege 
protections that apply in the civil and criminal settings.  A uniform 
privilege will link the destinies of civil and criminal defendants, 
providing greater leverage against congressional overstepping.  Even 
if Congress is tempted to limit protections too severely in the criminal 
context, its actions will have Fifth Amendment420 (privilege against 
self-incrimination) and Sixth Amendment421 (right to counsel) 
implications.  If these implications do not deter overreaching, 
recourse to the courts will remain.  Furthermore, I question whether 
the risks of congressional action are as great as they seem, particularly 
given the current, problematic state of privilege law.422 
Finally, despite the risks associated with the legislative process, we 
ought to have a national, public debate on many of the lingering 
privilege issues that judicial decision makers have been unable to 
resolve.  The difficult balancing of interests, benefits, and costs that 
must occur in delineating the parameters of the privilege is a 
uniquely legislative function, and, for all of the foregoing reasons, it 
is one that cries out for a resolution.  Although the process will not 
necessarily succeed, Congress, our national, politically accountable 
body, ought to attempt to craft a workable resolution. 
                                                          
 420. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 421. Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”). 
 422. For example, without a statute addressing the subject, the Justice Department 
can continue to set its own rules with regard to monitoring detainees’ 
communications with counsel, unless a federal court were to find such monitoring 
unconstitutional.  Similarly, without a congressional mandate, the Department of 
Defense, in crafting rules governing military tribunals, need not incorporate 
privilege protections comparable to those available in civilian courts.  Also, given the 
confusion and ambiguity in privilege law, judges now often can find a justification for 
denying privilege protection. 
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All of this being said, the question remains whether Congress 
would ever be interested enough to take on the challenge of 
codifying the attorney-client privilege and preempting contrary state 
law.  Indeed, undertaking a serious study of, and then overhauling, 
the attorney-client privilege probably is not high on Congress’s 
current agenda.  My message, however, is addressed not only to 
members of Congress but to others—scholars, judges, and 
practitioners—interested in addressing and working to solve the 
problems in the current privilege regime.  Under the Rules Enabling 
Act, only Congress can codify privilege law for the federal judicial 
system, and only Congress can implement other holistic changes, 
such as creating a national choice-of-privilege-law regime.423  
Congressional action, therefore, is needed for any significant national 
reform addressing privilege law. To the extent commentators, 
practitioners, the Judicial Conference, or others can capture 
Congress’s attention, they should use that rare opportunity to 
federalize the law of privilege, rather than to seek more limited, less 
effective reforms. 
2. Congress’s power to federalize privilege 
Even if Congress is both willing and capable of crafting clear, 
unqualified, and generally applicable attorney-client privilege 
legislation, it must have the power to enact such a far-reaching 
measure.  Although Congress occasionally has enacted legislation 
addressing privilege issues, these provisions have been narrow in 
scope, tied to federal agency activities, or, in the case of Rule 501, 
applicable only to certain matters litigated in federal courts.424 The 
legislation I propose—which would endow the client with a federal 
privilege right that supersedes and preempts contrary state privilege 
law and would apply in all judicial and nonjudicial fora—obviously 
raises greater concerns about congressional power.  This is 
particularly true given the Supreme Court’s “new federalism” 
jurisprudence.425  Yet I contend that Congress has the authority to  
act.  Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause426 to 
regulate and protect the provision of legal services, and, under the 
                                                          
 423. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.”).  
 424. See supra note 144. 
 425. See generally, e.g., David C. Feola & David R. Fine, The “New Federalism”: Ignore It 
at Your Peril, COLO. LAW., (Nov. 2000); Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference:  The 
Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245 (2000); Mark Tushnet, What Is 
the Supreme Court’s New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 927 (2000). 
 426. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”). 
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Supremacy Clause,427 to preempt contrary state law.  While the states 
have a long tradition of regulating the practice of law, their disparate 
approaches to the privilege may inhibit and burden the attorney-
client relationship, which is a subject of national interest and 
commerce.  Exercising this power will not run afoul of the Tenth 
Amendment428 or the values of federalism it serves.429 
a. The Commerce Clause 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution allocates to Congress the 
power “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”430  If 
Congress enacts legislation pursuant to this authority, it may, if it so 
chooses, preempt state regulation in the field pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause.431  Congress’s Commerce Clause power extends to 
three broad categories of activity: “[f]irst, Congress may regulate the 
use of the channels of interstate commerce;”432 “[s]econd, Congress 
may regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though 
the threat may come only from intrastate activities;”433 and, “[f]inally, 
Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . or 
in other words, those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”434  The privilege legislation I propose would fall primarily 
within the third category.435 
                                                          
 427. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 428. Id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, not prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”). 
 429. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE 
L.J. 947, 997-1001 (2001) (discussing the Tenth Amendment and the normative 
values of federalism that the U.S. system of dual sovereignty serves). 
 430. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 431. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 432. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (quoting United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)) (citations omitted). 
 433. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558) (citations omitted).  
 434. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59) (citation omitted).  
 435. Of course, some of the attorney-client communications that would be subject 
to the legislation would fall within the other categories.  For example, the legislation 
would protect attorney-client communications made over the telephone or other 
wire or electronic means.  Also, because the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel have been incorporated 
against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, then Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment may provide an alternative basis for federalizing the 
privilege in criminal cases.  See id. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by “appropriate legislation”). 
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Pursuant to its authority to regulate activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce, Congress has enacted an enormous 
variety of legislation regulating intrastate activities sufficiently related 
to interstate commerce.436  Recently, however, in United States v. 
Morrison437 and United States v. Lopez,438 the Supreme Court, while 
affirming Congress’s power to regulate intrastate activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce, has made clear that 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause has limits.439  In 
Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act,440 which 
made the possession of a gun on or near school premises a crime.441  
In Morrison, the Court struck down the portion of the Violence 
Against Women Act442 that provided a federal civil remedy for the 
victims of gender-motivated violence.443  In both cases, the Court 
found that the activity Congress sought to regulate was beyond the 
purview of the Commerce Clause because it was non-economic or 
noncommercial in nature and had only an attenuated effect on 
interstate commerce.444 
Morrison and Lopez emphasize that Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause has outer boundaries, and each case serves notice 
that the Supreme Court will not always defer to Congress’s judgments 
on matters of commerce.  These cases do not, however, stand in the 
way of national privilege legislation.  Unlike the regulation of gun 
possession in a school zone or the provision of a civil remedy for 
victims of gender-motivated violence, a national attorney-client 
privilege law regulates—indeed fosters and protects—economic and 
commercial activity, namely, commerce between attorneys and 
clients.  The provision of legal services is usually in exchange for 
compensation; indeed, the nation’s legal industry does a huge 
                                                          
 436. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-11 (citing Supreme Court decisions where the 
Court struck down federal legislation on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its 
power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 
(1995) (listing numerous examples when the Supreme Court has upheld 
congressional acts regulating interstate economic activity where the Court has 
considered the activities to substantially affect interstate commerce); Marina Lao, 
Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1687 
(1998) (discussing an array of “far-reaching” congressional legislation regulating 
intrastate economic activities). 
 437. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 438. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 439. See id. at 559-64, 567-68 (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act); 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-19 (invalidating as unconstitutional certain portions of the 
Violence Against Women Act). 
 440. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990). 
 441. 514 U.S. at 559-64. 
 442. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994). 
 443. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-16. 
 444. Id. at 617; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
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amount of business.445 The attorney-client privilege protects 
communications upon which the industry’s article of commerce—the 
provision of legal services—depends.  Thus, there is little doubt that 
legislation providing for such protection would be aimed directly at 
regulating commercial activity. 
In addition, far from having only an attenuated effect on interstate 
commerce, the regulation of the communications that underlie the 
provision of legal services would have a direct and substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.  The sheer volume of legal commerce has an 
enormous effect on interstate commerce, even if the provision of 
legal services were largely intrastate.446  Yet, as discussed previously,447 
there is a substantial amount of interstate legal activity.448  Nationwide 
legal practices and national litigation continue to grow, and counsel 
often is retained to assist clients with national or regional business 
interests.449 
Moreover, in our modern regulatory regime of varied and complex 
legal rules, businesses and individuals engaged in interstate 
commercial activity must resort constantly to attorneys for legal 
services.  Indeed, the smooth functioning of interstate commercial 
activity depends on attorneys and their continuous and sound advice.  
It is precisely because of the nexus between attorneys and the 
                                                          
 445. In the year 2000, the gross domestic product for the private legal services 
industry was $133.5 billion.  BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
TABLE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY IN CURRENT DOLLARS: 1987-93 AND 1994-
2000, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gpoc.htm (Oct. 31, 2001).  The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics estimates that, in the year 2000, 890,910 persons were employed in 
the legal services industry.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS “LATEST NUMBER,” (2000), 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
 446. See Note, Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ 
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1555-56 (1994) [hereinafter Lawyers’ Responses] 
(arguing that it is common for attorneys to hold themselves out as specialists in such 
high impact areas as banking or securities—areas which can have “significant and 
widespread economic impact on the public”); see also supra note 445 and 
accompanying text.  
 447. See supra note 417 and accompanying text (explaining that businesses have 
become more national in scope). 
 448. The interstate nature of legal services distinguishes the attorney-client 
privilege from most other testimonial privileges.  For example, Congress probably 
could not federalize, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, the spousal and priest-
penitent privileges because the communications these privileges protect do not 
substantially affect interstate commerce, nor are such communications generally tied 
to economic activity. 
 449. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 801 (stating that the national bar has grown 
exponentially since the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 501); Goldhaber, 
supra note 370 (discussing growing nationalization and increased commercial spread 
of the country’s biggest law firms); Lawyers’ Responses, supra note 446, at 1555 (calling 
multi-jurisdictional law firms and attorneys practicing in more than one jurisdiction 
“common features of the profession”). 
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interstate activity of their clients that a uniform, national privilege law 
is needed: attorneys provide legal services to clients engaged in 
business activities that may subject them to suit in different fora with 
conflicting privilege rules.450  These conflicting rules not only burden 
interstate commerce by inflicting transaction costs for those engaged 
in interstate business activities, but these rules also threaten to 
discourage communications that facilitate the legal services on which 
these activities depend. 
Of course, the provision of legal services is not exclusively 
commercial.451  Yet nothing in Morrison, Lopez, or the Supreme Court’s 
earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence requires that the activity 
Congress seeks to regulate be exclusively economic or commercial in 
nature—provided the activity is not truly noneconomic in nature.452  
The Court rejected the arguments in both Morrison and Lopez that the 
activities regulated had, in the aggregate, a substantial impact on 
interstate commerce because of the tenuousness of the relationship 
between the wholly noneconomic activity at issue and interstate 
commerce.453  Similarly, while both decisions mention the lack of a 
jurisdictional element in the legislation limiting the reach of the 
                                                          
 450. See supra note 368 and accompanying text (objecting to the creation of a 
uniform privilege rule). 
 451. For example, the attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in nature rather 
than merely contractual.  See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE §§ 14.1-14.2 (4th ed. 1995 & Supp. 1998) (explaining that the basic 
fiduciary duties of an attorney to a client are acknowledged by every American 
jurisdiction); see also Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in 
Legal Malpractice: Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 
33, 53 (stating that, even if no contractual engagement has been established, the 
attorney still owes a fiduciary duty to the client).  There are circumstances in which 
the provision of legal services is not for economic compensation; the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees the right to counsel—and hence mandates the provision of 
legal services—in criminal matters, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and, even while serving 
their clients, attorneys owe duties to the legal system and serve as officers of the 
court.   See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.3 (2002) (discussing a lawyer’s 
candor toward the tribunal); see generally Eugene R. Gaetke, Laywers as Officers of the 
Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989).  Also, in individual instances, legal services may be 
entirely intrastate in nature. 
 452. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that gender-motivated violence is not 
economic activity); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (stating that the Gun Free School Zones 
Act simply does not regulate commerce).  Yet, the Court affirmed previous 
precedents that had established broad congressional authority to regulate classes of 
activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce even if such activities were 
wholly intrastate or had little economic impact.  See id. at 557-61 (citing the ability to 
regulate local farming, wages of lumber workers, and local motels because of a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 453. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.  In Morrison in particular, 
the Court described how, given the tenuous relationship between gender-motivated 
violent criminal conduct and its purported effects on the national economy, the 
same sweeping arguments could be used to justify regulation of anything—including, 
for example, family law, since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and 
childrearing on the national economy is significant.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16. 
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regulation to activities tied to interstate commerce, the Court never 
stated that such an element is required nor that legislation cannot 
reach purely intrastate activity.454  Thus, the Court did not overturn 
longstanding precedent establishing that legislation under the 
Commerce Clause can reach instances in which the activity is 
noncommercial in nature or wholly intrastate as long as the class of 
activities regulated exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
or the national economy.455  National privilege legislation therefore 
would be a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power even though it 
would reach instances of noncommercial and wholly intrastate 
activity, because it would regulate a class of activities that is largely 
commercial and exerts both a direct and substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.456 
Finally, although both Morrison and Lopez make reference to areas 
of traditional state regulation, both opinions do so in the context of 
striking down congressional acts that regulated noneconomic activity 
with attenuated effects on interstate commerce.457  As to congressional 
                                                          
 454. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. 
 455. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (favorably referring to substantial effect 
precedent) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-61 (discussing and 
upholding a variety of decisions recognizing the expansive authority of Congress over 
classes of activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if entirely 
intrastate or having little economic effect).  See generally Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146, 154-56 (1971) (looking to the class of activities as a whole and determining 
that, if the collective effect of the class on interstate commerce is substantial, a law 
governing such activity is constitutional when applied to all within the class); 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968) (stating that, where statutory 
scheme substantially relates to commerce, the de minimis character of individual 
instances arising under the statute is inconsequential); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111, 125 (1942) (stating that even local activity not commonly regarded as commerce 
may be reached by Congress if the activity exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce). 
 456. Wholly intrastate or pro bono legal services have an impact on the rendering 
of legal services as a whole and, hence, commerce, just as the consumption of home 
grown and consumed wheat in Wickard had an impact on interstate commerce in 
wheat.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (characterizing the Wickard rationale as a regulation 
of intrastate activity that resultingly affected interstate commerce) (citing Wickard, 
317 U.S. at 128). 
 457. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (rejecting the notion that Congress can 
regulate violent criminal conduct based on the assumption that the conduct’s 
aggregate effect will impact interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (concluding 
that the possession of a gun within a designated school zone is not an economic 
activity that in the aggregate will affect interstate commerce).  In Morrison, for 
example, the Court stated as follows: 
[T]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and 
what is truly local.  In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the few 
principles that has been consistent since the [Commerce] Clause was 
adopted.  The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not 
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate 
commerce has always been the province of the States. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18. 
GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002  1:29 PM 
162 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:59 
regulation of economic activity, the Court was clear: “Where 
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”458  Thus, while the attorney-
client privilege—and the legal profession more generally—has been 
largely, but not exclusively, regulated by the states, congressional 
legislation regulating the privilege would be valid because it would 
regulate economic activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.459  Indeed, as this Article hopefully demonstrates, the 
problems with the privilege that the legislation would address are 
truly national in character. 
b. The Tenth Amendment and the values of federalism 
This legislation likewise would not offend the Tenth Amendment 
or the values of federalism it serves.460  In several recent cases, the 
Supreme Court has sought to delineate when congressional 
enactments, purportedly pursuant to Congress’s enumerated powers, 
in fact exceed these powers and invade the province of state 
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.461  For example, in 
New York v. United States,462 the Court struck down a portion of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act463 as exceeding 
Congress’s power because the Act left states in a position where they 
either were “commandeered” into the service of federal regulatory 
purposes, or were required to implement legislation enacted by 
Congress.464  Similarly, in Printz v. United States,465 the Court invalidated 
                                                          
 458. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560). 
 459. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (analyzing the 
changing nature of the economy and asserting that activities once thought to be 
purely local now have a substantial effect on the national economy and, therefore, 
fall under the Commerce Clause); see also Dudley, supra note 273, at 1832-36 
(discussing the growing federal interest in regulating the attorney-client privilege 
because of the growth of federal litigation and federal regulation in various fields 
and suggesting that the implication is that federal privileges should apply 
preemptively even in state court when the dispute involves federally regulated 
activity). 
 460. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
 461. See infra notes 462-71 and accompanying text.  See generally Erwin 
Chemerinksy, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001) (discussing historical 
and contemporary trends in the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
 462. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 463. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1994) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 
Stat. 1842).  
 464. New York, 505 U.S. at 175 (striking the portion of the Act that gave state 
governments the choice of either taking title to radioactive waste and assuming 
liability of generators’ damages, or regulating the disposal of waste according to 
Congress’s instructions).  The Court found this choice unconstitutional, since both 
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a provision in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act466 
requiring state officers—namely, “chief law enforcement officer[s]” 
of local state jurisdictions—to conduct background checks on 
prospective purchasers of handguns because the legislation 
compelled states and state executive officials to administer a federal 
regulatory program.467 
More recently, however, in Reno v. Condon,468 the Court upheld the 
portion of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act469 (“DPPA”) that 
restricts the states’ ability to disclose a driver’s personal information 
without the driver’s consent.470  Distinguishing New York and Printz, 
the Condon Court concluded that the regulatory scheme of the DPPA 
is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power that does 
not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment because it neither requires 
states to enact laws or legislation, nor commands state executive 
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal law regulating private 
individuals.471 
The New York and Printz decisions—both internally and now in 
light of Condon—do not call into question the validity of the privilege 
legislation I propose.  To the extent that parties assert the federal 
privilege right in state court, the limitations on commandeering state 
officials articulated in New York and Printz do not apply.  Indeed, in 
both decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that state judicial 
officers must enforce federal law.472  For example, in New York, the 
Court distinguished earlier cases involving enforcement of federal 
laws in state courts: 
These cases involve no more than an application of the Supremacy 
Clause’s provision that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land,” enforceable in every State.  More to the point, all involve 
congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional 
requirements that states regulate.  Federal statutes enforceable in 
                                                          
options went beyond Congress’s power to regulate, and both options commandeered 
state officials into serving federal regulatory purposes.  Id. 
 465. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 466. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (2000) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536).  
 467. Printz, 521 U.S. at 924-25. 
 468. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 469. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 30, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994). 
 470. Condon, 528 U.S. at 150-51. 
 471. See id. (finding also that drivers’ information, which historically has been sold 
in commerce, is in fact an article of commerce sufficient to support federal 
regulation). 
 472. See infra notes 473-76 and accompanying text.  See generally Bellia, supra note 
429, at 956-57 (discussing recent trends in federal control over state courts and their 
enforcement of federal law and procedure). 
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state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but 
this sort of federal “direction” of state judges is mandated by the 
text of the Supremacy Clause.473 
In Printz, the Court offered a similar assessment, stating that “the 
Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an 
obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as 
those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for judicial 
power.”474  The Court noted that this notion comes directly from the 
“Judges Clause” portion of the Supremacy Clause,475 which provides 
that “the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law].”476 
Since New York and Printz, some scholars have questioned whether 
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause or otherwise 
to require state judges to conform to federal regulatory mandates in 
all circumstances.477  This is particularly true in the wake of The Y2K 
Act of 1999,478 in which Congress sought to require state courts to 
change the mode or manner in which they adjudicate state-law claims 
arising from the “Y2K bug.”479  For example, in a recent article, 
Professor Bellia argues that, while state courts must enforce federal 
rights of action and defenses, and “procedural” rules that are “part 
and parcel” of those federal rights, Congress has no authority to 
prescribe procedural rules for state courts to follow in adjudicating 
state-law claims.480 
I agree with Professor Bellia that there may be limits on Congress’s 
authority to prescribe procedural rules for state courts to follow, 
unhinged from any federal substantive right or defense.  I do not 
believe, however, that my proposal to federalize privilege runs afoul 
of any such limitation.  Although the privilege has been mislabeled 
variously in the past as merely procedural, evidentiary, or testimonial, 
                                                          
 473. New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79. 
 474. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
 477. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 429, at 964 (explaining the circumstances under 
which the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate state court proceedings); 
Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 
44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1999) (discussing a number of proposed federal regulatory 
regimes that would impose procedural rules on state courts). 
 478. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (2001). 
 479. For example, the Y2K Act prescribed notice and pleading requirements for 
civil actions arising out of computer failures associated with the inability to read dates 
after December 31, 1999.  These notice and pleading requirements would apply not 
only to federal claims or claims brought in federal court, but also to state-law claims 
brought in state court.  Id. § 6601; see also Bellia, supra note 429, at 953-55 (discussing 
the Act’s provisions). 
 480. See Bellia, supra note 429, at 974-85 (analyzing the interpretations of relevant 
cases regarding conflicts between state and federal laws and their impact on state 
court proceedings). 
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for all the reasons discussed earlier, the modern privilege is a 
doctrine embodying substantive protections.481  Unlike the provisions 
of the Y2K Act, federal privilege legislation would not simply regulate 
the mode and manner in which state-law claims are adjudicated.  
Rather, the privilege regulates, indeed protects and promotes, 
primary conduct and commercial activity—attorney-client 
communications and the provision of legal services—and serves 
interests wholly extrinsic to the litigation in which it is asserted.482  
The substantive character of privileges is one of the key reasons why 
Article V of the Proposed Rules of Evidence failed, why Congress 
adopted Rule 501 instead, and why Congress has exempted privileges 
from the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority.483  Thus, whether 
called a “right,” an “immunity,” or a “defense” to compulsory 
disclosure, the federal privilege protection I propose is substantive in 
nature. 
Congress has the authority to create substantive rights or defenses 
that preempt contrary state regulations and which are applicable in 
state courts even in the absence of a corresponding federal cause of 
                                                          
 481. See supra notes 119-26, 394-401 and accompanying text. 
 482. See Dudley, supra note 273, at 1801-02 (discussing the substantive nature of 
privilege rules and the substantive ends that they serve); Margaret G. Stewart, 
Federalism and Supremacy: Control of State Decision-Making, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 432 
(1992) (“In other words, laws that tell you what promises you must keep, what degree 
of care you must exercise toward others, and what lies you must not tell, all regulate 
your daily conduct and are ‘substantive.’”); Weinstein, supra note 119, at 373 
(discussing the substantive impact of privilege rules and the extrinsic interests they 
serve). 
Similarly, the attorney-client privilege is distinguishable from other rules of 
evidence that simply regulate the character of proof in judicial proceedings.  A 
leading evidence treatise draws this distinction nicely, first explaining as follows: 
Most evidence law is . . . essentially dissociated from substantive policies, for 
it does not seek to protect any particular social value outside the immediate 
context of the conduct of litigation, nor even to insure that a particular 
kind of claim will be made relatively easier or more difficult to pursue or 
defend. 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 175, at 263.  Privileges, however, do not 
exist primarily to aid in ascertaining the facts or preserving efficiency.  See id. 
(discussing the need to reconcile federal law of privileges with Erie).  Rather,  
privilege law seeks to implement policies which in any given instance are 
likely to be wholly extrinsic both to the litigating process and the fact-
ascertaining policy underlying most evidence law, and extrinsic as well to 
the policies underlying the laws which govern the substantive issues at the 
heart of the lawsuit. 
Id.; Goldberg, supra note 119, at 683-84 (distinguishing privileges from other rules of 
evidence). 
 483. See supra note 482 and accompanying text.  Even if the Supreme Court were 
to accord Congress little deference on the question of what constitutes a substantive 
right, it would be difficult for the Court to ignore the history and commentary—
including the Court’s own—recognizing that the privilege is unlike most procedural 
rules in that it regulates primary conduct and serves exclusively extra-judicial 
interests.  See supra note 400 and accompanying text. 
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action.484  Such federal preemptive rights or defenses need not 
address the substance or merits of the state-law claim to be fully 
enforceable in state court; in other words, a right or defense asserted 
in litigation is not “procedural” in nature simply because it does not 
address the merits of the claims.485  The Federal Arbitration Act486 
(“FAA”), for example, federalizes the right to enforce arbitration 
clauses in written contracts and preempts state law less protective of 
that right.487  Among other things, the Act severely limits judicial 
review of arbitration awards.488  In so doing, however, the Act neither 
creates a corresponding federal right of action nor serves as a defense 
                                                          
 484. Professor Bellia and other scholars do not dispute that, pursuant to the 
Judges Clause, state courts must enforce constitutionally enacted federal defenses to 
state claims, in addition to enforcing federal claims.  See Bellia, supra note 429, at 974-
76 (reviewing the Judges Clause, New York, and Printz, and concluding that state 
courts must enforce valid federal claims or a defense to a state claim). 
 485. After tracing the historical treatment of enforcement of federal law in state 
courts, Professor Bellia argues that federal regulation of state-court procedures 
independent of federally recognized substantive rights exceeds Congress’s authority 
because, under traditional conflict-of-law principles, a forum state, like other 
sovereigns, may apply its own procedural law to all rights of action that it enforces.  
Id. at 988-89.  He therefore concludes that states can exclusively regulate procedure 
when enforcing a cause of action that arises under the laws of another state.  Id. at 
992.  Although he does not define “procedure” in detail, he does state that 
procedure includes remedies and modes of proceeding, unless such remedies or 
modes are part and parcel of federally recognized rights.  Id. at 989. 
Although I find most of Professor Bellia’s analysis convincing, he does not address 
privileges or other similar doctrines, and therefore does not consider the possibility 
of federal substantive rights and protections that do not form the basis for a federal 
claim or a federal defense to the substance or merits of a state claim.  I simply argue 
that federal substantive rights are not limited to federal rights of action or federal 
defenses to the substance or merits of state claims, but also extend to rights 
addressing primary conduct that can be enforced or protected in other ways, such as 
through immunity from compulsory disclosure.  Yet, to the extent Professor Bellia 
would distinguish between “substance” and “procedure” along the lines traditionally 
utilized by courts analyzing conflict-of-law situations, mechanical application of such 
an approach would not work in the privilege context.  Historically, the privilege 
often has been viewed as a court-centered and, hence, evidentiary or procedural 
doctrine.  See discussion supra Part I.A.  For all of the reasons I have discussed, 
however, the modern privilege is not a purely procedural doctrine, despite past 
characterizations.  See supra notes 119-26, 394-401 and accompanying text.  Thus, the 
fact that most courts have defaulted to the privilege law of the forum when facing a 
conflict, see supra Part II.C, should not inform our analysis of whether federal 
regulation of privilege infringes upon state sovereignty. 
 486. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307. 
 487. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (describing the 
FAA’s preemptive effects as unintentional by Congress, where limiting the Act to 
disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction would frustrate the intent of 
Congress that arbitration agreements be placed on the same ground as other 
contracts). 
 488. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (limiting the grounds for judicial vacation of arbitration 
awards); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (stating 
that the FAA necessarily limits judicial review of arbitration awards); Southland Corp., 
465 U.S. at 14-15 (concluding that the FAA’s provisions are applicable in state 
courts). 
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to the substance or merits of underlying state-law claims, which may 
be asserted and prosecuted in the arbitration proceeding.489  Yet the 
Supreme Court has held that the FAA creates substantive protections 
applicable in state courts and represents a proper exercise of 
Congress’s power.490  Similarly, the federal privilege right I propose 
would be neither the basis for a federal claim nor a defense to the 
substance or merits of state-law claims, but, like the FAA, a federal 
privilege would protect federally recognized substantive rights and 
therefore would not intrude upon a sphere of state court sovereignty 
over pure procedure, to the extent one exists.491   
To the extent my proposed federal privilege protection applies to 
administrative and legislative proceedings, it still does not invade the 
province of state sovereignty as delineated in New York, Printz, and 
Condon.  From the outset, it is worth noting that Printz reaffirms 
earlier decisions in which the Court upheld congressional mandates 
requiring state administrative agencies to apply federal law while 
acting in a judicial capacity.492  Thus, to the extent administrators, 
                                                          
 489. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 
(1983) (stating that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law regarding the 
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, but the FAA does not create any 
independent federal question jurisdiction). 
 490. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11-12; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 
n.32. 
 491. Indeed, because privilege law is truly independent of the merits of a claim, 
congressional privilege law does not create the kinds of dangers to the values of 
federalism that Professor Bellia and others fear.  See Bellia, supra note 429, at 996-97 
(expressing concern that federal regulation of state court procedure might 
federalize tort law without even allowing public recognition or consideration).  One 
of the concerns commentators have raised about the Y2K Act and other proposed 
tort reforms is that Congress will covertly or slyly federalize tort law by modifying, for 
example, pleading standards or burdens of proof.  See id. (suggesting that 
federalizing state court procedures in technical and obscure manners is a way for the 
federal government to preempt state tort law) (quoting Parmet, supra note 477, at 
65).  Because the federal privilege right that I propose is universal and wholly 
independent of the underlying claims and defenses, it has no such covert effects. 
If my proposed legislation required state courts to order disclosure or admission 
of attorney-client communications not protected by the legislation, there would be a 
better argument that the legislation would require states to adopt certain procedures 
detached from a federal substantive right.  But I only propose that Congress enact 
protective legislation, establishing a single, uniform immunity from disclosure of 
protected attorney-client communications.  If this federal protection is inapplicable 
in a given instance, state courts obviously are free to refuse to compel disclosure or 
admit the communications on other grounds, such as, for example, protection of 
work product, or avoidance of unfair prejudice.  Moreover, while I would 
recommend that states simply adhere to the federally mandated privilege protection, 
they could provide more protection, if they so chose. 
 492. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 & n.14 (1997) (upholding Testa v. 
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)).  In fact, the 
Printz Court stated that, when states transfer some adjudicatory functions to 
administrative agencies, Congress can also, either explicitly or implicitly, prescribe 
that such adjudication must account for federal law.  Id. 
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administrative law judges, commissioners, or other state executives 
serve in a judicial capacity, Congress can require them to apply 
federal law in their adjudicative proceedings. 
Yet, even in nonadjudicative contexts, the federal privilege right 
does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment because the federal 
privilege neither requires states to enact legislation nor 
commandeers state executive officials to assist in the enforcement of 
federal law.  Like the DPPA found constitutional in Condon, the 
privilege legislation would be self-executing, requiring no state 
legislative enactment of laws or regulations.  Similarly, the privilege 
legislation would not require state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal law regulating private individuals.493  My 
proposed privilege legislation simply prohibits state officials from 
compelling parties to reveal protected attorney-client 
communications.  Although this prohibition may require some effort 
on the part of state officials to comply with congressional mandates—
including determining the scope of the protection—such efforts do 
not offend the Constitution.  As the Court indicated in Condon, since 
regulation demands compliance, action required for compliance is 
an inevitable and commonplace consequence of regulated state 
activity.494  The legislation therefore validly extends to state 
administrative and legislative proceedings, whether adjudicative or 
not. 
Finally, while federal privilege legislation survives scrutiny under 
New York, Printz, and Condon because it commandeers neither state 
legislatures nor state executive officials, it also does not offend the 
values of federalism the Court emphasized in these and other “new 
federalism” cases.  The value of federalism cherished most 
prominently in New York and Printz is political accountability.495  In 
New York, for example, the Court scolded Congress for acting in 
stealth, which ultimately reduces the accountability of both federal 
and state officials: 
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that 
making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their 
best interest, they may elect state officials who share their view.  
                                                          
 493. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (finding that the DPPA 
regulates states as database owners, and does not require the state legislatures to 
enact any laws nor require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal 
statutes). 
 494. See id. at 150 (finding no constitutional defect when a state, wishing to engage 
in certain federally regulated activities, takes legislative action to comply with federal 
standards) (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)). 
 495. See infra notes 496-97 and accompanying text. 
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That view can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if 
it is contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal 
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and 
it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the 
decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.  But where the 
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state 
officials who bear the brunt of public disapproval, while federal 
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision.  Accountability is 
thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state 
officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local 
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.496 
Similarly, in Printz, the Court criticized Congress for forcing state 
officials to bear the costs and blame for implementing a federal 
regulatory program.497 
The federal privilege legislation I propose enhances rather than 
diminishes political accountability.  As preemptive, generally 
applicable legislation, my proposal applies equally to state and federal 
judicial and nonjudicial proceedings, and federal courts ultimately 
will have the final say on matters of interpretation.  Thus, unlike the 
regulatory regimes that the Court faulted in New York and Printz, 
Congress is not delegating the dirty or unpopular work of fashioning 
and implementing a regulatory scheme to state officials.498  Up to this 
point, both the federal and state governments have left privilege 
policy making largely in the hands of the judiciary, their least 
politically accountable branch.  My proposal would bring the policy 
debate out of the shadows of the common law and into the full light 
of legislative discourse, where, for the reasons discussed earlier, the 
debate belongs.499  There is no stealth here: once Congress enacts this 
legislation, Congress alone would be accountable for the policy 
choices contained in the legislation, and would not be able to avoid 
responsibility for the law’s successes or failures. 
                                                          
 496. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992). 
 497. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30. 
 498. Although the difficult task of actually applying privilege doctrine will fall 
largely on judges, administrative law judges, arbitrators, and other decision makers, 
this will be the case whether or not Congress enacts the legislation that I have 
proposed.  In fact, if Congress were to enact the proposed legislation, Congress 
would ease the burden of state decision makers by explicitly supplying the legal 
doctrine to be applied.  Moreover, absent exclusive federal jurisdiction, any federal 
enactment will impose the burdens of compliance on state officials, and application 
on state judges.  See Condon, 528 U.S. at 151 (explaining that federal regulatory 
statute frees state legislature from need to enact laws and regulations). 
 499. See supra Part III.B. 
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Similarly, both New York and Printz make clear that the prerogative 
of the central government in a system of dual sovereigns is to regulate 
individuals, not other governments.500  Thus, Congress—pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause and other enumerated powers—is to exercise 
its legislative authority directly over individuals, not through states.501  
Consistent with this principle, federal privilege legislation regulates, 
protects, and promotes commerce between attorneys and clients 
directly by shielding attorney-client communications from compelled 
disclosure by anyone, including judges and other officials. 
A further value inherent in the concepts of “dual sovereignty” and 
limited central government is that of decentralization and sharing of 
governmental control.502  For example, a balance of power between 
governments reduces the risk of abuse of power.503  In addition, 
decentralization allows for greater experimentation and local 
variations to fit local needs.504  Dual sovereignty also recognizes, 
however, that this value has its limits, and, in fact, that there is also 
value in centralization.505  The Commerce Clause itself was intended 
to address the failure of the Articles of Confederation to regulate 
commerce crossing sovereign boundaries.506  The balance between 
these values is not static: the value of local experimentation and 
variation subsides when it begins to have a harmful or burdensome 
effect on the nation as a whole.507  For this reason, the Court 
acknowledged in Lopez, Morrison, and New York that the scope of 
Congress’s authority to regulate has changed appropriately over time 
to fit changing circumstances.508  Indeed, “activities once considered 
                                                          
 500. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20 (stating that the Framers designed a system in 
which the federal and state governments would exercise concurrent authority, rather 
than the federal government acting through the states); New York, 505 U.S. at 166 
(noting that the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate 
individuals, not states). 
 501. New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (stating that “the Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the states to govern 
according to Congress’ instructions.”). 
 502. See infra notes 500-06 and accompanying text. 
 503. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921. 
 504. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 429, at 999-1000 (arguing that federalism “serves 
the diverse needs of a heterogenous society and promotes experimentation with 
different programs”). 
 505. See infra notes 506-07. 
 506. See New York, 505 U.S. at 158 (“The defect of power in the existing 
confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members [has] been 
clearly pointed out by experience.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 267 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 507. See id. at 157 (noting that today’s federal government undertakes activities 
beyond the imagination of the Framers because our constitutional framework has 
been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to permit enormous changes in 
the nature of government). 
 508. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-08 (2000); United States v. 
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purely local have come to have effects on the national economy, and 
have accordingly come within the scope of Congress’s commercial 
power.”509 
These lessons apply in the attorney-client privilege context.  Earlier 
in the nation’s history, local development of, and variations in, 
privilege law made sense, particularly given the difficulty in balancing 
the interests at stake.  But that time has now passed.  As the nation’s 
economy, regulatory structure, and litigation practices have changed, 
the role of legal services and, correspondingly, the privilege, also 
have changed.  While perhaps once provincial in character, the 
privilege now has obvious national implications, and the balance of 
interests informing privilege doctrine and application is now 
necessarily a matter of national concern. 
CONCLUSION 
Two things about the attorney-client privilege are certain: it is here 
to stay despite lingering controversy, and it will continue to inflict 
substantial costs.  The challenge then, is how to maximize the 
potential benefits of the privilege while minimizing its costs.  The 
current regime is ill-equipped to meet this challenge.  Today’s 
common-law approach to developing privilege doctrine has failed to 
achieve reasonably certain privilege protections.  Indeed, privilege 
doctrine is in disarray.  The conflicts between, and confusion within, 
jurisdictions around the country not only burden courts, clients, and 
attorneys with additional transaction costs, but also create sufficient 
uncertainty to defeat the very purposes that the privilege is supposed 
to serve.  Other proposed reforms seek to address aspects of this 
uncertainty, but fail to offer an adequately comprehensive solution. 
Federalizing privilege is the answer.  To achieve reasonable 
certainty, we must abandon our multi-jurisdictional, common-law 
approach in favor of a national, codified solution.  That leads 
inevitably to Congress.  Congress has the capacity and power to enact 
legislation that provides clear, unqualified, and generally applicable 
privilege protections.  If and when privilege reformers capture 
Congress’s attention, Congress should craft this type of legislation, 
rather than settle for lesser reforms. 
 
                                                          
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); New York, 505 U.S. at 158. 
 509. New York, 505 U.S. at 158. 
